UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-EIGHTH YEAR

2447th MEETING: 27 MAY 1983

NEW YORK

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NOTE

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2447th MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 27 May 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. M. KAMANDA wa KAMANDA (Zaire).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2447)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Namibia:
   Letter dated 12 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15760);
   Letter dated 13 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15761)

The meeting was called to order at 12 noon.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Namibia:
Letter dated 12 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15760);
Letter dated 13 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15761)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2439th meeting, I invite the representative of Mauritius to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Maudave (Mauritius) took a place at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2439th meeting, I invite the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the other members of the delegation of the Council to take places at the Security Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Lusaka (President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took places at the Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2439th meeting, I invite Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Nujoma took a place at the Council table.

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with decisions taken at previous meetings on this item [*2439th to 2444th and 2446th meetings*], I invite the representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, the Gambia, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Liberia, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, the Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Qatar, Romania, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Upper Volta, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia and Zambia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Zarif (Afghanistan), Mr. Hadj Azzout (Algeria), Mr. de Figueiredo (Angola), Mr. Muñiz (Argentina), Mr. Joseph (Australia), Mr. Hashim (Bangladesh), Mr. Moseley (Barbados), Mr. Adjibade (Benin), Mr. Legwaila (Botswana), Mr. Tsvetkov (Bulgaria), Mr. Pelletier (Canada), Mr. Trucco (Chile), Mr. Malmierca (Cuba), Mr. Moushoutas (Cyprus), Mr. Suja (Czechoslovakia), Mr. Al-Ashtal (Democratic Yemen), Mr. Khalil (Egypt), Mr. Ibrahim (Ethiopia), Mr. Davin (Gabon), Mr. Blain (Gambia), Mr. Ott (German Democratic Republic), Mr. van Well (Federal Republic of Germany), Mr. Kaba (Guinea), Mr. Rácz (Hungary), Mr. Rao (India), Mr. Kusumaatmadja (Indonesia), Mr. Shearer (Jamaica), Mr. Kuroda (Japan), Mr. Wabuge (Kenya), Mr. Abulhassan (Kuwait), Mrs. Jones (Liberia), Mr. Burwin (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Mr. Traore (Mali), Mr. Marin Bosch (Mexico), Mr. Erdenechuluun (Mongolia), Mr. Mrani Zentar (Morocco), Mr. Chissano (Mozambique), Mr. Oumarou (Niger), Mr. Bolokor (Nigeria), Mr. Cabrera (Panama), Mr. Jamal (Qatar), Mr. Marinescu (Romania), Mr. Niasse (Senegal), *Ms. Gonthier (Seychelles), Mr. Stevens (Sierra Leone), Mr. Adan (Somalia), Mr. von Schirnding (South Africa), Mr. Fonseka (Sri Lanka), Mr. El-Fattal (Syrian Arab Republic), Mr. Slim (Tunisia), Mr. Kirca (Turkey), Mr. Owiny (Uganda), Mr. Salim (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. Bassole (Upper Volta), Mr. Martini Urdaneta (Venezuela), Mr. Le Kim Chung (Viet Nam), Mr. Mojsov (Yugoslavia) and Mr. Goma (Zambia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.*

5. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Malaysia in which he requests to be invited to take part in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite him to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Tan Sri Zainal Abidin (Malaysia) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.

6. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received a letter dated 26 May from the representatives of Togo, Zaire and Zimbabwe [*S/15799*], which reads as follows:

> "We, the undersigned members of the Security Council, have the honour to request that the Security Council extend an invitation, under the provisions of rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure, to Mr. Johnstone F. Makatini, representative of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) to participate in the Council's consideration of the item entitled 'The situation in Namibia'."

7. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Council agrees to this request.

It was so decided.

8. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should also like to inform the members of the Council that I have received a letter dated 26 May from the representatives of Togo, Zaire and Zimbabwe [*S/15800*], which reads as follows:

> "We, the undersigned members of the Security Council, have the honour to request that the Security Council extend an invitation, under the provisions of rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure, to Mr. Lesaoana S. Makhanda, representative of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), to participate in the Council's consideration of the item entitled 'The situation in Namibia'."

9. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Council agrees to this request.

It was so decided.

10. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): Members of the Council have before them document S/15795, which contained the text of a letter dated 26 May 1983 from the representative of Panama addressed to the President of the Council [*S/15795*].

11. The first speaker is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, Mr. Yaqub-Khan, whom I warmly welcome.

12. Mr. YAQUB-KHAN (Pakistan): Mr. President, it gives me great pleasure to have the opportunity of addressing the Council while you are presiding over it. Our two countries have a long tradition of friendly and co-operative relationships which we deeply cherish.

13. I feel confident that with the benefit of your widely acknowledged qualities of statesmanship and diplomatic skill, the Council will be able to take important decisions to ensure earlier independence for Namibia. Let me avail myself of this opportunity to express our appreciation also to Mr. Umba di Lutete who guided the work of the Council earlier during this month with great distinction and success. At the same time, I wish to pay a warm tribute to Mrs. Jeane Kirkpatrick for her valuable contribution to the work of the Council during her presidency last month.

14. I am participating in this important debate in compliance with the mandate entrusted to me and to several of my other colleagues by the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi from 7 to 12 March 1983. I also do so in order to give expression to the abiding commitment of the people and the Government of Pakistan to the cause of Namibian independence. Being a country which has experienced the sufferings of colonial subjugation, Pakistan is dedicated to the cause of decolonization and the struggle of peoples for self-determination and independence. It is, therefore, a matter of pride for us to be able to make a contribution to the advancement of the cause of Namibian independence. We are willing to make every endeavour within the limits of our capacity and our resources to bring this noble objective closer to realization.

15. I should like to take this opportunity to pay a richly deserved tribute to SWAPO, which, under the leadership of Mr. Sam Nujoma, has brilliantly led the people of Namibia in their heroic struggle for the liberation of their country. Their struggle is just and its triumph inevitable.

16. The United Nations assumed direct responsibility for the independence of Namibia when the General Assembly terminated South Africa's Mandate over the Territory in 1966 [*resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966*]. Soon after, the Council became involved with the process of Namibian independence and in March 1969 adopted resolution 264 (1969) which recognized the termination of South Africa's Mandate, described the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia as illegal,

and called upon the Pretoria régime to withdraw immediately its administration from Namibia. In the following years, the Council, while firmly maintaining that South Africa's administration of Namibia was illegal, rejected all attempts by South Africa to alter the status of the Territory or to impose on it a settlement of its choosing or to call in question Namibia's unity and territorial integrity.

17. The endeavours of the Council to promote the independence of Namibia further matured in its resolution 385 (1976) which demanded that South Africa withdraw its illegal administration from the Territory and transfer power to the Namibian people and called for free elections in Namibia under the supervision and control of the United Nations. On the basis of this resolution, the then five Western members of the Council worked out a proposal for the peaceful settlement of the situation in Namibia [*S/12636*]. Subsequently, the Council endorsed this settlement plan in its resolution 435 (1978), which was accepted both by South Africa and by SWAPO. The resolution also envisaged the establishment of a United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) for Namibia.

18. The settlement plan embodied in resolution 435 (1978) enjoyed universal acceptance and raised hopes for an early solution of the Namibian question that would bring to a close the dark chapter of colonial subjugation. Regrettably, these hopes proved to be ephemeral.

19. Soon after the adoption of the plan, South Africa resorted to deceitful manoeuvres aimed at frustrating its implementation. The real intentions of the Pretoria régime became starkly evident at the pre-implementation meetings held at Geneva in January 1981 where South Africa refused to discuss a date for the implementation of the settlement plan and accused the United Nations of partiality. Thereafter, it raised unwarranted demands relating to constitutional arrangements and electoral procedures clearly designed to impede the process of independence of Namibia.

20. The Pretoria régime further stepped up its unreasonable demands by linking the progress on Namibian independence to the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. It is not difficult to recognize this entirely irrelevant condition for what is: a transparent machination devised to prolong South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia and to delay the independence of the Territory.

21. The Pretoria régime has been deservedly ostracized by the international community as a lawless entity which has imposed the inhuman *apartheid* system in South Africa and is determined to maintain its colonial stranglehold over Namibia in order to continue its plunder of the Territory's rich natural resources and its policy of aggressive militarism against the neighbouring front-line States.

22. As the fate of the United Nations settlement plan continues to hang in the balance, South Africa has intensified its ruthless repression of the Namibian people and the economic exploitation of their land. At the same time, it has escalated acts of armed aggression and destabilization against the neighbouring States. Lesotho and Mozambique have been the latest targets of Pretoria's wanton raids in which scores of innocent people were massacred and valuable property destroyed.

23. The question arises why a régime, universally condemned for its inhuman policies and practices, continues to defy the will of the international community. The answer to this question lies in South Africa's insolent reliance on the good will and tolerance of some of the members of the Western contact group who have openly acquiesced in Pretoria's intransigence and obstructionist attitude towards Namibia's independence. The protection available to South Africa, such as demonstrated by the triple veto exercised to prevent mandatory sanctions against it when the Council met in April 1981, has emboldened South Africa to continue its occupation of Namibia and its aggression against the African States. Yet another factor that has compounded South Africa's arrogance is its growing military strength, which has become the principal vehicle of its terrorism and aggression in the region.

24. The concern of the States Members of the United Nations over the delay in Namibia's independence, their indignation at South Africa's intransigence and their dissatisfaction with the lack of progress in the implementation of the United Nations settlement plan has been repeatedly expressed with clarity and with firmness in the United Nations. The position was reaffirmed by the Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries at New Delhi last March. These countries have consistently maintained the following.

25. First, the only basis for negotiation for the solution of the Namibian question is the settlement plan approved in Council resolution 435 (1978). This plan must be implemented without delay.

26. Secondly, the Namibian question is a question of decolonization. It must not be linked with any aspect of East-West confrontation, specifically, the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, which is an entirely extraneous issue. We appreciate the position taken by France in this regard and have also noted that the statement made in the Council by the representative of the United Kingdom on behalf of the Western contact group [*2439th meeting*] refrained from raising this question.

27. Thirdly, stepped-up aggression by South Africa is a clear proof of unwillingness to abandon its illegal hold on Namibia. Determined action rather than a policy of appeasement is the appropriate prescription for the settlement of the Namibian question. This was the conclusion reached at the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held in Paris in April.[1]

28. Even if the role of the Western contact group in the evolution of the settlement plan is acknowledged, the ambivalent position taken by some of its members since

the ill-fated pre-implementation meeting of 1981 at Geneva has created doubts about its will and capacity to pursue faithfully the implementation of the plan. The members of the group have manifested excessive deference to South Africa's interests; even outright support for the latter's unreasonable demands has not been lacking. Mr. Nujoma, the President of SWAPO, has strongly maintained that the group has lost contact with the letter and spirit of resolution 435 (1978) and that its recent endeavours appear to be a mere rescue operation for Pretoria.

29. It is a matter of great regret that the Western contact group has not been able to fulfil the expectations which its formation five years ago aroused. We are aware of the complexity of the situation and of the obstacles to be overcome on the path to Namibian independence. We do not believe for a moment, however, that these obstacles are insurmountable. The continuing sterility of the contact group's efforts has caused the erosion of its credibility.

30. In these circumstances, the Council must re-assume its responsibility for the implementation of the settlement plan. Given purposeful co-operation among the Council's members, that implementation should not take long to materialize. The Secretary-General's report [*S/15776*], which has explained the developments in the negotiating process with great clarity, points to the encouraging progress already made in securing a large measure of agreement on modalities to be employed in the implementation of the plan. According to the Secretary-General, as far as the United Nations is concerned, the only outstanding issues are the choice of the electoral system and the settlement of some final problems relating to UNTAG and its composition. Furthermore, SWAPO, the sole authentic representative of the Namibian people, has reaffirmed its readiness to sign a cease-fire agreement and to co-operate with the Secretary-General in order to ensure the smooth and peaceful transition of Namibia to independence. This assurance was reiterated in unequivocal terms by Mr. Nujoma at the 2439th meeting in his important statement before the Council.

31. I wish to take this opportunity to express our deep appreciation to the Secretary-General for his admirable and untiring efforts in the search for a settlement of the Namibian question, which reflect his firm commitment to the cause of Namibian independence. His persistent endeavours, which have served to sustain the hope of the international community for the success of the negotiating process, deserve the highest praise.

32. The Council must now define a time-frame within which the Secretary-General should make contact with the parties concerned in order to finalize the arrangements for Namibia's transition to independence. If efforts to ensure the implementation of the United Nations plan continue to be thwarted by South Africa, it will be only by taking appropriate measures, such as those envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to secure South Africa's compliance with resolution 435 (1978) that the Council will be able to discharge its responsibility towards Namibia.

33. The negotiations on Namibia's independence cannot be allowed to become a protracted process. The struggle for Namibia's independence has entered a decisive phase where firm and meaningful action by the Council can alone bring early success. The persistence of the current impasse would lead only to more bloodshed and to a widening of the conflict, which would entail grave consequences for regional and global peace and security. Any further delay in securing Namibia's independence would deepen the pervasive sense of frustration and mistrust which provides the seed-bed for conflicts and crises afflicting many parts of the world.

34. The participation in these meetings of the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs from a large number of countries of various regions of the world underlines international concern over Namibia's fate and the gravity of the situation created by South Africa's continued stranglehold on the Territory. We hope that the Council will be able to take decisions that will be instrumental in bringing about the early fulfilment of the collective commitment to independence for Namibia.

35. Mr. LIANG Yufan (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): First of all, Sir, allow me to welcome warmly your participating in and presiding over these important meetings of the Council. We all admire the skilful manner in which you have guided our deliberations in the past few days.

36. We have listened carefully to the statements of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of many African and other third-world countries, as well as to those of Mr. Nujoma, the President of SWAPO and other representatives. I wish, in the name of the Chinese delegation, to welcome warmly the participation of the distinguished Ministers for Foreign Affairs and of Mr. Nujoma in the meetings of the Council and to express deep appreciation for their positive and valuable contributions to our deliberations.

37. The Council has resumed its consideration of the situation in Namibia at the request of the African Group and the Non-Aligned Movement. That is entirely necessary. The non-implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978) and the continued stalling of the plan for the independence of Namibia have aroused strong dissatisfaction and indignation among African countries and peoples as well as serious concern in the international community. The Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi, in March [*see S/15675 and Corr. 1 and 2, annex, sect. I, para. 49*] and the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held in Paris in April,[2] both adopted solemn declarations calling on the Council to take vigorous measures to ensure the prompt implementation of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia affirmed in resolution 435 (1978). This justified demand has been reiterated by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and representatives

who have spoken in the past few days, and should by no means be ignored by the Council. There should be no further continuation of the situation in which the Council takes no decision after considering an issue or fails to enforce a decision it has adopted.

38. On the eve of the Council's consideration of the matter, the Secretary-General submitted a further report concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia [*S/15776*]. This is a concise report reflecting the actual situation. The Chinese delegation wishes to join many other delegations in expressing appreciation to the Secretary-General for his great efforts in pressing for the implementation of the United Nations plan.

39. Nearly five years have elapsed since the Council adopted resolution 435 (1978), and yet this solemn resolution is still no more than a piece of paper. Why is that? Evidently, the responsibility does not lie with SWAPO or the front-line African States, which, on the contrary, have made unremitting efforts towards the independence of the plan and whose reasonableness and constructive attitude have been highly appraised by the international community.

40. The crux of the problem lies with the total lack of good faith on the part of the racist régime of South Africa to solve the question of Namibia, and that explains why resolution 435 (1978) remains unimplemented thus far. In the past few years, that régime has resorted to tricks of all kinds, endlessly raising extraneous issues in the course of the negotiations and putting one obstacle after another in the way of the implementation of the resolution. In the meantime, it has stepped up the brutal suppression of the Namibian people's struggle for independence in an attempt to break the armed forces led by SWAPO. On the other hand, it has intensified its efforts to foster puppet forces on behalf of an "internal settlement". It has, moreover, repeatedly launched large-scale military invasions, or carried out sabotage or subversive activities, against neighbouring African States. Even now it is occupying a part of southern Angola.

41. Just a few days ago, the racist régime struck again, and this time it launched a savage air raid on Maputo, the capital of Mozambique, flagrantly violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of that country. This is another serious crime committed by the South African authorities against the African people. The Chinese delegation hereby voices its utmost indignation and strong condemnation of this outrage.

42. The South African authorities have done all this in order to perpetuate their illegal occupation of and colonial rule over Namibia so that they may continue permanently to appropriate and plunder the rich natural resources of the Territory and to oppress and exploit the Namibian people. Hence, the South African authorities are not only the culprits undermining peace and stability in southern Africa but also a menace to world peace and security. As the Secretary-General correctly points out in his report:

> "It is evident that the delay in implementing resolution 435 (1978) is having a destructive impact not only on Namibia itself but also on the prospect of a peaceful and prosperous future for the region as a whole. The delay also has an adverse effect on international relations in a wider sphere, adding to the prevailing sense of frustration and mistrust, with all that that implies for peace and security in the region." [*ibid., para. 16.*]

43. It should be stressed that the South African authorities would not have been so truculent and intransigent had it not been for the connivance and support on the part of a super-Power. That super-Power, in order to maintain its vested interests in the region, embraces the South African authorities as an "ally" and pursues a so-called constructive engagement policy towards it, and prevents the Council from imposing any sanctions on South Africa. Moreover, it has colluded with South Africa by linking Namibian independence with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. This unreasonable linkage has seriously hampered the implementation of the United Nations plan. As the Secretary-General points out in his report, these issues "were neither raised nor envisaged at the time when resolution 435 (1978) was adopted or in the subsequent negotiations under United Nations auspices. These issues now apparently constitute the main reason for the delay in the implementation of the United Nations plan" [*ibid., para. 19*].

44. It is only natural that the linkage has met with severe condemnation from the Namibian people and African nations and with the strong censure of the international community. Even its allies have refused to endorse the linkage.

45. The Chinese delegation supports the position of SWAPO and the front-line African States on this question. We oppose the linkage between Namibian independence and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Independence for Namibia is an inalienable right of the Namibian people; it is a problem of decolonization. It has nothing to do with the question of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The two different issues should not be linked together. As regards the so-called regional security arrangement, it is common knowledge that none of the independent African States adjacent to South Africa constitutes a threat to the security of South Africa. On the contrary, it is South Africa, by its constant invasion and subversion, that is threatening and undermining its neighbours and disrupting the peace and stability of southern Africa. Therefore, the so-called regional security arrangement is nothing more than an ill-concealed device to sustain Pretoria's racist and colonialist rule, and also to preserve its own vested interests. It is our view that the five Western Powers should take a stand conducive to the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), rather than doing anything that smacks of condoning South Africa's stalling tactics.

46. The Chinese Government and people will, as always, firmly support the just struggle of the Namibian people led by SWAPO and that of the African front-line

States and we shall provide them with assistance within the limits of our capability. We are of the view that the Council should fulfil its responsibility by accepting the justified demand voiced by many African and other third-world countries during the meetings of the last few days, and by taking effective measures for the prompt implementation of resolution 435 (1978) so as to speed up Namibian independence. We believe the Council should: first, again strongly condemn the South African authorities for continuing their illegal occupation of Namibia in defiance of United Nations resolutions, and demand that they implement Council resolution 435 (1978) unconditionally; should they continue to procrastinate or obstruct the implementation of the resolution, appropriate actions against them should be considered under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations; secondly, reaffirm resolution 435 (1978) as the sole basis for the settlement of the Namibian question and reject any linkage between Namibian independence and extraneous issues such as the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola; thirdly, authorize the Secretary-General to take effective steps to expedite the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), and request him to report to the Council within a specified time; fourthly, call on the international community to render stronger support and assistance, politically, morally and materially, to SWAPO and the African front-line States.

47. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want progress—this is an irresistible trend of history. Namibia—the largest remaining colony on earth—will one day join the international community as a new independent State. Any attempt to obstruct the decolonization of Namibia is doomed to failure.

48. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is Mr. Bolokor, the Minister of State for External Affairs of Nigeria. I welcome him and invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

49. Mr. BOLOKOR (Nigeria): Let me begin my statement, Sir, by extending to you my warmest congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of May. Given your previous experience as Zaire's Ambassador to the United Nations, before your elevation to the well-deserved position of Minister for Foreign Affairs of Zaire, and the outstanding contribution which you made to the United Nations while serving here, I have absolutely no doubts that you will acquit yourself creditably in your exalted position as President of this most important body. It is also appropriate that these crucial and important meetings of the Council on Namibia should take place under the presidency of an African State Member of the United Nations.

50. I should also like to extend, through you, our gratitude to your colleagues in the Council for affording us this opportunity to participate in the Council's deliberations on this occasion.

51. The objective of these meetings and our mission here is to seek justice and freedom for the long-suffering people of Namibia. The mandate for this mission derives from the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi in March, which decided that, in the light of the prolonged delay in implementing Council resolution 435 (1978), an urgent meeting of the Council was now called for. [*See S/15675 and Corr. 1 and 2, annex, sect. I, para.* 49.] That decision, fully endorsed by over 100 States Members of the United Nations and recently approved at the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held in Paris in April,[2] was taken with all due sense of responsibility. There were two basic reasons for that decision to request an urgent meeting of this Council.

52. First, for nearly two decades now—since both the General Assembly and the Security Council first voted to terminate racist South Africa's Mandate in Namibia—racist South Africa has refused to withdraw from the Territory, in open and arrogant defiance of the United Nations. Throughout this period, every effort to reach a peaceful settlement of the Namibian question has been spurned by the racist régime of South Africa. Racist South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia represents an open challenge to the authority of the Council, which clearly calls for punitive measures.

53. Secondly, in its desperate effort to cling to Namibia, the racist régime of South Africa has plunged the whole of the southern African region into a *de facto* state of war by its increased and irresponsible armed attacks on the neighbouring front-line States. The primary aim of these unprovoked military attacks, which the racist régime of South Africa has sought to justify on grounds of hot pursuit, is simply to intimidate and destabilize those States, in the misguided and mistaken belief that they will abandon their support for Namibia and for its sole authentic and legitimate representative, SWAPO. The southern African region is now embroiled in an undeclared war with very ruinous consequences for the fragile economies of those States.

54. Racist South Africa is clearly in breach of the purposes and principles of the United Nations as enshrined in Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations. Its aggressive and expansionist policies, which are amply demonstrated by the incessant wave of murderous military attacks on its neighbours and the wanton destruction of life and property brought about by those attacks, now require a prompt and effective response from the Council.

55. International peace and security have been gravely endangered by those unprovoked and irresponsible armed attacks by racist South Africa on its neighbours. It is the Council which has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Charter empowers it to act, and failure to do so can only further damage and undermine the authority of the Council and the United Nations system as a whole. Africa expects firm and decisive action from the Council.

56. The tragedy which has for several decades now been unfolding on the world stage is, indeed, a calamity.

First, owing to a fit of absent-mindedness, Namibia was taken from a rapacious German colonial administration and handed over to the Boers of South Africa, whose penchant for brutality is unparalleled in the annals of mankind. Then, at the end of the Second World War, the United Nations—in an equally mistaken and ill-considered manner—extended racist South Africa's Mandate over the Territory at a time when the obnoxious racist doctrine of the Boers had begun to rear its ugly head.

57. Is it any wonder, then, that the Boers—who contributed little or nothing to the war effort, but who were immediately rewarded with the spoils of the war—should immediately extend their abhorrent and inhuman practices to the mandated Territory of Namibia? Equally, is it any wonder that they should proceed to an unprecedented plundering of the natural resources of that Territory? Would we now have to contend with racist South Africa's effrontery and its brazen attempts to hold on to Namibia today, had the Boers been called to order before now? By failing to act to protect the interests of the oppressed people of Namibia and by covertly—and, in some cases, overtly—conniving at racist South Africa's oppressive policies in Namibia, the Western Powers bear a heavy moral responsibility for the untold hardship, suffering and brutality to which the people of Namibia continue to be subjected by the South African racists.

58. Let me recall that, in 1978, the Council adopted resolution 435 (1978) as the basis for Namibia's independence by an overwhelming majority. Racist South Africa also announced its acceptance of the plan publicly. The peace plan embodied in that resolution was the result of prolonged and very difficult negotiations, in which SWAPO made many concessions, often under pressure from African States. There were no corresponding concessions by racist South Africa. Africa nevertheless felt that the overriding factor and consideration must be Namibia's speedy and uninterrupted transition to independence. We believe, as we do today, that resolution 435 (1978) provided an honourable way out of this tragic problem.

59. But what happened at the Geneva pre-implementation meeting in 1981? Racist South Africa reneged on its commitment to the peace plan in a most despicable and treacherous manner.

60. Of course, racist South Africa, in reneging on the Namibia independence plan, did not act alone. In fact, it clearly did so in response to the encouragement and support of the new Administration in Washington which, on assuming office, publicly declared that some aspects of resolution 435 (1978) needed to be renegotiated. Soon after that, friendly visits were exchanged at the official level by Washington and Pretoria, including military exchanges and collaboration. It was soon explained to the world that Washington had taken up a policy that it calls constructive engagement with the racist régime of South Africa, which had already been castigated by the whole of the international community as an outlaw. There is nothing constructive about United States policy in southern Africa, nor is it even an engagement. It is a policy of abject surrender to the international outcasts whose primary objective remains the destruction of the United Nations and of world peace and order.

61. We, in concert with the front-line States and SWAPO, have tried as best we can to co-operate fully with the so-called contact group to resolve all outstanding constitutional and other problems relating to the United Nations plan for Namibian independence on the basis of resolution 435 (1978). Since the Geneva talks, we have for our part discharged fully our obligations as responsible Members of the United Nations in seeking a negotiated and peaceful settlement of the Namibian question. In entering into negotiations with the so-called contact group, we acted in good faith and in the belief that a negotiated settlement is preferable to the bloody conflict in Namibia. At every stage of those delicate and difficult negotiations we were given assurances by the Western group of five that the parameters of those negotiations were the provisions of resolution 435 (1978) and the independence of Namibia. As far as we are concerned, the negotiations have been completed. We are not prepared to enter into any discussion with the contact group on any matters outside the scope of the Namibia independence plan. The contact group, by not publicly repudiating the United States position on linkage, has damaged beyond repair its moral credibility on these matters.

62. In this connection, I should like to commend the Secretary-General for his forthright report in which he states that:

> "In the course of the period under review . . . it became increasingly clear that other issues were becoming a factor in the negotiations on Namibia. These issues, which are outside the scope of resolution 435 (1978), had not been raised or envisaged in previous negotiations on that question." [*S/15776, para. 11.*]

63. This is the crux of the matter: the independence of Namibia is being sacrificed on the altar of mistaken strategic perceptions by the United States. This is a most regrettable and unfortunate position which does nothing to enhance the so-called strategic interests of the United States in Africa. In fact, we reject any notion or idea that any Powers have any strategic interests in Africa which warrant the delay and obstruction of Namibia's independence.

64. Let me repeat what I have said on another occasion on this all-important question. We do not seek confrontation with any Power. We want peace in our continent, but not peace at any price, and we shall never give up the struggle for the liberation of Namibia. Together with the rest of the international community, we in Nigeria will continue to support SWAPO and the people of Namibia fully in their legitimate and just struggle for freedom. Nothing will deter us from this honourable commitment.

65. In conclusion, let me appeal once again to all the members of the Council to act swiftly while there is still time to save Africa and the world from a ghastly war. The Council is fully empowered to act. It is the ultimate

defender of the oppressed, the weak and the enslaved. It is the Council which has primary responsibility for international peace and security. It should act now, for it may be too late tomorrow.

66. Mr. de La BARRE de NANTEUIL (France) (*interpretation from French*): Allow me to say how pleased and honoured we are at seeing you, Sir, presiding over our work during this debate to which my country attaches particular importance.

67. I should also like to welcome the presence in this chamber of many Ministers for Foreign Affairs, especially the Ministers of the front-line countries.

68. My delegation has listened very attentively to their statements. We wish to pay a tribute to their spirit of compromise and to the high ideals expressed in their views.

69. Lastly, I should like to say to the President of SWAPO, Mr. Sam Nujoma, how touched my delegation was by the terms in which he spoke of my country's position on the question of Namibia.

70. This debate is not only important, it is also timely.

71. It is important because the United Nations, and in particular the Security Council, have a special and even a unique responsibility towards Namibia and its people.

72. It is timely because the constructive negotiations that extended from the autumn of 1981 to the autumn of 1982 did not result, as everyone was hoping, in the rapid implementation of the settlement plan. It is therefore legitimate and fortunate that the Council today is taking stock of what has been accomplished and is reflecting on the ways in which it can reinitiate its action and that of the Secretary-General.

73. I shall not refer to the past. Others before me have done so, especially the Secretary-General in his remarkable report [*S/15776*]. My delegation particularly values its lucidity and frankness. We fully endorse the analysis contained in it and all its conclusions.

74. In connection with the present situation, France's position is known to everyone here. It was defined in the clearest way by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Claude Cheysson, one month ago in Paris, at the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence.[3]

75. Our position has not changed since then and will not change. It can be expressed in a few words: Namibia's accession to independence and the implementation of Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978) cannot be impeded by external considerations. Those resolutions, which commit all Members of the United Nations, are complete in themselves. They must be implemented fully, as adopted, without conditions or prerequisites.

76. That is why my delegation can see only advantages in having the Council, at the conclusion of our debate, give the Secretary-General a mandate that would enable him to resume contact with all the parties concerned to ensure the effective implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

77. Looking beyond the near future, we should already be reflecting on the problems that will remain once the United Nations settlement plan is implemented in Namibia. Here I have in mind the security and development of the region, to which the Secretary-General referred in the last paragraphs of his report.

78. In this connection, I should like to refer to the two suggestions made one month ago at the Paris Conference by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, for they directly concern the United Nations and, in particular, in respect of the first suggestion, the Security Council. Mr. Cheysson, referring first of all to the problem of security, said the following:

> "France does not underestimate the legitimate concern of each country of southern Africa to ensure its security. However, we are surprised that there are some who are concerned only with the security of the strongest, richest and best armed State of the region, while we feel that the threat is greatest for the weakest, most disadvantaged and least well-armed countries. . . .
>
> "The desire to ensure the present and future security of each State of the region (I am thinking of Namibia) is legitimate and must be satisfied. . . . for each country, and particularly for Namibia, to decide alone and in full sovereignty what it feels should be done to strengthen and ensure its security. France is prepared to support the actions of the Security Council to ensure strict respect in the area for the rights and commitments of each country, and even to endorse situations which are recognized in the region in so far as one or more countries of that region freely proposes such a step or the Council decides on such a step. This of course cannot be considered in the case of Namibia until the day when, independent and provided with a representative Government, the new State seeks the support of the international community to protect the international status it has freely accorded itself.
>
> "The second disturbing . . . problem of the future which must be considered at the present stage is that of the development of the peoples of southern Africa, who have been most severely affected by the years and decades of disturbances, occupation and war. Significant development assistance has already been provided by France, directly and through the intermediary of the European Community . . .
>
> "This course must be resolutely continued. I therefore suggest that in support of the settlement plan for Namibia, the United Nations should envisage a reconstruction plan covering several years to which the principal donors of aid, States, agencies and institutions,

> would undertake to contribute. This proposal must apply also to the countries most seriously affected by the deplorable and unjust prolongation of the occupation of Namibia; we are thinking in particular of Angola which has not known one day of peace since its independence and has been the object of murderous raids, serious destruction and even partial occupation because its people came out in solidarity with the neighbouring people of Namibia.
>
> "It is appropriate to discuss all these matters at the present stage. The United Nations has a role to play in this consideration and this preparation. However nothing can or should be done without a formal proposal by the country or group of countries concerned. Above all, nothing should delay the settlement in Namibia according to the terms . . . of the Security Council resolution . . ."[4]

79. Bearing in mind the security problems that I have just mentioned, I cannot conclude without referring to the deadly air raid by South Africa against Mozambique. As soon as my Government was informed of that attack it published the following communiqué:

> "France condemns the South African raid against Mozambique. Nothing can justify this aggression against the independent State and friendly Republic of Mozambique. France reaffirms its condemnation of the system of *apartheid*, which, through its violation of human rights engenders a deplorable cycle of violence and reprisals."

80. Today a sinister chain of events seems imminent. Frustrations are mounting. Despair is deepening. More and more lives are being lost. Soon the violence may become widespread. While we are still on the brink, my country makes another solemn appeal, above all, to South Africa: nothing will be resolved by force, either in Namibia or elsewhere. In that Territory and outside it, the time for peace has arrived.

81. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Mongolia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

82. Mr. ERDENECHULUUN (Mongolia) (*interpretation from Russian*): Allow me first, Sir, to congratulate you on assuming the responsible post of President of the Council and to express the conviction of our delegation that your active and wise leadership will promote a constructive discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. I should like to convey the gratitude of my delegation to you and all the other members of the Council for having given us this opportunity to set forth the position of the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic on the question of Namibia.

83. Seventeen years have passed since the United Nations first assumed direct responsibility for bringing Namibia to full independence. During that period, the United Nations has adopted numerous decisions and resolutions on the question of Namibia and made considerable efforts to resolve the matter, once and for all, in a just manner.

84. Five years ago the Council adopted the well-known resolution 435 (1978), which, in the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the world community, should have served as the foundation for a peaceful settlement of the question of Namibia.

85. However, all these decisions and resolutions continue to be defiantly ignored by the racist régime in South Africa and to this very day Namibia remains in a state of illegal occupation with the situation daily becoming worse.

86. The Pretoria régime is constantly escalating its military potential and its presence in Namibia. According to some data, the strength of the South African force in Namibia is 100,000, that is, one member of the punitive expeditionary force for every 12 Namibians. The policy of Namibianization of the war is being continued by the racists, and the so-called South-West Africa Territorial Force has been operating in Namibia since 1980. Also, the racists in Namibia are served by thousands of mercenaries recruited from former Southern Rhodesian troops and from certain Western countries. They are there for only one purpose: to make it impossible for SWAPO, the sole legitimate representative of the people of Namibia, to come to power and to make it possible for them to continue to plunder the rich natural resources of that country.

87. South Africa's purposes are also served by the continuing policy of cruel repression, arrests, imprisonment without trial, torture and the mass slaughter of the peaceful inhabitants of the country.

88. A particular threat to peace and security not only in the region but in the world as a whole results from the fact that the Pretoria régime has turned Namibia into a military springboard for aggressive sorties against the front-line States in pursuance of its increasingly obvious desire to destabilize those States. It continues to commit acts of aggression against southern Angola, which has been occupied for more than a year now, not to mention the completely unprovoked raid recently carried out on the capital of Mozambique. Mongolia strongly condemns this new barbaric act of aggression, which has caused destruction and the death of peaceful inhabitants of that country, emphasizing once again the seriousness of the situation in this region and the need to restrain these fanatical racists.

89. The position of Mongolia on the question of Namibia is well known. Our solidarity with the peoples that are struggling for their freedom, independence and legitimate national rights and our support for their struggle stem essentially from the fundamental and intrinsic essence of our foreign policy. A message dated 27 May from the Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Great Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic, Mr. Tsedenbal, and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mr. Batmonh, to the leaders of the Organization of African Unity

(OAU) on the twentieth anniversary of African Liberation Day, expresses firm support for the struggle for the African peoples against imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism and racism, and for the cause of peace, national independence and social progress. It also expresses our conviction that the imperialist efforts to undermine and disunite the OAU will be firmly rebuffed.

90. The Government and people of Mongolia are constant in their support of the struggle of the people of Namibia, under the militant leadership of SWAPO, for their inalienable right to national independence, freedom and self-determination. We firmly condemn the continuing illegal occupation of Namibia by the racist régime of South Africa and the policy of delay and subterfuge pursued by the racists and their overseas protectors.

91. We categorically reject the attempts of Pretoria and its allies to link or to draw a parallel between the granting of independence to Namibia and the question of withdrawing Cuban troops from Angola. It is patently absurd to assert that there is any link whatsoever between those two matters. A limited contingent of Cuban forces is in Angola at the official request of the legitimate Government of Angola in view of the threat that exists to the independence and sovereignty of that newly formed State. If any troops are to be withdrawn from Angola, it should be the South African racist forces which still continue to occupy part of that country.

92. It is more than time for specific steps to be taken to settle the Namibian problem. It is perfectly obvious now that the notorious racist plans for an internal settlement and the spurious efforts of the so-called contact group will yield no positive results. The purpose of those manoeuvres is quite obvious: to delay any solution of the Namibian problem for as long as possible.

93. That is indicated by the unambiguous statements that have been made by the representatives of South Africa and by Western representatives. In particular, after agreement was reached during his visit to Washington in December last on the emplacement on the territory of South Africa of cruise missiles of the Tomahawk type which can carry nuclear warheads, Mr. Botha stated: "This will make it possible for us to intimidate not only neighbouring States but all African States." The Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Mr. Luns, also stated: "South Africa should be given responsibility for directly protecting Western interests in Africa." It could hardly be put more plainly than that.

94. Mongolia regards as very important and timely the initiative of the non-aligned countries in asking that the Council be convened immediately to consider the question of further steps to implement the plan to bring Namibia to complete independence, which would mean that the Council would be discharging its major responsibility for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). That initiative reflects the considerable alarm felt by the world public concerning the state of affairs in the southern part of Africa, particularly on the matter of granting independence to Namibia. That is also referred to in the Paris Declaration on Namibia adopted at the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence.[1]

95. The international community expects decisive action from the Council. It should now fulfil its responsibility without any further delay. Mongolia will support any efforts in that connection to establish a definite time-frame for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

96. At the same time, we continue to believe that it is high time comprehensive mandatory sanctions were imposed against the racist régime in South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

97. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of the Upper Volta, whom I invite to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

98. Mr. BASSOLE (Upper Volta) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, I should like to thank you and, through you, the other members of the Council for having granted my delegation's request to be allowed to participate in this debate, thus giving my country, the Upper Volta, an opportunity to make its modest contribution in the search for a solution to the problem now before us.

99. First of all, I should like to perform the agreeable duty of conveying to Mr. Sam Nujoma and, through him, to SWAPO and all its militants, the brotherly greetings of the people of the Upper Volta, its People's Salvation Council and its President, Mr. Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo.

100. I wish to assure you, Sir, that it is a genuine pleasure for me to congratulate you on behalf of my delegation and on my own behalf on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of May. Your outstanding qualities as an experienced diplomat and statesman committed to dialogue are, I am convinced, a guarantee that the work of this Council will proceed smoothly, and lead us to hope that there will be a successful conclusion to these debates.

101. I also wish to take this opportunity to convey to Mrs. Jeane Kirkpatrick, the representative of the United States, my delegation's gratitude for the competence and sense of responsibility she demonstrated in guiding the work of the Council during the month of April.

102. It is more than 15 years since the General Assembly terminated South Africa's Mandate over Namibia and assumed direct responsibility for the Territory. When it adopted, on 27 October 1966, resolution 2145 (XXI), in which it stated its conviction that the administration of the Territory of Namibia by South Africa had been conducted in a manner contrary to the Mandate conferred upon it by the League of Nations in December 1920, to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the General Assembly was indeed right. This was recognized and confirmed by the

Council itself when it adopted resolution 264 (1969) in order to remind South Africa that its Mandate over Namibia had been terminated and to inform the Pretoria régime that therefore the time had come for it to withdraw its administration from the Territory. However, nothing was changed as a result of that, and it was then necessary to request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice, which was handed down on 21 June 1971.[5]

103. The failure of all these steps to produce any results shows clearly that South Africa defies the international community and scorns the resolutions and decisions of our Organization.

104. Thus, each day we move farther away from those resolutions and decisions, allowing South Africa to believe that it can continue to ignore them when it is not defying them.

105. We owe South Africa's refusal to comply to the complicity of certain Western countries whose immediate economic interests are given precedence over the noble cause of the Namibian people and neutralize all political will. It is precisely the political will of those countries that we need to put an end to the intractibility of the racist régime of Pretoria, to the shameful exploitation of Namibia and the suffering of the Namibian people whose only fault is that of aspiring, as all other peoples do, to the exercise of their inalienable right to self-determination, freedom and independence.

106. Instead of that political will, what are we offered? Some want us to rely on a contact group whose action falls far short of what we were entitled to expect. Others want us to establish a link between the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, a free, independent and sovereign country.

107. We are pleased to note that the international community reacted negatively to the question of linkage, because what they are really trying to do by that unacceptable amalgam is to force us further away each day from the implementation of the settlement plan and make us forget Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978). At times it would seem that common sense is not the world's best distributed asset.

108. My delegation feels that we have no miracle cure to foil these Machiavellian attempts.

109. The courage, determination and foresight with which the Secretary-General determined, from the very beginning of his term of office, to tackle the problem of Namibia, gives my delegation reason to believe that the time has come to strengthen his role even more, in order to ensure that Namibia is placed, or rather, is placed once again under the sole responsibility of the United Nations. My delegation wishes to congratulate him on the objective and realistic report [*ibid.*] that he submitted to us at the beginning of these meetings.

110. We believe, like many previous speakers at these meetings, that, in order to save time and be effective, the negotiations, as well as the search for solutions for implementing the settlement plan, should take place, as in the past, exclusively within the framework of the United Nations.

111. In that way, and in that way alone, the efforts made to arrive at a just, lasting and equitable solution to the Namibian problem will no longer be unilateral, because we must note that, thus far, of the two parties directly concerned with the problem, SWAPO alone has shown its constant goodwill and readiness. I wish to pay a tribute to SWAPO for its flexibility and its sense of restraint, which has been evident to all of us throughout the negotiations.

112. Strengthening the role of the Secretary-General would not in itself, however, suffice to open the way to implementing the settlement plan. My delegation is fully aware that the determination of the Council, guarantor of international peace and security, united and strong, will contribute a great deal. Furthermore, its credibility is at stake. May it be even more aware of this and act in such a way as not to disappoint the hopes placed in it.

113. Hence, in our view, the results of the Council's deliberations at the end of these meetings will have two important aspects: to reaffirm the will of the Council to assume its full responsibilities, whose importance everyone is aware of, and to open the way for breaking the deadlock in which the Council now finds itself and which involves a threat to international peace and security.

114. It is also for the Council, through its relevant decisions, to affirm its determination to support and strengthen the role of the Secretary-General.

115. In conclusion, I wish to pay a particular tribute to the United Nations Council for Namibia for the dedication and seriousness with which it assumes its difficult responsibilities. I wish to assure it that the co-operation of the Upper Volta will not be lacking until the triumph of the just cause of the Namibian people.

116. The **PRESIDENT** (***interpretation from French***): Before adjourning this morning's meeting I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received a letter dated 26 May from the representatives of France, the United Kingdom and the United States [*S/15792*], which reads as follows:

> "We have the honour to refer to the messages addressed on 24 May to you and to the representatives of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States by Mr. L. J. Barnes and Mr. J. G. A. Diergaardt, requesting the opportunity to address the Security Council on the situation in Namibia. In accordance with the usual practice of the Council in inviting persons whom it considers competent for the purpose to supply it with information, we request that, in the course of the current discussion of the Council concerning the situation in Namibia, an invitation under rule 39 of the provi-

> sional rules of procedure be extended to Mr. Barnes and Mr. Diergaardt. We would, of course, similarly support applications from other persons competent for the purpose who request the opportunity to speak at the meeting in order to supply the Council with information on this matter."

117. In accordance with the request in the letter I have just read out, I intended to put this proposal to the vote. But following consultations with the members of the Council, it is my understanding that no one insists upon a vote on this matter.

118. Mr. LICHENSTEIN (United States of America): Mr. President, with respect to the letter that you have just read out, I wish to say, on behalf of my Government and of our contact group colleagues who are members of the Council, that we believe certain issues of principle are involved. The first concerns the implementation of the Council's own provisional rules of procedure, in this case rule 39, which provides that persons competent to provide information or otherwise assist in the examination of a matter before the Council may be given the opportunity to speak. The second concerns the responsibility of the Council to reflect in its own practices the principles of fairness, openness and evenhandedness which are central to the purposes of the United Nations.

119. The members of the contact group believe it to be important that the Council, which by its previous decisions has engaged itself to seek the holding of free and fair elections in Namibia, provide the opportunity to those who will be parties to those elections to present their views; simply that the Council hear them and listen to them.

120. That, Mr. President, is why we have made this request, through you, to the members of the Council. After further consultations, however, and in the light of all relevant circumstances, we do not at this time insist that the question be put to the vote.

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.

NOTES

[1] See *Report of the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, Paris, 25-29 April 1983* (A/CONF.120/13), part three.

[2] *Ibid.*, para. 193.

[3] See *Report of the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, Paris, 25-29 April 1983* (A/CONF.120/13), annex II, sect. A. 3.

[4] *Ibid.*, paras. 42-46.

[5] *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I. C. J. Reports 1971*, p. 16.

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Litho in United Nations, New York 00300 90-60205—March 1991—2,050

UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-EIGHTH YEAR

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2448th MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 27 May 1983, at 4 p.m.

President: Mr. UMBA di LUTETE (Zaire).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2448)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Namibia:
    Letter dated 12 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15760);
    Letter dated 13 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15761)

The meeting was called to order at 4.40 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Namibia:
Letter dated 12 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15760);
Letter dated 13 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15761)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2439th meeting, I invite the representative of Mauritius to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Maudave (Mauritius) took a place at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2439th meeting, I invite the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the other members of the delegation of the Council to take places at the Security Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Lusaka (President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took places at the Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2439th meeting, I invite Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Nujoma took a place at the Council table.

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with decisions taken at previous meetings on this item [*2439th to 2444th, 2446th and 2447th meetings*], I invite the representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, the Gambia, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Liberia, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, the Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Qatar, Romania, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Upper Volta, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia and Zambia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Zarif (Afghanistan), Mr. Hadj Azzout (Algeria), Mr. de Figueiredo (Angola), Mr. Muñiz (Argentina), Mr. Joseph (Australia), Mr. Hashim (Bangladesh), Mr. Moseley (Barbados), Mr. Adjibade (Benin), Mr. Mogwe (Botswana), Mr. Tsvetkov (Bulgaria), Mr. Pelletier (Canada), Mr. Trucco (Chile), Mr. Malmierca (Cuba), Mr. Moushoutas (Cyprus), Mr. Suja (Czechoslovakia), Mr. Al-Ashtal (Democratic Yemen), Mr. Khalil (Egypt), Mr. Ibrahim (Ethiopia), Mr. Davin (Gabon), Mr. Blain (Gambia), Mr. Ott (German Democratic Republic), Mr. van Well (Federal Republic of Germany), Mr. Kaba (Guinea), Mr. Rácz (Hungary), Mr. Rao (India), Mr. Kusumaatmadja (Indonesia), Mr. Shearer (Jamaica), Mr. Kuroda (Japan), Mr. Wabuge (Kenya), Mr. Abulhassan (Kuwait), Mrs. Jones (Liberia), Mr. Burwin (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Tan Sri Zainal Abidin (Malaysia), Mr. Traore (Mali), Mr. Marin Bosch (Mexico), Mr. Erdenechuluun (Mongolia), Mr. Mrani Zentar (Morocco), Mr. Chissano (Mozambique), Mr. Oumarou (Niger), Mr.

Bolokor (Nigeria), Mr. Cabrera (Panama), Mr. Jamal (Qatar), Mr. Marinescu (Romania), Mr. Niasse (Senegal), Ms. Gonthier (Seychelles), Mr. Stevens (Sierra Leone), Mr. Adan (Somalia), Mr. von Schirnding (South Africa), Mr. Fonseka (Sri Lanka), Mr. El-Fattal (Syrian Arab Republic), Mr. Slim (Tunisia), Mr. Kirca (Turkey), Mr. Owiny (Uganda), Mr. Salim (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. Bassole (Upper Volta), Mr. Martini Urdaneta (Venezuela), Mr. Le Kim Chung (Viet Nam), Mr. Mojsov (Yugoslavia) and Mr. Goma (Zambia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

5. The **PRESIDENT** (*interpretation from French*): I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Grenada in which he requests to be invited to take part in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite him to take part in the discussion without the right to vote, under the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Taylor (Grenada) took a place at the side of the Council chamber.

6. The **PRESIDENT** (*interpretation from French*): The first speaker is Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Republic of Tanzania, to whom I extend a welcome. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

7. Mr. SALIM (United Republic of Tanzania): Mr. President, I am grateful to you and your colleagues in the Council for allowing us to participate in this important series of meetings devoted to consideration of the question of Namibian independence. I wish to express to you personally our sincere congratulations on your assumption of the high office of President of the Council for this month. It is a matter of great satisfaction to us in Tanzania that a distinguished son of the sisterly and neighbourly State of Zaire should be President at a time when the United Nations is once again addressing itself to a problem of great importance to our continent and to the international community as a whole.

8. On a more personal level, I am happy to see both the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Zaire and the Permanent Representative of Zaire occupying the position of President in the present deliberations of the Council. I am confident that your rich diplomatic experience and your recognized talents will be put to full use in steering the current proceedings of the Council.

9. This is the sixty-eighth year of South African military occupation of Namibia. It is the seventeenth year since the General Assembly terminated South Africa's Mandate over the Territory and assumed direct responsibility [*resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966*]. Yet, despite numerous resolutions of the General Assembly and the Council calling for the withdrawal of the illegal occupying forces of South Africa, the people of Namibia continue to languish under the tyranny of foreign occupation. Indeed, despite the international consensus that has prevailed in support of Namibia's independence, freedom continues to elude the people of Namibia. Thus the armed struggle forced upon SWAPO, the representative of the Namibian people, has had to be escalated as hopes for a negotiated settlement have continued to dwindle. These hopes have diminished, not for lack of a political framework for negotiations but because of the deliberate efforts of the South African régime to obstruct the peaceful path. Regrettably, this obstruction has also been made possible because of the policies and actions of some Members of the Organization.

10. This series of Council meetings on Namibia is taking place at a time when the efforts of the international community to bring about a peaceful solution are at an impasse. The Council has been convened precisely to address itself to this impasse and how to overcome it.

11. The adoption in 1976 of Council resolution 385 (1976) was hailed as an important opportunity to stop bloodshed in Namibia. To that end, SWAPO and South Africa were called upon to co-operate with the United Nations in the implementation of that resolution, which would have enabled the Namibian people to determine freely their own future through elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations. It is a matter of public record that, while SWAPO pledge its full support for that resolution, South Africa not only refused to do so but continued its repressive activities against the people of Namibia and proceeded to create new *faits accomplis.*

12. The significance of resolution 385 (1976), *inter alia*, lay in the fact that it inspired the initiatives which led to the adoption by the Council of what is now known as the United Nations plan for Namibia. The adoption of Council resolution 435 (1978), containing the plan, ushered in one of the busiest periods in the diplomatic efforts on Namibia. If the closeness to independence of a colonial Territory were measured in terms of the frequency of meetings and diplomatic shuttles and the number of initiatives, Namibia was close to independence on the adoption of that resolution. Indeed, Namibia should have been independent years ago.

13. Unfortunately, it has also been a period of a succession of disappointments. For some of us who have been involved in both private and public consultations leading to and following the adoption of the plan, the experience has been painful indeed. Initiated by countries closely associated with South Africa and therefore with the most leverage and capacity to ensure compliance by South Africa, the plan, which was so detailed, could not but have convinced the world community, as it did, that there was now a serious intention to ensure the decolonization of the international Territory of Namibia.

14. Indeed, the history of the events pursuant to the adoption of the plan is too well known to the Council to need detailed elaboration. At every crucial moment of

the negotiations when the international community was given to believe that the implementation of the plan was imminent, the South African régime invariably came up with new demands and pretexts aimed at effectively obstructing the way to the implementation of the plan. The result has been that we have been subjected to one frustrating experience after another. Throughout these frustrating experiences it has been SWAPO and Africa that have invariably been urged to be realistic and understanding with regard to the demands of the South African régime. Yet with every concession made by SWAPO, supported by the African States, South Africa sought more; and with every breakthrough that transpired, new impediments were created. The Western Five are perfectly aware of this.

15. The examples are many. One is the pre-implementation meeting at Geneva in January 1981. On 19 September 1980, the Secretary-General wrote to the South African authorities proposing that a United Nations mission should visit South Africa to resolve outstanding difficulties [*S/14184*]. This mission spent a week in South Africa at the end of October 1980.

16. Technical matters appeared to have been resolved and the main obstacle, according to the South African régime, was so-called lack of confidence. The Secretary-General therefore presented, on 24 November 1980, a report [*S/14266*] to the Council proposing that he convene a pre-implementation meeting to take place from 7 to 14 January 1981. According to the Secretary-General's report, only two outstanding matters were identified: lack of confidence and the composition of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). The proposal was acceptable to all parties and arrangements were made for the pre-implementation meeting to be convened at Geneva.

17. That meeting was opened by the Secretary-General on 7 January 1981. In welcoming the two delegations, those of SWAPO and of South Africa, the Secretary-General stressed that the problems remaining related very largely in one way or another to confidence, and especially to confidence in the future. He continued by referring to the settlement proposals and arrangements for a cease-fire and confirmed that the main aim was to get agreement to set that process in train, which would allow for the achievement of Namibian independence before the end of 1981. [*See S/14333, para. 5.*]

18. The President of SWAPO, Mr. Sam Nujoma, declared his readiness to sign a cease-fire and agreed to the immediate implementation of the United Nations plan. But this was not to happen. The South African Administrator-General of Namibia announced on 13 January that they were not prepared to proceed with implementing the plan. The meeting broke up the following day.

19. There was no mistaking the responsibility for the failure of the Geneva talks. All the members of the contact group in one way or another put the blame squarely on Pretoria. The deputy of the then British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and leader of the British delegation to the Geneva talks, Sir Ian Gilmour, told the House of Commons in London on 7 May: "There is no question but that the failure of the conference in Geneva was the fault of the South African Government." South Africa not only torpedoed the meeting at Geneva, but also proceeded with unprovoked attacks against Angola.

20. In the light of this defiance, the African States turned to the Council. We did so conscious of the Council's responsibilities and also in the hope that those members of the Council that were the authors of the plan would fulfil their responsibilities and support Council action aimed at ensuring the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). When the Council met in April 1981, the African countries did not fail to impress upon the three Western permanent members of this body their own responsibility in working for the scrupulous implementation of a plan of which they and their colleagues of Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany are the authors. To our profound regret, the Council was prevented from taking appropriate action owing to the triple veto of the three Western permanent members of the Council.

21. These three major Western Powers chose, therefore, to protect South Africa at this crucial stage in the struggle for Namibian independence. Inevitably, these vetoes were interpreted by the *apartheid* régime as guaranteed protection for South Africa, irrespective of what action it took over Namibia. The Pretoria régime responded immediately. Plans were put into operation for a major invasion of southern Angola. Initial attacks took place in July 1981 and were followed by a full-scale invasion of southern Angola on 23 August. Parts of southern Angola have been under continuous occupation since then.

22. This invasion was not an isolated act. The South Africans had invaded Angola before independence in order to stop the coming to power of a Government which was committed to the welfare of its own people and to the liberation of southern Africa as a whole. On 4 May 1978, South African forces massacred over 700 Namibian refugees at Kassinga, within a few days of South Africa's agreeing to the United Nations plan. In January 1981, they launched a major attack against the Angolan army at Cuamato, near the border with Namibia, timed to coincide with the break-up of the Geneva pre-implementation meeting. The August 1981 invasion, however, represented a major escalation of the *apartheid* régime's war against Angola and against Africa as a whole. It can now be seen as an essential component in a wider strategy of South Africa and some of its supporters to deny the people of Namibia genuine independence and to reverse other victories achieved by the forces of African freedom in the region in the previous decade.

23. All this was taking place during the advent of a new Administration in the United States. We were then told

to be patient and exercise restraint while the new Administration was in the process of reviewing its policies on the southern African situation. The substance of that review was soon to be clear and official. On the one hand, the United States had decided to open a new chapter of co-operation with the South African régime within the context of the so-called constructive engagement, and, on the other, there was to be a review of the United Nations plan.

24. Whatever the intention of the policy of constructive engagement, the fact remains that the South African Government has taken this not only as a certificate of respectability for its policies but also as a means of reinforcing its defiance of world opinion, both in its internal policies of aggression against the African people and in its persistent acts of aggression and destabilization against the African States.

25. With respect to the review of the United Nations plan, the series of consultations among the members of the five Western States produced notions such as that of strengthening resolution 435 (1978). In their consultations with us, we expressed our concern that such proposals invited the danger of revising the plan. Such was the concern of the front-line States that, at the meeting of the leaders of the front-line States held at Luanda, in April 1981, the summit expressed its apprehensions at the disquieting signals which suggested that there was an attempt to reverse the sequence of the independence process agreed to in resolution 435 (1978). Conscious of the fact that such an exercise would provide the Pretoria régime with an excuse for more delay, the leaders of the front-line States reaffirmed their firm support for the plan and underlined the urgent need to implement it without further delay, prevarication, qualification or modification. At the same time, they stressed the responsibility of the five Western States to ensure the implementation of the plan and underscored the latter's special obligation to exert the necessary pressure on South Africa to comply with Council resolution 435 (1978).

26. In our consultations with the Western Five we made it clear to them that they were addressing themselves to the wrong issues. What was needed, we pointed out, was not the strengthening of the United Nations plan but rather its implementation. We cautioned that South Africa had one objective in mind, namely, the prevention of free and fair elections, which they knew SWAPO would win. We pointed out that the Pretoria régime is a past master in the game of prevarication and certainly did not need any assistance from the Western Five.

27. Our apprehensions and reservations notwithstanding, the Western Five persistent in their approach. By September 1981 they announced their new initiative. It envisaged three phases. Phase one was designed to commit the parties concerned to a set of constitutional principles for the election of a constituent assembly. Phase two was concerned with specific arrangements for the cease-fire, UNTAG and agreement on United Nations impartiality. Phase three was a public commitment by all parties to a date for the beginning of the implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978).

28. On 25 October 1981, representatives of the Five flew to Nigeria on the start of a tour of the front-line States and South Africa to present the contact group's constitutional principles. These proposals were widely interpreted as designed to minimize the influence of SWAPO, however great its electoral strength. A key principle stated that "the future Constitution of an independent Namibia would have to be approved by a two-thirds majority of the Constituent Assembly". Another principle stated that "fair representation of the different political groups will be achieved" through an appropriate electoral system.

29. This new initiative represented a deviation from the sequence of events envisaged under the United Nations plan. The United Nations plan envisaged that the Constitution for Namibia would be drawn up by a Constituent Assembly to be elected under United Nations supervision and control. Under this new proposal, however, South Africa was in effect given an effective veto over the framework of the principles of the Constitution for an independent Namibia. Yet, characteristic of Africa's commitment to pursue a negotiated settlement, SWAPO, supported by the rest of the independent States of Africa, decided to respond constructively to the contact group's proposal.

30. A meeting of SWAPO and the front-line States, together with Nigeria and Kenya, held at Dar-es-Salaam on 17 November 1981, prepared a detailed response based on the contact group's proposals. Our objective was to facilitate a quick agreement. We did not, therefore, reject any of the controversial proposals such as those relating to the two-thirds majority, "guarantees of property and minority rights" and so forth. The Five, however, on 17 December published their revised proposals and produced what SWAPO described as a "unique and undemocratic electoral system" based on a principle of "one person, two votes". In a memorandum explaining this electoral procedure it was proposed that each voter would cast two votes, one to be counted on the level of a single national constituency and the other one on the basis of the voter's local constituency. Those with knowledge of the demography of Namibia were convinced that this proposal was aimed at minimizing the electoral influence of SWAPO and at exaggerating the electoral strength of both the white community and the tribally-based "internal" elements.

31. The front-line States, Nigeria and SWAPO firmly rejected these electoral proposals during our meeting on 23 January 1982, and we called for a clear and simple electoral process. The contact group, however, instead of taking these reservations seriously, sent a delegation to Angola in early April to propose that, as an alternative to the "one person, two votes" system, there should be a "one person, one vote, counted twice" type of system. SWAPO responded with a very detailed analysis, pointing out that the proposed electoral process was designed

to deny it a two-thirds majority of the seats in the Constituent Assembly, which would enable Pretoria's allies to block the independence of Namibia by starting an endless debate on the constitution of the Constituent Assembly. The electoral process was designed, SWAPO explained, "on the one hand, to ensure guaranteed representation for the white minorities . . . . On the other hand, the choice of such an electoral double standard is aimed at giving Pretoria an opportunity to use and accentuate tribal or ethnic factors against SWAPO." SWAPO's statement went on to say that "the experience of the last six months has shown that the phased approach to the negotiations is being used to force SWAPO, step by step, to make concessions, sometimes irreversible ones, while South Africa is yielding practically nothing."

32. It is pertinent to mention here that, when the Western Five submitted their original constitutional proposals, they suggested an electoral system based on one of three options, namely, a single-member constituency, proportional representation or a combination system. SWAPO accepted two of those systems, namely, proportional representation or a single-member constituency. Yet the Western Five insisted on a complex electoral process using a combination system—which was, incidentally, preferred also by South Africa.

33. That, then, is the background to the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the front-line States held at Dar-es-Salaam on 4 May 1982, which endorsed the rejection by SWAPO of this complex voting system and agreed that all outstanding issues should be discussed together in a comprehensive manner in order to resolve them as a package. "Such negotiations should take place in a Geneva-type conference under the auspices of the United Nations", we proposed, "but other means of achieving that objective are not excluded". This firm stand resulted in the contact group abandoning its electoral proposals and suggesting that the matter be deferred. But soon new obstacles were to emerge.

34. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the five Western States met in Luxembourg on 17 May 1982, a few days after a lengthy meeting in Paris of the African directors of the contact group countries. It is widely assumed that it was at these crucial meetings that agreement was reached on a "summary of points" to be presented by the contact group to all the parties. Representatives of the Western Five visited Africa from 7 to 12 June to present those points. Most of the points concerned the items which had previously been identified as needing to be resolved, that is, the cease-fire, United Nations impartiality and UNTAG. These and no other points were later to form the basis of the proximity talks.

35. These talks were initiated by the contact group in response to the decision of the front-line States and SWAPO on 4 May 1982 to reject the phased approach to the negotiations and also because, according to the British Foreign Office briefing, "the Five have been encouraged by signs of greater flexibility on the part of the South Africans". An impression was thus conveyed that agreement could be reached rapidly on the choice of the electoral system, the deployment of UNTAG and the question of United Nations impartiality. It was claimed that South Africa was no longer raising obstacles. The front-line States and SWAPO, therefore, responded positively at their summit meeting held at Dar-es-Salaam on 14 June and agreed to participate in the proximity talks. Meetings took place during most of July here in New York.

36. From the very start of these proximity talks there was a firm understanding among the contact group, the front-line States, SWAPO and Nigeria that these points would not be considered outside the framework of resolution 435 (1978) and that therefore, in reality, there was nothing particularly new in the subject-matter of the negotiations.

37. South Africa, we were given to understand, wanted to be reassured that when the elections commenced SWAPO would not be at an advantage as compared with other elements within Namibia. For that purpose, South Africa insisted—we were told—that, effective from the time the Security Council adopted the resolution to trigger the implementation of the plan, the United Nations and all bodies within the United Nations system should refrain from providing any assistance to SWAPO and that in their activities those bodies should equally refrain from showing their support for SWAPO. Not to leave any stone unturned, SWAPO went to the extent of making far-reaching concessions.

38. In this spirit, compromises were also made with regard to the constitution and deployment of UNTAG as well as to the logistics of the cease-fire. The Western Five assured us, as the negotiations progressed, that the agreement of South Africa was obtained on the compromises. It was therefore possible, at the conclusion of the negotiations, to visualize the quick implementation of the United Nations plan. This explains the enthusiasm which was generated at that time in the world community.

39. Since then the world has waited anxiously to see the Council meet and UNTAG go into Namibia. But instead the world has been presented with a completely different problem, entirely unrelated to Namibia. For now the international community is aware that one of the members of the Western Five inisists on holding the independence of Namibia hostage to the presence of Cuban forces in Angola. Not only is this insistence on linkage of breach of good faith with SWAPO and all those who helped achieve the compromises which SWAPO has conceded to, but it is in fact in defiance of international law and values because, the rights of the Namibian people apart, the linkage is an attempt to interfere in the sovereign right of Angola to determine its friends and determine its security requirements.

40. The idea of linkage, like many other irrelevant issues, came up soon after the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Five in May 1982, under the heading of the so-called other regional issues. Right from

the start, this irrelevancy was rejected outright, not only by SWAPO and Angola but also by the front-line States. Since then it has also been rejected and condemned by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries and the General Assembly. In fact, except for the United States, the members of the contact group themselves have made it clear that they do not believe that the withdrawal of the Cuban forces can be made a pre-condition for a Namibian settlement. An eloquent statement to this effect was made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France when he addressed the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, in Paris,[1] and a similar position was taken here by the representative of France when he addressed the Council this morning [*2447th meeting*]. All in all, it is this extraneous issue which has now fundamentally changed the course of the negotiations and is responsible for the total impasse which we now face.

41. If the background which I have related—the saga of the tortuous history of the pursuit of a peaceful settlement—is of any use, it is, I believe, to confirm that the people of Namibia, through their representative, SWAPO, have left no stone unturned and have shown that no serious request for flexibility and patience was beyond their capacity for tolerance. SWAPO has also demonstrated that it is not their preference to resort to armed struggle, with its attendant destruction, if peaceful means for the attainment of their independence are feasible. The Namibian people, under the leadership of SWAPO, have therefore made every concession humanly possible for a peaceful alternative. They have agreed to a prior determination of their constitutional system; they have accommodated a number of demands to be embodied in their constitutional principles. This is, in fact, a determination of their socio-economic system by external parties. They have given the benefit of the doubt to the *apartheid* régime. South Africa demanded that provision be made for so-called trust and confidence. Ridiculous as the demand was, SWAPO agreed to a pre-implementation meeting. South Africa demanded guarantees on a number of issues. SWAPO conceded to those demands. South Africa prevaricated on the electoral system and SWAPO was willing to allow time for South Africa's latest decision.

42. It must therefore be amply evident that, if a peaceful settlement to the Namibian question is not feasible, the burden of responsibility has absolutely nothing to do with SWAPO. It must be placed squarely on somebody else. It is also clearly evident that there is absolutely no legitimate issue whatever pending to which the failure to implement Council resolution 435 (1978) can be attributed.

43. It is, needless to say, obvious that the *apartheid* régime of South Africa is primarily responsible for the colonial situation in Namibia. The policies of South Africa, well known and condemned by the world community, are by nature colonial, aggressive, racist and totally incompatible with the ideals, values and principles of the Organization. If no serious action on the part of the international community is taken against such a régime and, worse still, if some Members of the Organization extend any form of comfort to it, that régime cannot be expected to work for the efforts of the decolonization of Namibia and the furtherance of any United Nations principles.

44. This history of negotiations is also in some ways an indictment of some of the very authors of the plan for the independence of Namibia. For one of the things we cannot fail to observe is that, whereas it was expected that the members of the contact group should have demonstrated a sense of commitment and urgency, it has always been necessary to remind them that they were the authors of the plan and that it was their initiative which created the momentum for a negotiated settlement. If today we have to repeat this reminder, it will not in any way be for the first time. But what we have been getting in response all along from the Western Five has been a plea for flexibility, a plea for patience and a plea for realism. Indeed, when the Council was forced to meet in 1981 under similar circumstances, that was the response of the Western Five to our appeal.

45. If the Council is to make an important and relevant contribution to eliminating the present impasse, it is important to bear in mind the historical facts. It is particularly important to separate fact from fiction. I should therefore once again like to recapitulate the facts in brief.

46. First, since the adoption of the United Nations plan, the African States have done everything possible to facilitate its implementation. Secondly, throughout the process of negotiations, the African States, in support of SWAPO, have never been found wanting in flexibility and compromise. Thirdly, as a result of the mature and responsible approach adopted by SWAPO and supported by the African States, through the front-line States and Nigeria, the South African régime's pretexts for prevarication have been exhausted. Fourthly, with the exhaustion of those pretexts the introduction of a totally unrelated issue has given that régime a completely new excuse to defy the international community.

47. In this respect, it is important to stress that when the Western Five were preparing their proposals for a settlement, which ultimately emerged as the United Nations plan, this preparation was done in intensive consultations with the South African Government. At no point in the course of these consultations was the issue of the Cuban presence in Angola raised. At any rate, on all occasions when the Western Five had consultations with us prior to the adoption of resolution 435 (1978), they never raised the question of the Cuban presence in Angola. Yet it is a matter of record that resolution 435 (1978) was adopted in 1978 and the Cuban forces had been in Angola since the end of 1975. It is also significant that for three years subsequent to the adoption of resolution 435 (1978) and, indeed, even at the Geneva pre-implementation meetings, the South African régime never raised the question of the Cuban presence in Angola. We therefore wonder why, if the issue of Cuban forces in Angola was such a vital one for the South Afri-

can régime, it was not raised in all the five years we have referred to.

48. Africa and the Non-Aligned Movement have made it very clear that the issue of the Cuban presence is a false issue. It is immoral to hold the independence of Namibia hostage to a matter which is entirely within the sovereign right of an independent African State. We remain convinced that the insistence on linkage is not only counter-productive but inimical to the collective efforts made by the world community, including those by the Western Five, in an attempt to secure the implementation of the United Nations plan.

49. It is incorrect to allege that South Africa has been contructive and co-operative in the efforts to ensure the implementation of the plan for Namibia. Even today South Africa does not accept that its occupation of that Territory is illegal. From the statements made by the leaders of the *apartheid* régime it is obvious that they are not interested in a genuinely free election; for how else can we explain the tantrums they persistently throw in the face of the possibility of an election victory by SWAPO?

50. There is one other element which I am obliged to point out in my statement in view of the events of the past few days. South Africa is facing increasing resistance to its policies of *apartheid* within the country. Its outward manifestation of the arrogance of power is in reality an expression of its vulnerability to the forces of resistance from within South Africa. Those forces represent an irresistible tide of history which cannot be stopped. Talk of non-aggression pacts in that context is therefore a lot of nonsense. For, as the President of the United Republic of Tanzania succinctly put it in his address to the General Assembly in 1970, "It is impossible for us to sign a non-aggression treaty with aggression itself".[2]

51. The real threat against the South African régime does not come from outside South Africa. The authorities in Pretoria know that perfectly well. It is an accepted fact that South Africa has the most powerful military machine in our continent. No front-line State, no combination of front-line States or, for that matter, of independent States in southern Africa at present, poses a military threat to South Africa. In any case, the struggle for freedom in South Africa can and will be won by the people of South Africa themselves. And in this context South Africa is currently facing mounting opposition to its policies of *apartheid* within the country itself. Indeed, the *apartheid* régime is undergoing a security crisis caused by its own anachronistic internal policies, which have made its own perceived invincibility and security as a military power become vulnerable.

52. It is therefore pure fantasy for the *apartheid* régime to claim that its criminal acts of aggression and destabilization against Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Seychelles, Zambia and Zimbabwe, are provoked by any external threat. Indeed, if it were not for the tragedy caused to thousands of innocent people by these acts of aggression, as well as the havoc and destruction in which such acts result, one would have laughed at South Africa's spurious claims. For how can one possibly rationalize the claim that the small, proud, peaceful nation of Lesotho could be such a threat to South Africa as to warrant the carnage that that régime imposed on it last December? And how can one possibly assert that the islands of Seychelles, which were the victim of a South African mercenary invasion constitute a threat to the security of South Africa?

53. The arrogance and the threatening language to which we were subjected in the Council by the representative of the *apartheid* régime do not in any way alter the basic fact of South Africa's lawlessness in the region—lawlessness which was most recently manifested on 23 May in the criminal bombing of Maputo by the South African Air Force. The history of the world is rich in information on the fate of tyrants. The authorities in South Africa will be deluding themselves if they believe they can fare any better.

54. We have come to the Council because we are seriously concerned at the present impasse on the Namibian question. We are particularly saddened by the fact that what had appeared to be a great opportunity to put an end to the bloodshed in that international Territory through a process of negotiation is tragically slipping away. We seek of the Council no more than a firm commitment to the implementation of the United Nations plan—a plan which the Council itself, in its wisdom, adopted some five years ago.

55. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Zambia, my colleague, brother and friend, Mr. Lameck Goma, said a few days ago in the Council [*2440th meeting*], we have not come here to seek a confrontation with anyone. But we do ask that the Council confront and overcome the challenge with which the *apartheid* régime has faced the international community. For the continued obstruction of the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) is an act of defiance of the Council.

56. It is not just the credibility of the Council that is at stake, not just the suffering of the people of Namibia, but, indeed, the peace and security of the entire southern African region. As the Secretary-General aptly observes in his report, "the settlement of the Namibian question is of overriding importance for the future peace and prosperity of the entire region" [*S/15776, para. 20*].

57. At this juncture I wish to register the appreciation of my Government for the efforts of the Secretary-General, to bring about the implementation of the United Nations plan. We are inspired by his commitment and very impressed by the lucid and objective report which he has submitted to the Council. As the international community intensifies its efforts to ensure the independence of Namibia, it is most reassuring to note the firm and unequivocal commitment of the Secretary-General to that objective. My Government fully shares and, indeed, endorsed the following assertion of the Secretary-General in his report: "I regard the problem of

Namibia as a special responsibility . . . in view of the unique relationship between the United Nations and the people of Namibia." [*ibid.*] Indeed, the very least that the Council can do is to enhance his role by giving him all possible support in his efforts towards the implementation of the United Nations plan.

58. My statement will not be complete if I do not pay SWAPO a tribute that it so much deserves. For let us not forget that, but for the armed struggle of the Namibian people, under the leadership of SWAPO, conditions would not have been created for efforts to reach a negotiated peaceful settlement. SWAPO deserves every commendation, for the statesmanship it has demonstrated throughout these negotiations, for the patience it has demonstrated and for the extraordinary and indeed the utmost degree of flexibility and accommodation that it has been prepared to show for the sake of a peaceful settlement in the interest of the Namibian people. The United Nations in particular, whose responsibility it is to free Namibia from South Africa, is indebted to SWAPO.

59. The **PRESIDENT** (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Ethiopia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

60. Mr. **IBRAHIM** (Ethiopia): I am pleased to see this important debate on Namibia presided over by you, Sir, a distinguished son of Africa whose country's struggle for independence from colonial rule uniquely qualifies it to champion the cause of the Namibian people, namely, freedom and independence. We are confident that under your presidency the Council will not only respond to the yearnings of Namibians for freedom and human dignity but will also take meaningful steps to bring to an end the intransigence of the racist oligarchy of South Africa.

61. Through its membership in the League of Nations, the OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement, my country, Ethiopia, has a long-standing and very close association with the question of Namibia. My delegation is therefore participating in this debate to underline the great importance that we attach to the early independence of Namibia and, at the same time, to discharge a responsibility assigned to my country to represent the Non-Aligned Movement in this debate together with 30 other non-aligned States.

62. Since their very inception, the OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement have championed the cause of the Namibian people. The United Nations, on which the legal responsibility for the Territory rests, has also contributed in no small measure to the reaffirmation and universal recognition of the inalienable right of the Namibian people to freedom and independence. The role played in this regard by both the principal and subsidiary organs of the United Nations can hardly be underestimated. Numerous other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations have also kept the issue in the forefront of their preoccupations. Indeed, today hardly a week passes without the issue of an official communiqué by Governments—be it individually, bilaterally or collectively—reaffirming support for and expressing solidarity with the liberation struggle waged by the gallant people of Namibia under the wise and courageous leadership of SWAPO, their sole and authentic representative.

63. All those activities and pronouncements by both Governments and organizations are of course a source of satisfaction and encouragement to all those who stand at the side of the oppressed people of Namibia. Yes, there is no gainsaying the fact that, as a direct result of these efforts, the question of Namibia has been kept high on the international agenda. Yes, people all over the world, including the public in the Western countries are, as a result, increasingly aware of and sympathetic to the cause of the Namibian people. Moreover, material and financial assistance rendered by the international community has enabled SWAPO to sustain the armed struggle ever since 1966. South Africa has also, by and large, been isolated from the family of nations and at present has hardly any contact with the overwhelming majority of States.

64. Yet, the racist régime of South Africa survives—indeed, it thrives—and the people of Namibia still languish under its rule of oppression and exploitation. Through fraudulent elections, unrepresentative institutions and, above all, the introduction of racist laws and decrees, the *apartheid* régime continues in its attempts to perpetuate and even legitimize its occupation of Namibia. Hand in glove with imperialist monopolies and in open defiance of Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia, enacted by the United Nations Council for Namibia[3] and numerous other decisions, Pretoria exploits avariciously the human and natural resources of Namibia. While, through such exploitative and plundering activities, the racist régime and its collaborators reap super-profits, the present generation of Namibians is deprived of a fair return for its labour and future generations are denied the benefit of their natural heritage. Furthermore, Namibians both inside and outside the Territory are not only denied their political freedom but are also deprived even of the basic right to life and limb. Acts of aggression against Angola and the other States in the region have become all too frequent, thus plunging the entire southern Africa in turmoil. The policy of illegal occupation has also been extended from Namibia into the territory of Angola.

65. That Pretoria has been able to occupy Namibia this long with impunity, in open defiance of the will of the international community and in clear contravention of the rules of international law, must seem rather intriguing at first glance. But to us in Africa the reason for this seemingly curious situation is crystal clear. In two simple but eloquent words, it is Western collaboration. Over the past several decades, Pretoria has enjoyed a very close co-operation with the Western countries. The West has built itself a large stake in the South African economy through direct investment and the provision of credits and loans. Trade between the West and South Africa is allowed to flourish while Western technology in its entirety is put at Pretoria's disposal. Moreover, South

Africa is considered in the West not merely as an active business partner but as a political and military ally as well, perhaps even as the last bastion of "Western civilization" on the African continent. As a result, it should not be difficult to discern where the sympathy of much of the West lies, its verbal condemnation of ***apartheid*** notwithstanding. That South Africa has both a strong industrial economy and a powerful military machine, with both conventional and possibly even nuclear capabilities the like of which can be found nowhere else in Africa, cannot but be attributed to this long-standing and continuing Western collaboration. Ironically, it was because of this close relationship between the West and Pretoria—and not in spite of it—that SWAPO, Africa and, indeed, the whole world in 1978 accepted the initiative of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States of America [*S/12636*] ostensibly to lead Namibia to independence through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations.

66. Since that time, all peace-loving and freedom-loving people everywhere have been working for the full and speedy implementation of the plan which resulted from that initiative, whereas the South African régime has left no stone unturned to frustrate, at every stage and turn, this laudable effort. In fact, all the elements in the plan have at one stage or another been raised as thorny topics for negotiation by Pretoria, with the deliberate intention of delaying its implementation. At a time when all the elements have been clarified and agreed upon, Pretoria, pursuing its policy of intransigence and prevarication, now insists on introducing into the consideration of the plan new and totally extraneous issues that have no bearing on the independence question.

67. Since we had known all along that the racist régime was not yet ready or willing to relinquish its hold over Namibia, its delaying tactics do not come as a surprise to us. What surprises us, however, is the singular lack of commitment and political will on the part of the contact group of the five Western countries which initiated the plan and on whose political and economic leverage its implementation was predicated.

68. Not only have the Five failed to press South Africa to co-operate with the United Nations but they are indeed, regrettably, collaborating with Pretoria in its attempt to undermine and modify the United Nations plan. In this connection we cannot help recalling what a member of the contact group, in presenting the settlement proposal and speaking on behalf of all five States, stated at the ninth special session of the General Assembly on 26 April 1978:

> "The proposal must be seen as a balanced package, the individual parts of which should neither be changed nor burdened with new conditions so as not to jeopardize the feasibility of the settlement as a whole."[4]

69. The extent to which the Five have failed to keep their word since then is a matter of record. As we all know, even today the United States is actively striving to make the implementation of the plan conditional upon the realization of some of its strategic objectives in southern Africa, particularly the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. Again, we cannot help contrasting the position currently held by the United States with the position its representative took in the debate during the ninth special session:

> "Unlike Rhodesia, Namibia is a direct responsibility of the United Nations. It is our responsibility to ensure that the people of Namibia achieve their independence. That is our primary task and it cannot be subordinated to ideological differences"—

I repeat, "cannot be subordinated to ideological differences"—

> "or to any special relationship which any of us may hope to have with an independent Namibia."[5]

70. At this juncture I cannot fail to register Ethiopia's deep regret at the present position and conduct of the Western Five. To us, not only is the legitimate presence of Cuban internationalist forces in Angola irrelevant to the implementation of the plan but to raise this issue is nothing but an unwarranted and arrogant interference in the domestic affairs of Angola as well as a breach of the solemn commitment the Five had entered into during the adoption of the plan by the Council in resolution 435 (1978).

71. The desire for peace and the flexibility and statesmanship of SWAPO, have allowed us to come this far with the plan, but we must recognize that it is South Africa's intransigence and the lack of political will on the part of the Western Five that is preventing us from moving forward with its implementation. In fact, at this stage we cannot be wrong if we conclude that neither Pretoria nor the contact group has any interest in the implementation of the plan and that perhaps the negotiating process itself is being deliberately used to delay further the very independence of Namibia.

72. What must the international community do in the circumstances? I submit we all know what has to be done; it is only the will to do it that continues to elude some of us. To most of us, the primary responsibility for the implementation of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia rests on its original sponsors, namely, the contact group of the five Western countries. But as the Five have failed to discharge that responsibility we should all call upon the United Nations to shoulder fully its legal and moral responsibilities to the Namibian people. Furthermore, since we believe that the contact group has outlived its usefulness and since there is an imperative need for the United Nations to reassert its central role in the matter, we urge the contact group to consider seriously the desirability of disbanding itself and joining the rest of the world in pursuit of the sacred goal of Namibia's genuine independence.

73. We also invite the Five and the other Western countries to weigh carefully their interest in southern Africa from both the short-term and the long-term perspectives. Inasmuch as Namibia's independence is intimately linked with the freedom and dignity of the rest of Africa, we further invite them to evaluate their relations with Africa on the one hand and the racist régime on the other. We urge them also to examine their consciences to find out whether it is the precepts of justice and legality or the logic of the pocket-book that deserve primacy in the consideration of the national rights of the Namibian people. We venture to hope, perhaps against hope, that the lofty ideals of justice and human rights—which they so often advocate—will guide them to take the side of the oppressed and dispossessed rather than that of the oppressor and exploiter in southern Africa.

74. That direct and primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security lies with the Security Council has now become a cliché, but according to the Charter of the United Nations it still is an obvious truth. Through its continued illegal occupation of the international Territory of Namibia, the racist régime in Pretoria not only challenges the authority of the United Nations but also threatens the peace of Africa in general and that of southern Africa in particular. Its unprovoked and all too frequent acts of aggression and destabilization in the front-line States have breached the peace of the entire area. Indeed, by its open and blatant aggression against Angola and its illegal occupation of that country's southern province, the racist régime continues to threaten international peace and security. Are these not the very acts referred to in Chapter VII, Article 39, of the Charter and which should form the basis for enforcement measures by the Council? Yes, they are indeed.

75. Ethiopia therefore believes that it is incumbent upon the Council to consider measures against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter sooner rather than later, for later might be too late for many Namibians. Those who fail to heed the law should be brought to suffer its sanctions. The Council must act promptly and decisively. If it fails to act in the clear-cut case of Namibia—a Territory over which the legal authority and responsibility of the United Nations are universally recognized—very few would expect it to discharge its Charter responsibilities in other situations where the constituent elements are at once less clear and more disputable. If by its action, or rather, its inaction, the Council abdicates its responsibilities, not only will its authority continue to be eroded but indeed its very *raison d'être* will be seriously brought into question. The independence of Namibia, I submit, is the litmus test of both the effectiveness and the relevance of the Council. We in Ethiopia trust and hope that it will not be a test failed.

76. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Liberia, whom I invite to take a place at the Council table and to make her statement.

77. Mrs. JONES (Liberia): Mr. President, I wish to express my appreciation to you and the members of the Council for the invitation extended to my delegation to participate in this most important debate. Your skilful leadership and renowned ability displayed during this crucial session of the Council on the fate of Namibia should provide the Organization and the world community with an opportunity to achieve a breakthrough in the present deadlock in the negotiations for a peaceful Namibian settlement leading to the independence of Namibia.

78. Through you, Mr. President, I wish also to express to your predecessor, Mrs. Jeane Kirkpatrick, the representative of the United States, the satisfaction and commendation of my delegation in regard to her exemplary conduct of the meetings of the Council in the month of April.

79. Liberia's decision to participate in this debate has been motivated not by an impulse of blind solidarity but by a sense of profound responsibility which dates back to nearly 20 years ago when Liberia and Ethiopia instituted proceedings against South Africa in the International Court of Justice to free Namibia. We are participating in this meeting with the serious commitment of the Government of Liberia to make its due contribution to the achievement of Namibia's independence, within the context of Council resolution 435 (1978), at the earliest possible date. It should be well noted that the convening of the Council on the question of Namibia at the initiative of the non-aligned countries at this time is most opportune. The case of Namibia has brought an upsurge of sympathy for Namibia, the front-line States and the neighbouring African States. The assumption by South Africa and its allies that if independence were achieved for Namibia today the result would be anarchy has no sound and justifiable precedent in the liberation struggles of the African peoples for independence. The lesson has been that too many extraneous conditions and too much interference tend to provoke anarchy, but there is overwhelming evidence that when the Africans have been left to themselves the results have been relative peace and tranquillity after independence.

80. The international community has long realized that such smear tactics have been used to cast doubts on the integrity of the Namibian people. The generous contributions and the effectiveness of the nationhood programmes hold promise that the results will not be as stated. The excellent research and training programmes carried out by the United Nations Institute for Namibia at Lusaka are also significant contributions to bringing about a peaceful Namibia after independence.

81. My delegation would like to see the settlement plan for Namibia's independence remain within the framework of the United Nations. Therefore, without pressure on the contact group and a new set of commitments from that group to work more in harmony with the Secretary-General the results would look grim indeed. That group should be given the opportunity for reorientation.

82. The Secretary-General deserves our commendation, for he has demonstrated his good will and his capability

to bring about Namibia's independence if only his efforts are not frustrated and sabotaged. It would indeed appear from the evidence before us that progress was made towards Namibia's independence and that we were well on our way to achieving our goal of Namibia's independence when certain extraneous conditions were placed in the way. The task that confronts us all is crucial but not hopeless. Along with the present frustrations which all freedom-loving peoples feel in regard to Namibia's present fate, we also face more opportunities for the achievement of Namibia's independence.

83. My delegation supports any action which would give the Secretary-General a mandate to continue to take the leading role in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and appeals to each and every Member of the United Nations to give him full and unconditional support.

84. The lines become more clearly drawn each time the question of Namibia comes up for debate. On one side are the proponents of materialism, and on the other the proponents of humanism, each seeking to teach the other the value of its ideology. It is in this light that the sincerity of the contact group may be questioned. The credibility of these nations as genuine peace-brokers and freedom-brokers will soon be cast into the dustbin of history unless they can redeem their reputations as self-appointed ombudsmen of the United Nations, as they have so far only preserved the *status quo*.

85. The delay factor has also become crucial in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). In September 1978, the contact group made a proposal with the intention of breaking the impasse, in which we still find ourselves. They certainly stood to gain much in undertaking that initiative. It may also be noted that their offer to assist the Council was made because it was expedient for them to do so. With few exceptions, they are also well experienced in handling delicate colonial issues. Indeed, almost all the members of the contact group are experienced colonial midwives. If at this point in time they fail to live up to their good intentions and credentials and the impasse still exists, with the independence of Namibia still uncertain, then it can certainly be concluded that the contact group all along had ulterior motives, before 1978 and up to the present time. They have not told us the full story. The whole story will unfold before the world in agonizing bits and pieces. We have been told only what is considered enough for the present condition and time. What is quite clear is that the situation in Namibia is, by far, bigger than Namibia itself and certainly the most challenging in the entire liberation struggle of Africa.

86. There are so many stakes and risks involved in Namibia's struggle to become like the rest of Africa. Indeed, Namibia is a very special case. Namibia is undoubtedly the richest African colony to fight for its independence and its riches and resources are vital for the preservation and advancement of Western civilization. It would indeed appear as if there is a master plan in which Namibia has been programmed to play a key and vital part. There is also nostalgia, it seems, about letting go this last of the African colonies, nostalgia at seeing the end of an era at last.

87. The election, the Constitution and the linkage factors are said to be the remaining issues to be negotiated for Namibia's independence. Let us hope that this is the case, for there may be other linkages in the making which are at present kept hidden from the world. We appeal to South Africa and the contact group and assure them that the world will be a happier and better place if the evil system in southern Africa is put to rest and when Namibia becomes independent. The world is always a better place when an evil system has run its course. The world was a better place with the end of the slave trade, and better still with the end of colonial rule. We envisage the same happy prospect for a free and independent Namibia.

88. What is needed today is encouragement for more positive measures for the furtherance of the negotiations on Namibia's independence. The efforts of the Secretary-General need to be further strengthened and his role and prestige further enhanced to enable him to fulfil speedily and effectively the obligations of the Organization concerning the freedom of Namibia. My delegation expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his untiring efforts to make resolution 435 (1978) a living reality.

89. The OAU and SWAPO continue to demonstrate restraint. Aggression should be restrained at this late and crucial hour. SWAPO has also indicated its readiness to sign a cease-fire agreement and to accept a timetable for the deployment of UNTAG in furtherance of the electoral process under the supervision of the United Nations.

90. The intervention of the President of SWAPO in this debate [*2439th meeting*] also demonstrated restraint. His agreement to consider the proposals for the electoral system and Constituent Assembly for Namibia is heartening. His further assurance that the white minority and their property in a free Namibia will be protected should allay many fears and doubts on this matter.

91. South Africa, too, has told us that it is capable of self-restraint and good will and it will not accept the charge that it is opposed to freedom for Namibia.

92. How long South Africa will indeed march with a rhythm that is out of step with the rest of the world is unknown. If, after more than 300 years, the whites of South Africa have not learned the lesson of good-neighbourliness, when will they ever learn? They must cease to be distrustful of the efforts of their own kind even when the latter would persuade them that the earth is the common heritage of all mankind, where all mankind, including white South Africans, can find security and be understood, accepted, forgiven and loved. With honesty to ourselves and the Namibian people, the political will, moral courage and a determination on the part of the

entire membership of the United Nations, it should be possible for Namibia to achieve its independence in the immediate future.

93. If Namibia is not free today it is because it is a pawn on the international chessboard. Negotiations should proceed in good faith so that distrust and suspicion give way to the prospect of lasting good will and friendship in the years ahead, with a free Namibia contributing it full share to universal peace and brotherhood.

94. We must all work in harmony to put to rest the fears and suspicions of South Africa. Friendship, however, cannot be cultivated at the point of a gun. The whites in South Africa must also know that, while there may be a diversity in the races of mankind, the one thing that they all hold dear and in common is their love of freedom, which even man's Creator cannot take from him. The love of freedom is universal. It is as vital to life as the breath of life that man breathes. Man not only sheds his blood for freedom; be gives it a place of immortality to preserve it long after it has been achieved.

95. Mr. TROYANOVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): After a lengthy interval, the Council has met once again to consider the question of Namibia and the situation concerning the implementation of the Council's decisions regarding the early achievement of independence by the people of that country.

96. We welcome the participation in the meetings of the Council of the ministers for foreign affairs of a large number of African and other non-aligned States Members of the United Nations.

97. We also welcome the presence, at these meetings of the Council of Mr. Sam Nujoma, the President of SWAPO, which for so many years has led the heroic struggle on the part of the people of Namibia for their national liberation. Mr. Nujoma set forth most clearly and carefully the position of SWAPO on the item under discussion [*ibid.*].

98. The convening of the Council at the present time has been occasioned by profound concern on the part of African, but by no means only African, countries at the lack of progress in resolving the problem of Namibia, and the serious overall deterioration of the situation in the south of Africa. I would go even further and say that the whole of Africa is up in arms and furious about the situation that now exists. The Soviet people share this anger and indignation.

99. The report submitted to the Council by the Secretary-General rightly expresses serious concern at the delay in the implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978). The report states that:

> "the delay in implementing resolution 435 (1978) is having a destructive impact not only on Namibia itself but also on the prospect of a peaceful and prosperous future for the region as a whole. The delay also has an adverse effect on international relations in a wider sphere, adding to the prevailing sense of frustration and mistrust, with all that that implies for peace and security in the region." [S/15776, para. 16.]

100. In recent days the whole world has witnessed yet another act of aggression: the barbarous raid by the South African Air Force on Maputo. This is not a link in any kind of cycle of violence, as certain speakers have tried to present it here; no, it was an unprovoked attack on a sovereign State: the sovereign State of Mozambique, a Member of the United Nations. In the statement on this event issued on 27 May by TASS, reference is made to the solidarity of the Soviet Union with the people of Mozambique and its unswerving and unfailing support for the people of Mozambique in its unremitting struggle against the forces of imperialism, colonialism and racism.

101. I doubt that anyone would deny that Namibia's winning of independence and its liberation from the colonial and racist yoke constitute today one of the most urgent of international tasks. The development of the situation, not only in southern Africa but far beyond the confines of that region, will depend on the justice and speed with which that task can be completed.

102. The United Nations bears a direct responsibility for the political fate of Namibia, for its decolonization and for its attainment of independence. Taken together, United Nations decisions, including Council resolution 435 (1978), set out the ways and means for ensuring Namibia's transition to independence as well as the role of SWAPO as the sole authentic representative of the Namibian people. These United Nations decisions and the Organization's position cannot be diminished by any political intrigues.

103. In this regard, the Soviet delegation would like to mention the great work done by the United Nations Council for Namibia, presided over by the representative of Zambia, Mr. Paul Lusaka. The Council for Namibia has done a great deal to defend the interests of the Namibian people and to assist the noble cause of the liberation of Namibia.

104. One would have to be extremely naïve in political affairs to believe that the Pretoria racist régime could possibly have acted so provocatively as to have persisted in its occupation of Namibia and in its aggressive actions against neighbouring African States were it not for the fact that it is aware of the direct and indirect military, economic, political and diplomatic backing and protection of the United States and certain other countries members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This has been often repeated, but the obvious must be repeated because there is no getting away from it. Nor can there be any doubt that, were it not for that support, the representative of the Pretoria régime would not have dared to speak here in the Council in such a provocative way, threatening African States with all manner of reprisals.

105. But since that is the case, can one be surprised at the fact that the so-called Western contact group—which Mr. Nujoma referred to here as self-appointed—should have finally succeeded after five years of effort in leading the Namibian settlement process into a deadlock? Could one really have expected any effective assistance in the matter of liberating Namibia from those countries, which are so closely linked with South Africa, which consider it a long-standing ally and which themselves have an interest in seeing the continuation of the colonial economic exploitation of Namibia?

106. In the course of the five years that have elapsed since the Council's adoption of resolution 435 (1978), one artificial obstacle after another has constantly been raised to the implementation of that resolution. In the beginning, as we know, the major obstacle to the independence of Namibia was said to be the absence of guarantees for the white minority. Then we had the question of the electoral system. Later we heard about the so-called problem of the impartiality of the United Nations. Very recently a new condition has emerged: linkage between the settlement for Namibia and the withdrawal of the Cuban military contingent from Angola, a contingent which is there at the request of the Angolan Government and on the basis of an agreement between Angola and Cuba. This unlawful demand is aimed at a clear and obvious target: blockage of a Namibian settlement. At the same time it has a hidden purpose: to weaken Angola in the face of the military threat from the South African aggressors. Obviously, this is nothing but flagrant, inadmissible intervention in the internal affairs of the sovereign State of Angola. In spite of the serious losses it has sustained, Angola, which is at the very forefront of the struggle against colonialism and racism, continues to defend the cause of the freedom of peoples and peace in the African continent. This has earned it great authority in and beyond Africa. It is not for nothing that this notorious linkage has been repudiated by the entire world community. It is not for nothing that, in this very chamber, one speaker after another has rejected the linkage between the question of Namibia and the withdrawal of the Cuban military contingents from Angola.

107. The question arises: What other rabbits are the Western illusionists going to pull out of the hat in order to prevent a settlement of the Namibian problem?

108. The representative of Western countries are continuing to express forced optimism and to give their assurances that, if they are given just a little more time, the problem will be solved and everything will be fine. Even now, at these meetings of the Council, we are hearing once more the voices of the North Atlantic sirens repeating the same words of comfort and encouragement.

109. But SWAPO and the States of Africa have learned from their own bitter experience the real value of those assurances and those promises. It was for good reason that Mr. Nujoma stated here frankly that SWAPO believes the role of the so-called contact group to be over. It is for this very reason that African States and non-aligned countries took the initiative of calling for the convening of the Council. The United Nations—its Security Council and its General Assembly—have given a mandate to no one to take over their role and responsibility in the matter of bringing about a political settlement of the problem of Namibia.

110. Every year we witness the growth and the broadening of international support for the just struggle of the Namibian people to rid its homeland of the colonial yoke. Striking testimony to this is found in the documents adopted recently by a number of international conferences and meetings. The Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi from 7 to 12 March this year, adopted important decisions relating to the just struggle of the people of Namibia [*see S/15675 and Corr. 1 and 2, annex, sect. I, paras. 40-51*]. The Conference expressed firm support for the demand for the granting of independence to Namibia and called for the elimination of the *apartheid* régime in South Africa. The Political Declaration adopted at that Conference condemns the lawlessness of the South African racists, their connivance with Western Powers and demands the earliest possible implementation of Council resolutions on the granting of independence to Namibia. It confirms wholehearted solidarity with the oppressed people of South Africa and demands a comprehensive boycott of South Africa and condemns the support for Pretoria given by the United States [*ibid., paras. 52-59*].

111. Of great significance too was the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held in Paris this April.[6] The decisions of the Conference and the statements made by its participants demonstrated the determination of the world community to put an end as soon as possible to the colonial occupation of Namibia by the racist régime and to enable the people of Namibia to exercise their inalienable right to independence. The Conference unambiguously rejected the manoeuvres of the United States aimed at linking the problem of Namibia with the withdrawal of Cuban military personnel from Angola.

112. The Soviet Union categorically condemns the continuing illegal occupation of Namibia by the racist régime of Pretoria and favours the immediate granting of genuine independence to Namibia, in accordance with the decisions of the United Nations in their totality, including Council resolution 435 (1978), which define the basis for a peaceful settlement of the problem of Namibia.

113. The Soviet Union favours the earliest possible exercise, by the Namibian people, of their inalienable right to self-determination and independence on the basis of the preservation of the unity and territorial integrity of Namibia, including Walvis Bay and the offshore islands and favours the immediate and total withdrawal from Namibia of the troops and administration of South Africa.

114. The Soviet Union favours the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in a Namibian settlement by means of ensuring effective control by the Council—and I mean the Council and not some group of States—over the implementation of all aspects of the attainment by Namibia of genuine independence, including, of course, matters pertaining to the formation, composition, leadership, deployment and activities of UNTAG, mentioned in paragraph 7 of the report of the Secretary-General [*S/15776*]. We believe it is necessary to lay down a clear-cut time-frame for carrying out further measures designed to ensure independence for the people of Namibia.

115. It is the bounden duty of the Council to take all necessary measures to see to it that as soon as possible implementation of its resolutions on the question of Namibia is secured.

116. In this regard, our own country supports the demands for the Council to impose comprehensive, mandatory sanctions on the Pretoria régime, in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. It is important to ensure that all States observe the embargo decreed by the Council on arms deliveries to South Africa [*resolution 418 (1977)*] and halt co-operation with South Africa in the political, economic and military fields, including the nuclear field. The Council must take measures to prevent access by South Africa to the possession of nuclear weapons.

117. Solidarity with the people struggling against the vestiges of colonialism, racism and *apartheid* for the attainment of independence is one of the fundamental principles of Soviet foreign policy. The Soviet Union has given and will continue to give consistent support for the just struggle of Namibia against colonial domination, a struggle it has been waging, under the leadership of SWAPO, its sole authentic and legitimate representative. We have supported and will continue to support the front-line States in their efforts to bring about a Namibian settlement on the basis of implementation of the decisions of the United Nations on that subject.

118. Mr. AMEGA (Togo) (*interpretation from French*): Two years ago, on 22 April 1981 [*2269th meeting*], addressing the Council on the question that remains before it today, the question of Namibia, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of the Togolese Republic, Mr. Anani Kuma Akakpo-Ahianyo, denounced the decline of moral values in our time which enables the racist régime of Pretoria, with the undisguised support of certain States Members of the Organization, to continue with impunity its illegal occupation of Namibia. Then, turning to the crux of the problem, namely, the means of rapidly securing the independence of Namibia, the Minister declared that South Africa's friends were facing a fundamental choice, namely, to continue to seek satisfaction of their short-term interests by supporting South Africa in its illegal occupation of Namibia and thus to alienate the rest of Africa or, on the other hand, to abandon this short-sighted and hopeless policy and contribute positively to the advent of an independent Namibia and thus earn the recognition and friendship of eternal Africa.

119. The thrust of that statement and the clear-cut nature of the choice proposed clearly reflect the very great importance that the Togolese Government and its leader, General Gnassingbe Eyadéma, attach to the independence of Namibia.

120. We know, Sir, that that unwavering devotion of the Togolese Government and people to the cause of Namibia is also shared by the Government and people of Zaire. You will therefore understand my delegation's satisfaction at seeing the worthy son of a great African country presiding over the Council when it is once again considering the question of Namibia. We are convinced that under your wise guidance the Council, at the conclusion of this debate, will adopt the measures long awaited by the immense majority of the international community to hasten the long-delayed independence of Namibia.

121. Until the very last moment, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Togo hoped to participate personally in these very important meetings of the Council on the question of Namibia. However, events beyond his control unfortunately prevented him from being present here today. He asked me to convey to you, Sir, to his colleagues who came here expressly to demonstrate the importance that Africa attaches to the settlement of the question of Namibia and to the members of the Council his appreciation, encouragement and best wishes for success.

122. My delegation takes this opportunity to pay a well-deserved tribute to Mr. Sam Nujoma, the President of SWAPO, for the political wisdom and great qualities he has demonstrated in the quest for a just solution to the Namibian question.

123. Inscribed on the agenda of the General Assembly ever since the creation of the United Nations, the question of Namibia is so well known to the members of our Council and the participants in this debate that there is no need for any historical account to be given. The history of this question has, moreover, been lucidly presented by the United Nations Council for Namibia in its report to the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, which was held in Paris from 25 to 29 April.[7]

124. However, my delegation would like briefly to present the situation in Namibia. On the one hand, there are the Namibian people, a people who love freedom and peace, unfortunately driven to armed struggle for the exercise of their inalienable and sacred rights to freedom and independence—rights recognized for all peoples by the Charter of the United Nations and other international legal instruments. On the other hand, there is the abject *apartheid* régime, condemned by the international community, continuing its illegal occupation of Namibia despite General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration on the Grant-

ing of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; despite General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, which terminated the Mandate of South Africa over Namibia and placed the Territory under the direct responsibility of the United Nations; despite the advisory opinion handed down in 1971 by the International Court of Justice, declaring South Africa's presence in Namibia illegal and that that country was obliged to withdraw from Namibia;[8] and, finally, despite numerous resolutions of the General Assembly as well as of the Security Council, which required South Africa to withdraw from the Territory. That is the nature of the problem which is once again before the Council.

125. To resolve the problem that I have just described, the Council, on 29 September 1978, in which it approved the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation [*S/12636*], urging the conclusion of a cease-fire agreement, the creation of a demilitarized zone, the deployment of UNTAG and the holding of free and fair elections under United Nations supervision and control. All of the interested parties accepted that resolution, including South Africa, and the five member countries of the contact group undertook the task of securing the implementation of that resolution from the parties concerned.

126. The Council is once again seized of the question of Namibia because, nearly five years after its adoption, resolution 435 (1978) has not even begun to be implemented. In the view of my delegation, this resolution has not been implemented for four reasons.

127. First, the so-called acceptance of this resolution by South Africa was in reality merely a ruse to gain time so that it could continue the racist régime's domination of Namibia. How else can we explain the fact that, after having declared that it accepted the United Nations plan for Namibia, the *apartheid* régime sought to impose on the Namibian people and upon the international community an alleged internal settlement, the objective of which was to extend the shameful system of *apartheid* definitively to the Territory? How else can we explain the fact that, despite its acceptance of resolution 435 (1978), South Africa continued and stepped up its dilatory and diversionary tactics, declaring, at the pre-implementation meeting held at Geneva in January 1981, that it was premature to discuss the implementation of that plan, when SWAPO was prepared to negotiate a cease-fire agreement and to set a date for the holding of free and fair elections?

128. Secondly, it is due to the insolent intransigence of South Africa. That intransigence is demonstrated at the internal level by relentless oppression, whose main features and methods I described in the statement I made at the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly.[9] Externally, the intransigence and insolence of South Africa may be seen in its repeated acts of aggression against neighbouring countries, namely, Angola, Lesotho and Mozambique, in flagrant violation of the principles of the non-use of force in international relations and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States. The intransigence of South Africa would not be possible without the extremely regrettable support that country continues to receive from certain States Members of the Organization.

129. Thirdly, it is due to the fact that not all the members of the contact group have exerted all the pressure they could bring to bear on the Government of Pretoria in view of the enormous influence they enjoy with that Government and of their real weight in the international community.

130. Finally, the fourth reason is the linkage that has been established between the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of foreign forces which are present in Angola at the express request of the Government of that sovereign State. In order to establish that linkage, it was first necessary to distort the question of Namibia. The problem of Namibia—which is, as we have demonstrated, a simple problem of decolonization—was turned into a complex ideological problem. This was followed by a feigned ignorance of the fact that the foreign forces are in Angola precisely because of the repeated acts of aggression on the part of South Africa against that country. As I said in my statement to the General Assembly on 14 December 1982:

> "The question of the withdrawal of foreign troops in Angola is a matter exclusively within the competence of that country. The withdrawal of those foreign troops, which is desired by certain parties, would, in fact, be greatly helped by South African military disengagement in Namibia and the granting of independence to that Territory. Eliminate the cause and the effects disappear."[10]

131. My delegation thus deeply regrets the linkage that has been established between the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of foreign troops from Angola. We address an urgent appeal to the allies of South Africa to place the Namibian problem back in its proper context. The question of Namibia is a question of decolonization and nothing else. It concerns the inalienable rights of a people to self-determination, freedom and national independence. If we return the Namibian problem to its proper context, we are obliged to recognize that resolution 435 (1978) provides an equitable basis for its solution. That is why, in conformity with the Paris Declaration on Namibia and the Programme of Action on Namibia, adopted by the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence,[11] and in conformity with the recommendations of the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries [*see S/15675 and Corr. 1 and 2, annex, sect. I, paras, 40-51*], my delegation requests the Council to take the necessary steps to secure South Africa's immediate implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

132. It is time that the Council remembered that the question of Namibia is the direct responsibility of the United Nations and that it is incumbent upon the Council

to use every means to prevail on South Africa to implement resolution 435 (1978). In so doing, the Council will finally do justice to the oppressed people of Namibia, who continue to place their trust in the United Nations.

133. To conclude, my delegation wishes to reaffirm the complete support of the Government and people to Togo for the heroic struggle being waged by the Namibian people for their independence, under the wise and responsible leadership of SWAPO, its sole and authentic representative. My delegation wishes also to reiterate to the Secretary-General and to the United Nations Council for Namibia—so effectively presided over by my colleague and brother, Mr. Paul Lusaka—the appreciation of the Togolese Government for their tireless efforts to hasten the advent of a free and independent Namibia.

134. Mr. SALAH (Jordan) (*interpretation from Arabic*): I should like to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month and to express our confidence that your experience and diplomatic talents in conducting the deliberations will lead to the results that we all desire.

135. I should also like to avail myself of this opportunity to welcome the ministers for foreign affairs who have come here to participate in this important debate on Namibia, despite the urgent political tasks awaiting them in their countries. The presence in New York of this impressive number of ministers for foreign affairs bears witness to the critical nature and importance of the stage which the question of Namibia has reached. It also emphasizes the need for the international community to take effective and urgent action to ensure the implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978), which provides for Namibia's independence. It gives me pleasure also to welcome Mr. Sam Nujoma among us during these deliberations and I should like to reaffirm to him Jordan's solidarity with the people of Namibia in their struggle to exercise their right to freedom and independence.

136. The question of Namibia is one of a people under foreign rule. That foreign domination has been perpetuated by the illegal hold on Namibia by South Africa, which received a Mandate from the League of Nations to help the Namibian people achieve sovereignty and independence within the framework of the full exercise of their right to self-determination. The situation has been complicated by the continuation of the policies of racial segregation and discrimination of South Africa, so that the Namibian people, together with other peoples of southern Africa, are the victims of foreign occupation and the policies of racial segregation and discrimination.

137. I shall not dwell at length on the ethical and legal aspects that have been ignored by South Africa. I do not think that there is any controversy within the Council over the justice of the cause of the Namibian people. However, I realize that we live in a world in which having rights and a just cause is not enough to check oppression and deter aggression. I represent a country and belong to a people which have legal instruments and ethical justification for terminating foreign occupation of our land. However, force prevents the exercise of our rights there, as it does in southern Africa.

138. Fortunately, there is unanimity about the justice of the cause of the Namibian people—despite differences concerning the way to redress the wrongs visited upon them—and I consider that to be real progress.

139. We understand the political obstacles that block the implementation of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia. Most of them are the result, first, of the continuing South African occupation of Namibia and, secondly, of the strange political nature of the South African system. These have spilled over into the neighbouring region. South Africa's prevarication concerning allowing the people of Namibia to exercise their right to self-determination, and its racist policy have complicated the social and political problems in southern Africa, and this has led to the emergence of a condition of instability that has increased the level of extremism, violence and resistance in the area.

140. Hence, it is clear that tackling the question of Namibia first and that of southern Africa second will lead to an amelioration of the situation in the area and, as a corollary, to some sort of stability. To consider the cause as the effect will not help the advocates of realism, pragmatism and moderation. We believe in realism and moderation in dealing with international political problems, provided this is preceded by an exact and realistic diagnosis of the principal cause. My delegation believes that the circumstances which led to the emergence of the so-called linkage cannot be separated from the foreign occupation of the Territory of Namibia and the policies of *apartheid* of the State responsible for that occupation. We believe that, if the question of occupation is resolved first and that of the policy of *apartheid* afterwards, the concern that some feel about the matter of linkage may automatically be dispelled, because the circumstances that led to it will have been eliminated.

141. The adoption of Council resolution 435 (1978) was a turning-point in the road leading to Namibia's independence. In this respect, we note with satisfaction the convergence of views on the need to bring about the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) as the only acceptable framework. We cannot fail to mention also the important recommendations adopted by the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held recently in Paris.[11]

142. My delegation welcomes the response of the front-line States and their co-operation with the Western contact group in the search for the best and most effective way to ensure the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). We pay particular tribute to the positive and realistic spirit shown by SWAPO, the sole legitimate representative of the people of Namibia, to facilitate the implementation of that resolution. We welcome its willingness to sign the cease-fire agreement and its commitment to co-operation with the Secretary-General and the

United Nations machinery with a view to bringing about a peaceful transition to independence.

143. We avail ourselves of this opportunity to commend the extent of the progress achieved among the various parties through the Western contact group. However, the prevarication of South Africa and its obstruction to the process of the independence of Namibia are evident; it has introduced extraneous conditions that have not been part of the negotiations concerning the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and have nothing whatsoever to do with the resolution itself. As the Secretary-General stated in his recent report:

> "These issues now apparently constitute the main reason for the delay in the implementation of the United Nations plan. I am deeply concerned that factors which lie outside the scope of resolution 435 (1978) should hamper its implementation." [*S/15776, para. 19.*]

144. We share the Secretary-General's concern over this situation. We share his view that the essential issue of Namibian independence should be dealt with speedily. We believe that the settlement of the question of Namibia would have a positive effect in lessening tension in the area and creating circumstances conducive to reinforcing the opportunities for stability and security in the area.

145. My delegation wishes to commend the persistent efforts of the Secretary-General in his attempt to accelerate the implementation of the plan for Namibia's independence in accordance with resolution 435 (1978). The Secretary-General has fulfilled his role with dedication, as is clearly reflected in his report. We wish to express our gratitude to the Secretariat, which has worked with efficiency and speed to launch UNTAG and thus help to implement the settlement plan.

146. More than ever before, the Council is required to shoulder its responsibilities for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), especially in view of recent events in the area which led to loss of life and material damage and of the aggression to which Mozambique has been subjected. All these may have grave implications for security and safety in the area. If the Council does not deal effectively with the matter and discharge its responsibilities, the situation in southern Africa will deteriorate beyond control.

147. In conclusion, we are confident that the Namibian people's dream of independence and sovereignty under the leadership of their sole legitimate representative, SWAPO, will soon come true. However, the Council and all concerned should contribute to hastening the coming of that day so that the Namibians can build and develop their country and enjoy security and a better life.

148. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Botswana, Mr. Archibald Mogwe, to whom I extend a welcome. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

149. Mr. MOGWE (Botswana): Even as delegations from different parts of the globe were arriving in New York to participate in the Council's debate on the situation in Namibia, South African military aircraft were violating the territorial integrity of Mozambique, strafing innocent civilians and spreading death and destruction. The raid was not the first one into Mozambique, nor is Mozambique the only State in the region to have been so brutalized. Such raids are undertaken to kill, maim, terrorize and destablize local populations. They are undertaken in retaliation for acts of sabotage carried out in South Africa by South African nationals. The raid into Mozambique during the present debate illustrates forcefully the danger to which States in the region are exposed on account of South Africa's intransigence and its contempt for resolutions calling for the dismantling of *apartheid* and the granting of freedom to its oppressed peoples. South Africa alleges that States in the region harbour, train and arm the freedom fighters. This is quite often the pretext for attacking refugee camps.

150. The economic circumstances of our countries are such that they allow us to spend our limited resources only on the development of our countries and not on training and arming freedom fighters. We are not at war with South Africa nor do we pose any danger to its security. SWAPO is waging a liberation war and has long declared its readiness to sign a cease-fire agreement with South Africa; but rather than respond favourably to SWAPO, South Africa wants non-aggression pacts signed with countries with which it is not at war. South Africa's acts of aggression must be condemned.

151. The explosion which took place in Pretoria last week, resulting in suffering and serious loss of life, should be a matter of profound concern to the international community as it vindicated equally forcefully the fears which have been expressed by our leaders over a long period but which have gone unheeded. The attack was not an accident, an aberration or a hideous dream to be wished away or ignored. It was a fact of the unfolding tragic situation in southern Africa. It is regrettable that the terrorism of *apartheid* and all it stands for has driven man to violence. It has taken 70 years to make this hard choice.

152. Faced with a similar problem Brutus said to Cassius:

> "We all stand up against the spirit of Caesar;
>
> And in the spirit of men there is no blood:
>
> O! then that we could come by Caesar's spirit,
>
> And not dismember Caesar."

That is our prayer too.

153. Mr. President, my delegation congratulates you on your conduct of the proceedings of the Council. I have had the privilege of knowing you and working with you over a long period of time, and your impartiality has

never been called in question. That also goes for your country, Zaire.

154. Contrary to what Mr. von Schirnding, the representative or South Africa, said the other day, the purpose of these meetings of the Council is to promote a peaceful settlement of the question of Namibia. Almost five years ago, the Council adopted resolution 435 (1978). Since 1978, the front-line States, the Secretary-General, the Security Council, the General Assembly, the OAU, the Non-Aligned Movement and, recently, the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence have all made every endeavour to facilitate the implementation of the resolution, but to no avail. Angry speeches and declarations, solidarity rallies, resolutions, programmes of action, contemplated sanctions, negotiations and even more patient negotiations, supplicatory pilgrimages to Pretoria and Cape Town and every mode of gentle persuasion—all have failed to induce South Africa's co-operation in the implementation of a plan it accepted in 1978. The plan remains unimplemented. South Africa maintains its illegal and unwanted presence in Namibia with defiant impunity.

155. The statement made before the Council by the representative of South Africa [*2440th meeting*] was a brutal revelation of South Africa's contempt for the United Nations and its resolutions. The statement was depressing and a source of much frustration. It harks back to the Mandate of the League of Nations and underlines, with typical Boer frankness, South Africa's non-acceptance of the termination of its League of Nations Mandate and its contemptuous refusal to recognize resolutions passed and action taken consequent upon the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice.[8] The statement gave a catalogue of allegations against the United Nations itself and accused its officials of duplicity and partiality towards SWAPO. The statement accused SWAPO of embracing Marxist principles, of deriving its inspiration from the Cuban Revolution and of some mission to kill and to impose itself by force on the people of Namibia. The statement was a display of the arrogance that is a common attribute of the strong and powerful. The statement contains a fundamental contradiction, for, while South Africa alleges that it accepts the right of all peoples to self-determination, it says in the same breath that it will "not tolerate the expansion of Soviet imperialism" on its borders.

156. I have already stated that the objective of this series of meetings is to remove such obstacles as impede the way to a peaceful settlement of the question of Namibia. We have come here because we remain steadfast in our commitment to the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). We have come here because Namibia continues to be a candidate for General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and because the Territory is a direct responsibility of the United Nations in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI).

157. We continue to proclaim our devotion to the efficacy of peaceful change. We have come because we believe that the birth of independent Namibia, long overdue, need not continue to be violent and as such to be a source of international anxiety and concern. We are satisfied that the United Nations plan for Namibia provies, in spirit and design, the right conditions for peaceful change. Yet the plan has been sidetracked and rendered ineffectual by insistence on the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola as a pre-condition for its phased implementation.

158. In January 1981, the Geneva pre-implementation talks were held to advance the negotiations to a stage for determining the date for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). The failure of the meeting to achieve its objectives resulted from South Africa's expressed distrust of the United Nations, and progress towards the implementation of the resolution could only follow the restoration of mutual trust and confidence among the parties. No other reason was given, not even the presence of Cuban forces in Angola. The challenge and the defiance had to be met and obstacles and impediments to the solution of the Namibia problem removed. Principles to be inscribed in the independence Constitution of Namibia were formulated and, after careful and deliberate consideration, accepted by SWAPO. We were close to an agreement on the implementation of the United Nations plan—a fact Mr. Bush, Vice-President of the United States, acknowledged at Nairobi in November 1982.

159. Having progressed so far, it is not only surprising but distressing that South Africa should do precisely what it accuses the United Nations of doing, that is, return to the threadbare arguments of the past. South Africa still seeks "firm and concrete signs" that the United Nations has terminated what it regards as bias in favour of SWAPO. The United Nations, through the report of its Secretary-General [*S/15776*], has demonstrated its seriousness of purpose in advancing the peaceful solution of the problem. The United Nations, by giving some measures of recognition to the role played by the Western contact group in the settlement process and by going along with the constitutional principles formulated by the group [*S/15287*], has demonstrated its desire to dispel any of South Africa's concerns that might hinder peaceful negotiations. Our presence here and the large number of meetings held on this one subject also provide firm and concrete proof, not merely a sign of our concern for the people of Namibia.

160. Resolution 435 (1978) is not being implemented yet—not because there are any major outstanding issues still to be resolved but because the United States and South Africa have decided to subordinate Namibia's progress to freedom and independence to the removal of Cuban forces from Angola.

161. The representative of South Africa, having recounted what, in the view of his Government, were the reasons for the non-implementation of the resolution, added:

> "In the meantime, another threat to the stability and the process of self-determination in South West Africa

> . . . is casting its ominous shadow across our subcontinent, yet another peril for the peace of southern Africa which is growing with each passing month and which has not been of South Africa's making. I refer to the increasing and threatening presence of the surrogate forces of an expansionist . . . super-Power in our region." [*2440th meeting, para. 81.*]

162. "In the meantime" South Africa says. Yet the Cuban forces have been in Angola for the past eight years. South Africa says: "another threat", "another peril", "not of South Africa's making". SWAPO is waging the war of liberation and the people of Namibia are struggling for their independence because South Africa as the then administering Power resolutely refused to comply with Article 77 of the Charter of the United Nations to place South West Africa, a non-self-governing Territory, under the trusteeship system; refused to transmit information on its administration of the Territory; refused to take due account of the political aspirations of the people and to assist in the progressive development of their free political institutions. South Africa says: "another threat", "another peril", "not of South Africa's making".

163. In a major speech in Nairobi last year, the Vice-President of the United States declared that: "The withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola in a parallel framework with South Africa's departure from Namibia is the key to the settlement we all desire." The implication of this statement is that the withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia, as scheduled in the United Nations plan, must take place at the same time as the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. The condition vitiates the United Nations plan accepted by both South Africa and the United States and has been responsible for the present impasse and for the continuing loss of human life in Namibia.

164. Repeat assurances by Angola that the Cuban presence in Angola implies no offensive designs against any States have failed to dissuade the United States and South Africa from their obstructive role. Cuban forces in Angola are seen as a threat to South Africa's security despite the fact that they have neither invaded Namibia nor, to our knowledge, have they at any time ever engaged the South African occupying forces. Reasons for the United States/South African obstructive collaboration, known euphemistically as constructive engagement, should therefore be sought elsewhere.

165. First, the independence of Namibia is seen as a decisive step in the encroachment of African nationalism into areas hitherto preserves for white domination and racism. The question to be asked is: Would it be far wrong to assume that South Africa is playing for time until, in its opinion, SWAPO will have lost the support of the electorate? Secondly, Cuban forces were invited into Angola because of South Africa's invasion of that territory. This was done with the knowledge and tacit support of the United States. May we not therefore surmise that the United States considers it its bounden obligation to get the Cuban forces out of Angola and by that means reverse the situation they helped to create? Thirdly, South Africa's act of aggression against Angola was condemned by Council resolution 387 (1976). South Africa must have felt betrayed by its allies, including the United States, because, instead of opposing the resolution outright or using their power of veto, the United States and others opted for abstention. Would it be wrong therefore to assume that the United States insistence on linkage is atonement for that seeming betrayal and an attempt to restore mutual confidence?

166. United States officials tell the world of some empirical relationship existing between the removal of South Africa's occupation army from southern Angola, its forces from Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. We are told that the introduction of Cuban forces in the area "has torn the fabric of reciprocal restraint between the United States and the Soviet Union". We are told that the dissident National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) movement is an entity to bear in mind in the search for a peaceful settlement. East-West ideological rivalry is the altar on which the people of Namibia are being sacrificed.

167. We reject the view that Namibia's concerns are subordinate to those of South Africa and that the latter's preoccupations must be considered so overriding that the former's must be compromised, sacrificed or reduced to the level of a mere cold-war issue. The presence of Cuban troops in Angola is irrelevant to the search for a solution to the Namibian problem. Their future stay in Angola is a matter to be decided solely by the Governments of Angola and Cuba.

168. Namibia is a United Nations Territory. Resolution 435 (1978) approves a plan to be implemented under the authority of the Council. We cannot over-emphasize the role of the Secretary-General in this regard. As he himself rightly points out in his report, he regards "the problem of Namibia as a special responsibility of the Secretary-General in view of the unique relationship between the United Nations and the people of Namibia" [*S/15776, para. 20*]. We support the Secretary-General in the discharge of that responsibility.

169. Botswana recognizes that, contrary to accusations of gross interference often levelled against them, the involvement of the members of the contact group in the Namibia question is in compliance with the role Africa has long envisaged for them as friends of South Africa. We recognize that their role can only be ancillary to that of the Council and the Secretary-General. Their private national interests should not be allowed to delay or divert the course of Namibian independence.

170. We are here to seek peaceful ways of facilitating the implementation of the plan for Namibia. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Zambia stated the other day: "We are not seeking a confrontation with any country or group of countries . . ." [*2440th meeting, para. 50*]. Our mission is a limited one. It is to promote the peaceful

settlement of the Namibia question through the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and to require the Council and the Secretary-General to assume fully the responsibilities laid down for them.

171. Our political responsibilities, however, compel us to register our opposition to what we seriously consider to be a determined effort by the authors of the linkage and parallelism problems to subvert resolution 435 (1978), employing it to serve purposes and interests at variance with the objectives of the resolution. Resolution 435 (1978) is not a comprehensive plan for the solution of South Africa's regional problems or an excuse to serve United States global strategy. It is a United Nations plan for the settlement of the Namibian question. We therefore urge the United States and South Africa to co-operate fully with the international community in the settlement of the issue.

172. This is our modest contribution to this debate. We cannot brandish arms to instil fear in the hearts of those who obstruct the progress of Namibia to independence, for we do not have any. What we have is the moral courage to speak out against injustice.

173. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Malaysia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

174. ZAINAL ABIDIN (Malaysia): At the outset, I should like to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of May. We are pleased to see in the Chair a person of your stature, experience and ability. My delegation is confident that, under your able guidance, the Council will achieve constructive and positive results. At the same time, I should like to take this opportunity to express my sincere appreciation to you, and through you to the other members of the Council, for giving me the opportunity to participate in these important deliberations.

175. The Council is meeting at a very crucial time. As everyone is aware, the situation in and around Namibia today has been greatly aggravated, basically because of South Africa's continued illegal occupation of that Territory and its belligerent policy, which threatens the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the front-line States. It is not an exaggeration to say that the atmosphere in southern Africa is charged and tense and that it poses a serious threat to regional and world peace. If Namibian independence does not become a reality soon, the consequences may be too frightful to contemplate. It is therefore the solemn duty of all of us here, in particular the members of the Council, to facilitate the termination of South Africa's horrifying policy of violence, which undermines the foundations of peace in that region, and to put an end to South Africa's persistent and blatant disregard of the inalienable right of the Namibian people to independence.

176. The presence of an impressive number of ministers for foreign affairs from non-aligned countries, who have come to address the Council, underscores the importance that the Non-Aligned Movement attaches to this question. It should be sufficiently clear that the issue of Namibia is becoming more and more intolerable to the members of the international community, irrespective of their political persuasion or their stature. It is in this regard that my delegation would like to appeal to the Council to be more alive to and conscious of its inherent responsibility to the people of Namibia in their struggle for freedom and dignity.

177. It is quite obvious that the Namibian question is one of the most urgent questions confronting the United Nations. It is a problem in which the Council bears direct responsibility. In this context, my delegation welcomes the report of the Secretary-General [*S/15776*] and appreciates the interest being shown by him in trying to resolve the problem. He has accorded the Namibian question a high priority, as is shown by the visits he has undertaken to all the front-line States and the contacts he has made with the parties involved. While the Secretary-General and his team have exerted considerable constructive efforts, there seems to be a lack of political will and a reluctance on the part of some members of the Council to co-operate in the necessary speeding-up of the process of independence for Namibia. Such an attitude is indeed regrettable as it will only contribute to perpetuating the misery and frustration of the people there and will further aggravate the security situation in the region.

178. It must be noted with concern that since the adoption in 1978 of resolution 435 (1978), the credibility of the Council has been undermined, as the Council has been utterly ineffective in implementing its own recommendations, although we are constantly told that discussions outside the framework of the United Nations are continually being held. These discussions, initiated by the Western contact group, could have complemented efforts by the United Nations to seek a negotiated settlement of the Namibian problem. Unfortunately, issues that are extraneous to the United Nations plan have been introduced into these discussions, and this has only served to prolong the domination of South Africa over Namibia. As the prospect of independence through the process of negotiation becomes increasingly dim, the frustrations and anger in Namibia become more marked. The level of tension in the region has heightened, and we can envisage greater bloodshed and difficulties for the people in the area in the days to come.

179. For the past two decades, SWAPO has borne the burden of fighting for the inalienable right of the Namibian people to fredom and independence. Since its inception in April 1960, SWAPO has become a truly nation-wide movement, representing all sectors of Namibian society and incorporating the various anti-colonial forces in Namibia. From a humble beginning, SWAPO has today become the embodiment of the Namibian struggle for freedom and independence. The United Nations recognition of SWAPO as a national liberation movement and the representative of the Namibian people reflects the extensive support and confidence SWAPO now enjoys.

180. My Government wholly identifies itself with the struggle of SWAPO against oppression and for the liberation of its land. We believe that no nation, in any circumstances, notwithstanding its size and power, should interfere in the affairs of other States. It is clear that peace can be preserved only if nations steadfastly abide by the ideals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

181. We cannot deny the fact that South Africa has been somewhat emboldened in its continued intransigence on the question of Namibia by the wilful and flagrant violation by some countries of the mandatory arms embargo imposed under resolution 418 (1977). Such disregard and the collaboration of these States with South Africa have only served to bolster that country's war machine and dampen the incentive to resolve the Namibian question. It is thus imperative for the Council to ensure scrupulous compliance with the mandatory arms embargo and to take measures to prevent any such violations. In addition, any links that may exist, particularly in the realm of commerce and industry, between some States or their transnational corporations and the Pretoria régime should be severed in order to exert greater pressure on and isolate South Africa.

182. The policy of my Government on the question of Namibia is well known. We view developments there with grave concern and attach considerable urgency to the resolution of the problem. The Council therefore must live up to its responsibility and ensure the implementation of its resolutions forthwith. My Government has extended and will continue to extend its fullest support to the people of Namibia in their valiant struggle to free themselves from the yoke of South Africa's oppression and domination. We shall continue scrupulously to observe the mandatory arms embargo, the oil embargo and all voluntary sanctions and boycotts against South Africa. We shall continue to condemn South Africa's policy in Namibia and its acts of defiance of the will of the international community. South Africa cannot and should not be allowed to procrastinate and to entertain the illusion of perpetual domination of a land and people that do not rightfully and legally belong to it.

183. We are convinced that the irresistible forces of nationalism that dismantled the great colonial empires of the past will prevail again, in Namibia. In this regard, the Government and the people of Malaysia wish to reaffirm their unequivocal support for SWAPO, the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people themselves, in their firm and courageous struggle to achieve freedom and independence. We are confident their sacrifice, dedication and devotion will not fail them. The inevitability of Namibian independence is beyond doubt.

184. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Afghanistan. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

185. Mr. ZARIF (Afghanistan): I should like at the outset, Sir, to congratulate you warmly on your assumption of the high office of President of the Council. Well acquainted as we are with your outstanding professional and human qualities, we are confident that, under your able guidance, the present discussions of this body will be crowned with great success.

186. Almost 17 years have elapsed since the General Assembly, in its resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, terminated South Africa's Mandate over the Territory of Namibia and decided that henceforth the Territory would become under the direct responsibility of the United Nations; on 19 May 1967, by its resolution 2248 (S-V), it established the United Nations Council for Namibia as the sole legal Administering Authority to guide the people of the Territory towards the achievement of full independence.

187. In the face of the arrogant defiance of the occupying Power, namely, the racist régime of South Africa, an advisory opinion was sought from the International Court of Justice to verify whether or not the United Nations was legally and politically authorized to assume direct responsibility for the Territory by terminating South Africa's Mandate conferred upon that country by the League of Nations. The International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion of 21 June 1971,[8] stated in unambiguous terms that the decisions of the General Assembly in its resolution 2145 (XXI) and its resolution 2248 (S-V) were in full conformity with the principles of the international legal system.

188. While the repeated calls of the international community went unheeded, the South African authorities lost no time in tightening their grip on Namibia. The abhorrent faces of colonial occupation and racist oppression manifested themselves in the most blatant manner. The plunder of the human and natural resources of the Territory by the occupying Power and by transnational corporations of its allies assumed an ever-increasing pace, in open defiance of Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia,[3] enacted by the United Nations Council for Namibia, on 27 September 1974.

189. To suppress the struggle of the Namibian people the racist régime of South Africa embarked upon the path of heavy militarization of the Territory in a manner that could also serve its aggressive and hegemonic designs in the whole of southern Africa. Thanks to these plans, the racist régime is capable of launching piratical attacks against the sovereign and independent States of Angola, Botswana and Zambia, with a view to intimidating those countries and to stopping the support they render the national liberation struggle of the people of Namibia.

190. These acts, coupled with repeated acts of aggression against other neighbouring States, such as Lesotho, Mozambique, Seychelles and Zimbabwe, apart from their immediate consequences, constitute a grave threat not only to the African continent but to the security of the entire world.

191. At times we wonder how it is possible for an outlawed régime to fly in the face of the overwhelming majority of mankind and act in total defiance of the verdict of the international community. Afghanistan believes that this would not have been possible had it not been for the political, economic and military co-operation extended to the racist régime by certain Western States, first and foremost, the United States. Only with the assistance of these countries was the *apartheid* régime able to build its monstrous, oppressive, warmongering machine.

192. Council resolution 418 (1977) on a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa is being consistently violated by some of the very same countries that voted in favour of that resolution in the Council. There are persistent reports of the existence of secret military and security arrangements between the Government of South Africa and some Members of the United Nations, which run counter to the obligations assumed by those countries under the Charter of the United Nations.

193. The collaboration of the Zionist régime of Israel and the Governmens of some other countries in the fulfilment of the nuclear ambitions of the *apartheid* régime has given rise to legitimately grave concern over the security of Africa and of the world at large. The dangers of arming the arrogant régime of South Africa with the atomic bomb will no doubt go beyond the limits set by the wishful thinking of the partners of that régime.

194. Facts have also surfaced concerning the continued attempts by the United States and certain other countries to establish a "South Atlantic treaty organization" that would include the racist régime of South Africa and have the task of defending imperialist interests in the southern hemisphere. Were this plan to materialize, the threat posed by the South African régime to the security of the whole area would acquire a new and far-reaching dimension that would inevitably result in the serious deterioration of the international security climate.

195. Some rather recent developments have already served as obstacles in the way of reaching a settlement on the question of Namibia. The United States Administration's policy of so-called constructive engagement with the Government of South Africa has given enough political support to that régime for it to resist the pressure of the international community for a speedy settlement of the problem. The decision of members of the European Community to extend economic assistance to the occupying Power in Namibia and the International Monetary Fund's loan of over $1 billion to the racist régime of South Africa would not only help the overwhelming majority of South Africans and Namibians but would logically result in the diversion of greater amounts of resources to the further militarization of the *apartheid* régime.

196. If the present trend is not stopped, the international community will ultimately have to face a situation where the achievement of a settlement will be far less possible than it may appear to be today.

197. There are certain elements which lie at the core of this unfortunate problem. I should like to underline these elements here.

198. First, the question of Namibia is, in the full sense of the word, a decolonization problem. To portray it in the context of East-West confrontation would be a futile attempt to diminish the importance of the right of all nations to self-determination and independence.

199. Secondly, on the basis of the Definition of Aggression contained in General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, the continued occupation of Namibia by the racist South African forces constitutes a clear act of aggression. The people of Namibia are thus entitled to all forms of struggle, including armed struggle to rid their Territory of the forces of occupation. At the same time, all patriots who have been captured in the course of this struggle by the racist occupying Power must enjoy the status of prisoners of war in conformity with the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949.[12]

200. Thirdly, SWAPO is the sole legitimate and authentic representative of the people of Namibia and the vanguard of their struggle for total independence. Thus, any attempt to gain recognition or legitimacy for the puppet subservient local authorities in Windhoek or to establish the so-called council for constitutional development totally violates the provisions of Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978).

201. Fourthly, Council resolution 435 (1978) constitutes the only basis for the settlement of the Namibian problem. Any attempt by the so-called contact group or from any other quarter to sidetrack the issue from its original course is a violation of Council resolutions. The United States and South Africa's designs to tie the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola to the Namibian settlement is therefore aimed at injecting extraneous and irrelevant issues with a view to prolonging the search for a solution to the problem.

202. Fifthly, the United Nations Council for Namibia is the sole legal Administering Authority of Namibia, and thus the issue of Namibia is an issue between the South African racist régime on the one hand and the international community on the other. This fact belies South Africa's attempt to portray the question of Namibia as a regional issue.

203. Sixthly, under Council resolution 432 (1978) and General Assembly resolution S-9/2 of 3 May 1978, the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia unquestionably imply the inclusion of Walvis Bay, Penguin Island and other offshore islands. Any attempt to secede those areas from mainland Namibia are thus null and void.

204. Seventhly, since the Government of South Africa has consistently defied the resolutions of the Security Council and those of the General Assembly and has thus violated the obligations it assumed under the Charter of

the United Nations, the Council should, in our view, adopt without any further delay comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against that Government under Chapter VII of the Charter and set its own timetable for the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia.

205. The Government of Afghanistan believes that the international community should allow no further time for the dilatory tactics of the racist régime of South Africa and its imperialist collaborators. All-round co-operation and assistance should be extended to SWAPO and to the front-line States with a view to enabling them to intensify their struggle against racist occupation and subjugation and to resist acts of aggression and destabilization.

206. In conclusion, I should like to express our gratitude to the Secretary-General for the lucid and comprehensive report which he submitted to the Council, as well as for his extensive endeavours on behalf of finding a speedy solution to the problem. Our thanks and appreciation also go to the United Nations Council for Namibia which, under the able presidency of Mr. Paul Lusaka of Zambia, has been discharging its responsibilities successfully. Finally, Sir, I should like to thank you and, through you, the Council, for the time you have given my delegation to express our views on the issue before us.

207. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The last speaker is Mr. Lesaoana S. Makhanda, to whom the Council extended an invitation at the 2447th meeting. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

208. Mr. MAKHANDA: First and foremost, Sir, allow our delegation warmly to congratulate you for the second time on your assumption of the presidency of this important body for the month of May. We are confident that under your able leadership the Council will make a valuable contribution to the cause of justice and peace. Allow me also to thank you and the members of the Council sincerely for giving the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) this opportunity to address the Council.

209. It is said that where there is a will, there is a way. In the opinion of PAC, the custodian of the legitimate aspirations of the oppressed, exploited and dispossessed people of Azania, these urgent meetings of the Council have been called to ascertain that will.

210. As far back as 1966, the United Nations correctly terminated South Africa's Mandate in Namibia [*General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966*] and thereafter considered racist South Africa's presence in the Territory illegal. Since 1966, what has been required is that the United Nations should exercise full responsibility for the Territory and lead the people of Namibia to genuine independence. However, because the United Nations failed to live up to the responsibility entrusted to it, we are meeting here today.

211. Namibia is a United Nations responsibility and, for the sake of its own credibility and effectiveness, for the sake of world peace, the United Nations is duty-bound to carry out faithfully its sacred responsibility in occupied Namibia.

212. We, the oppressed, exploited and dispossessed peoples, whether in occupied Namibia, Palestine or colonized Azania, regard the United Nations as an organization committed to upholding the inalienable right of dispossessed peoples and, more important, of righting the wrongs committed against peoples. We believe that the overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations are firmly committed to the lofty principles of the Organization. For instance, speaker after speaker has declared that he fervently upholds the right of the people of Namibia to genuine independence; and yet the realization of that overwhelming wish does not appear to be imminent. It is incumbent upon us to investigate why.

213. The naked truth is that a mere handful of régimes—out of greed, out of expansionist tendency and out of blind pursuance of racist policies—have been flagrantly violating all the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all internationally accepted norms of behaviour and all resolutions adopted by international organizations. The most guilty in this respect have been the racist régime of South Africa and the Zionists in occupied Palestine. It is also a fact that successive United States Administrations have encouraged those racist entities in their acts of aggression, expansion and intransigence.

214. Given these realities, one is tempted to ask: What wisdom prevailed that led to asking the so-called contact group, which includes and is invariably led by the United States, to act as an "honest broker" when the collusion and collaboration between racist South Africa and successive United States Administrations are so well known?

215. Today we acknowledge an impasse in the Namibian independence issue. However, the nature of this impasse too is no secret. It is the introduction of an extraneous and totally unrelated issue of the internal affairs of Angola, namely, the presence of Cuban forces in Angola.

216. The introduction of this totally unrelated issue is a grave and gross misuse of the Namibian cause to promote super-Power rivalry and extension of the so-called spheres of influence. Consequently, the introduction of this totally unrelated issue has not only led to the holding of the Namibian people hostage in the cold-war game but also to manipulation of the United Nations in this game.

217. The Council must make it abundantly clear to all that the United Nations will not shirk the responsibility entrusted to it in respect of the people of Namibia and, more important, will not allow any Power to hijack the Namibian issue to further its global ambitions. This categorical declaration is important both for the credibility of the United Nations itself and for the continued faith placed in it by the peoples of the world, especially the oppressed, exploited and dispossessed peoples. Such a

resolution would also clear the mist that now hovers over the Namibian issue. The Council must give practical effect to this will and do so urgently.

218. As a national liberation movement committed to the complete overthrow of the Fascist, colonial, *apartheid* system in South Africa itself, we of PAC cannot help but draw parallels. There exists evidence galore of racist South Africa's persistent insincerity and obvious reluctance to end its illegal occupation of Namibia. The racists have openly flouted every international resolution and appeal. The overwhelming consensus here is that racist South Africa is intransigent.

219. The existing state of affairs poses very pertinent questions. What should the United Nations, especially the Council, do in the face of this blatant intransigence? Should it capitulate or should it firmly meet this challenge? We of PAC do not believe this particular point is debatable or even negotiable.

220. The Council has no alternative but to meet this intransigence firmly and squarely. Moreover, it has the power and the instrument which can be most effectively used to end racist South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia. The power is the collective will of all the members of the Council, especially the five permanent members. However, it is incumbent upon us to draw the attention of the Council to the fact that one of its permanent members, the United States, has a very special role in giving the Council a decisive collective will in the Namibian issue. The instrument is the imposition of mandatory and comprehensive sanctions under the provisions of the Charter. This is the sole, the most effective path open to the Council to bring a speedy end to this fundamental problem which has been before this world body for over two decades. For the sake of the continued credibility of the United Nations, for the sake of justice, for the sake of world peace and in the name of humanity, the Council must unanimously decide, at the end of this crucial and timely debate, to put an end decisively to racist South Africa's intransigence, its war of aggression and deliberate delaying tactics and forthwith implement resolution 435 (1978)—the only legitimate basis for leading the people of Namibia to genuine independence. The Council must act decisively now because time is running out.

221. However, we feel duty-bound to remind Council members, especially the United States, that, should the Council fail to take this decisive action and unduly prolong racist South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia, or introduce the already discredited bantustan-type policy or extraneous and irrelevant issues into the question of Namibia's independence, the people of Namibia, acting through their national liberation movement, SWAPO, will leave no stone unturned to regain their usurped motherland and inalienable rights. About this there should be no doubt. Moreover, independent Africa and progressive and peace-loving peoples the world over will render every possible assistance to the people of Namibia in their just struggle. About this also there should be no doubt.

222. The era of colonialism is over. The growth of the United Nations in the past two decades is living testimony to that fact. The fact that you, Mr. President, distinguished representative of once-colonized Zaire, are presiding over the highest United Nations organ for peace and security testifies to that fact. Only recently, the heroic people of Zimbabwe convincingly demonstrated, in a difficult situation which duplicated present-day racist South Africa, that seemingly innocuous statements about the orderly transfer of power, or the linkage issue in the case of Namibia, are, in fact, excuses for holding on to power for the benefit of colonialist or imperialist nations; that, in fact, no obstacles can suppress the will of a people to be free; that delays only prolong suffering.

223. Nevertheless, there are those who still live in the past, and those who simply refuse to change with time. These are the moribund forces of history. The Council has a singular responsibility to drum sense and reality into them in order to avert a repetition of the grave tragedies of the past and so that the future may be viewed with a sense of security and justice. The Council, moreover, must act decisively against these moribund forces and firmly implement the provisions of the Charter, so as to build a world based on justice and respect for human dignity and the right of peoples to live as free men, women and children. Although the topic is Namibia, the issue is whether the United Nations, and especially the Council, has the will to uphold and implement its declared principles. We sincerely hope the Council will not fail, because the alternative would be war. And, if the moribund forces believe that through such a war they could perpetuate their occupation, oppression and naked exploitation, they are very much mistaken.

The meeting rose at 8.05 p.m.

NOTES

[1] See *Report of the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, Paris, 25-29 April 1983* (A/CONF.120/13), annex II, sect. A. 3.

[2] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1867th meeting, para. 52.

[3] *Ibid., Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 24*, vol. I, annex II.

[4] *Ibid., Ninth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th meeting, para. 103.

[5] *Ibid.*, 14th meeting, para. 140.

[6] See *Report of the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, Paris, 25-29 April 1983* (A/CONF.120/13).

[7] A/CONF.120/11.

[8] *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports, 1971*, p. 16.

[9] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-seventh Session, Plenary Meetings*, 104th meeting.

[10] *Ibid.*, para. 147.

[11] See *Report of the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, Paris, 25-29 April 1983* (A/CONF.120/13), part three.

[12] United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, No. 972.

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Litho in United Nations, New York 00400 90-60205—April 1991—2,050

UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-EIGHTH YEAR

2449th MEETING: 31 MAY 1983

NEW YORK

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2449th MEETING

Held in New York on Tuesday, 31 May 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. UMBA di LUTETE (Zaire).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2449)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Namibia:
   Letter dated 12 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15760);
   Letter dated 13 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15761)

The meeting was called to order at 11.45 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Namibia:
Letter dated 12 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15760);
Letter dated 13 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15761)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2439th meeting, I invite the representative of Mauritius to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Maudave (Mauritius) took a place at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2439th meeting, I invite the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the other members of the delegation of the Council to take places at the Security Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Lusaka (President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took places at the Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2439th meeting, I invite Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Nujoma took a place at the Council table.

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with decisions taken at previous meetings on this item [*2439th to 2444th, and 2446th to 2448th meetings*], I invite the representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, the Gambia, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Grenada, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Liberia, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, the Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Qatar, Romania, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Upper Volta, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia and Zambia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Zarif (Afghanistan), Mr. Hadj Azzout (Algeria), Mr. de Figueiredo (Angola), Mr. Muñiz (Argentina), Mr. Woolcott (Australia), Mr. Hashim (Bangladesh), Mr. Moseley (Barbados), Mr. Adjibade (Benin), Mr. Mogwe (Botswana), Mr. Tsvetkov (Bulgaria), Mr. Pelletier (Canada), Mr. Trucco (Chile), Mr. Malmierca (Cuba), Mr. Moushoutas (Cyprus), Mr. Suja (Czechoslovakia), Mr. Al-Ashtal (Democratic Yemen), Mr. Khalil (Egypt), Mr. Ibrahim (Ethiopia), Mr. Davin (Gabon), Mr. Blain (Gambia), Mr. Ott (German Democratic Republic), Mr. van Well (Federal Republic of Germany), Mr. Taylor (Grenada), Mr. Kaba (Guinea), Mr. Rácz (Hungary), Mr. Rao (India), Mr. Kusumaatmadja (Indonesia), Mr. Shearer (Jamaica), Mr. Kuroda (Japan), Mr. Wabuge (Kenya), Mr. Abulhassan (Kuwait), Mrs. Jones (Liberia), Mr. Burwin (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Mr. Tan Sri Zainal Abidin (Malaysia), Mr. Traore (Mali), Mr. Marin Bosch (Mexico), Mr. Erdenechuluun (Mongolia), Mr. Mrani Zentar (Morocco), Mr. Chissano (Mozam-

bique), Mr. Oumarou (Niger), Mr. Bolokor (Nigeria), Mr. Cabrera (Panama), Mr. Jamal (Qatar), Mr. Marinescu (Romania), Mr. Niasse (Senegal), Ms. Gonthier (Seychelles), Mr. Stevens (Sierra Leone), Mr. Adan (Somalia), Mr. von Schirnding (South Africa), Mr. Fonseka (Sri Lanka), Mr. El-Fattal (Syrian Arab Republic), Mr. Slim (Tunisia), Mr. Kirca (Turkey), Mr. Owiny (Uganda), Mr. Salim (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. Bassole (Upper Volta), Mr. Martini Urdaneta (Venezuela), Mr. Le Kim Chung (Viet Nam), Mr. Mojsov (Yugoslavia) and Mr. Goma (Zambia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

5. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Ghana and the Islamic Republic of Iran in which they request to be invited to take part in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite them to take part in the discussion without the right to vote, under the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Gbeho (Ghana) and Mr. Serajzadeh (Islamic Republic of Iran) took places at the side of the Council chamber.

6. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The first speaker is the representative of Australia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

7. Mr. WOOLCOTT (Australia): Mr. President, first let me say that the Australian delegation is pleased to see you presiding over the Council during this important series of meetings. Let me also, through you, thank the members of the Council for agreeing to Australia's request to participate today.

8. Australia rarely seeks to intervene before the Council and has only done so today for a number of reasons. First, we recognize the particular importance of the subject under discussion and the unique responsibility of the United Nations for it. Secondly, as one of the few Western members of the United Nations Council for Namibia, we thought it appropriate to add our perspective. Thirdly, the newly elected Australian Government has recently completed a review of its policy on the question of Namibia and we wanted to take this opportunity to state that policy.

9. Australia's commitment to a free and independent Namibia is unquestioned and unequivocal. There can be no doubt that South Africa's occupation of the Territory is illegal and that this is a position held by the international community.

10. The question is not whether Namibia should be free and fully independent—on that there is international consensus—but rather when that should occur and under what conditions. We earnestly hope that this Council debate will assist the process of bringing Namibia to independence. As a number of speakers before me have said, this debate should be used as an opportunity for constructive progress and not for the venting of rhetoric which seems aimed at purposes other than the early independence of Namibia.

11. The Australian delegation has closely followed the debate and commends the spirit of conciliation and moderation that has been demonstrated by most of the parties directly involved. This is a hopeful development. There have, of course, been some extravangant statements but mostly from countries far removed from the scene. Regrettably, the statement by the representative of South Africa did not fit this pattern of conciliation and moderation.

12. Since the adoption of Council resolution 435 (1978), the path towards its implementation has been arduous. There have been substantial achievements but also substantial setbacks. Undeniably the negotiations have oscillated between troughs and peaks. I refer to the pessimism after the 1981 Geneva pre-implementation meeting was torpedoed by South Africa and the optimism last September when the contact group advised the Secretary-General of the agreement on a set of constitutional principles. But by any standard the path has been too long and too slow—unnecessarily so, in Australia's view. My delegation, therefore, expresses its emphatic conviction that resolution 435 (1978) should now be implemented as soon as possible to allow the people of Namibia to determine their own future and set about the task of reconciliation and nation building.

13. Australia's policy on this question is predicated on support for Council resolutions 431 (1978), 432 (1978) and, as I have already mentioned, 435 (1978). In resolution 431 (1978) there was a call for the early independence of Namibia through free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations. In resolution 432 (1978), Walvis Bay was recognized as an integral part of an independent Namibia, while resolution 435 (1978) provided a means of fulfilling the pledge contained in resolution 431 (1978).

14. Much attention has been paid during these meetings to the reasons why resolution 435 (1978) has not yet been implemented. The Australian Government very much regrets the delay that the question of so-called linkage is creating. We should be concerned if the linkage of negotiations on Namibian independence to other issues were to cause a stalemate in the pursuit of independence for Namibia, at a time when all the other signs for early independence looked propitious.

15. I should add, however, that Australia does not think that criticisms directed at specific Western States contribute to an improved climate for negotiations. Insead, we would urge those responsible for the negotiations to focus again on resolution 435 (1978), which contains the essential elements of a settlement, in order to promote afresh, and as a matter of priority, the independence of Namibia.

16. Australia acknowledges the efforts to date of the five Western members of the contact group. The inability of the group so far to complete its allotted task is a cause of frustration to the Australian Government, as indeed it is to the parties most diectly involved. Australia is convinced, however, that the contact group still offers the best chance for bringing about an internationally acceptable solution to the question of Namibia and looks forward to the resumption of progress in the group's efforts.

17. Many speakers have made reference during this debate to the escalating cycle of violence in southern Africa. This violence is to be deeply deplored, as are the continuing efforts of South Africa to destabilize its neighbours. Australia cannot condone the indiscriminate use of violence and, as the Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Robert Hawke, said in the Australian Parliament as recently as 24 May: "The Australian Government unequivocally condemns the latest use by South Africa of its air force to attack a sovereign neighbouring country."

18. Australia cannot support the endorsement of armed struggle as a means of achieving independence for Namibia, as this would be inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. We are committed as a matter of principle to a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the question of Namibia.

19. At the same time, however, the Australian Government understands the frustrations that have led many countries and people to take the view that, if peaceful methods do not produce the necessary results, force may inevitably occur, as a last resort, to end institutionalized discrimination in southern Africa. South Africa must quickly agree to remove its armed forces not only from the Territory of Namibia but also from the sovereign State of Angola. It is essential that all States in the region can be confident about their security without the threat of South African incursions.

20. As a member of the United Nations Council for Namibia, Australia recognizes the Council as the sole legal Administering Authority of the Territory until independence. We shall continue to work actively and constructively within the Council. We believe that the Council could be a force for good in the complex and delicate negotiating process and we shall continue to oppose efforts by some Council members to push it into an obstructionist position.

21. The Australian delegation would like to pay a tribute to the Secretary-General. His assiduous efforts on this difficult issue demonstrate his clear commitment to the cause of an independent Namibia. We especially appreciate the forthright nature of his report [*S/15776*]. We should also pay a tribute to his Special Representative for Namibia, Mr. Ahtisaari, and express the hope that he will be available to continue his valuable work. My Government rejects any imputation against the impartiality of the Secretary-General and his staff and takes this opportunity to express again our full support for his involvement.

22. The importance of this debate is amply demonstrated by the presence during its course of so many ministers for foreign affairs. South Africa should be left in no doubt that it is isolated in its apparent determination to stall the negotiations on independence for Namibia.

23. I have already noted that southern Africa has become an area of heightened tensions and military activity. We believe that the independence of Namibia should be the next step in the complex process of bringing stability to the southern African region because of the immediate impact it would have on the climate of confidence in the area. We should not lose sight of the fact that the primary objective is the independence of Namibia.

24. It is the sincere wish of the Australian Government that the parties directly concerned in the negotiations should take the lead from these expressions of international solidarity and seize the opportunities at hand for the early implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and bring to Namibia and its people the independence which for far too long has been denied them.

25. Mr. SCHELTEMA (Netherlands): Since this is the last day of your presidency, Sir, it is perhaps a little late to congratulate you on your assumption of that office, but I should like to take this opportunity to congratulate you on the very skilful and very diplomatic way you have so far handled the business of the Council. I have full confidence that you will handle it on your last day in the same way. I should like to add that it was a great pleasure to me to see, during parts of the debate we had last week on this question, a former colleague of ours, now your Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sir, presiding over the meetings of the Council.

26. Finally, I take this opportunity to congratulate your predecessor, Mrs. Kirkpatrick, on the very able and dignified way in which she conducted the business of this Council.

27. The present meetings of the Government unmistakably reflect the feelings of impatience and disappointment felt by the international community over South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia. They also signal widespread uneasiness at the slow pace of the negotiations conducted with the aim of securing internationally recognized independence for the Namibian people. Ever since 1968 the Council has decided to remain seized of this question, which is a particular responsibility and concern of the United Nations. Seventeen years after South Africa's Mandate over the Territory was terminated by the General Assembly [*resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966*], Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978) are still awaiting implementation. South Africa so far has failed to comply with those resolutions.

28. The international community is confronted with South Africa's intransigence and that country's practice of constantly raising the price for co-operation in the implementation of the United Nations plan for a settle-

ment. More than once has the South African Government resorted to delaying tactics, raising new problems that have needed to be addressed. My Government seriously questions the willingness of South Africa to vacate the Territory and grant independence to the Namibian people. This will be denied, of course, by the South African side, and they will point to their acceptance of resolution 435 (1978). Whose responsibility is it then, that, five years after the independence plan was adopted, the Namibian people still remain deprived of their legitimate rights? My Government cannot but draw the conclusion that South Africa has not yet decided if it will live up to its declared intentions.

29. The Netherlands, not being directly involved in the negotiations that resulted from the adoption of resolution 435 (1978), welcomed the settlement plan and has consistently encouraged all parties concerned to persevere in their efforts and to show all possible flexibility and goodwill in order to facilitate its peaceful implementation. For its part, my Government has offered to contribute a detachment of civilian police to the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) which will assist the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Namibia in supervising Namibia's orderly transition to internationally recognized independence.

30. Before I continue, I should like to pay a warm tribute to the Secretary-General for his objective, balanced and lucid further report concerning the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia [*S/15776*]. We fully concur in his analysis and we wish to reiterate our deep appreciation for his indefatigable efforts to discharge what he rightly describes in his report as his special responsibility for the problem of Namibia in view of the unique relationship between the United Nations and the people of Namibia. As the Secretary-General's report indicates, five years of protracted negotiations since the adoption of resolution 435 (1978) have so far not yielded conclusive results. Yet the report also sets out in convincing detail the substantial progress that has been achieved thanks to the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, the front-line States, Nigeria, SWAPO, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and, last but not least, the contact group of five Western States, which are the authors of the settlement plan. My Government intends to continue to support these efforts towards the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) because they remain the only viable way to enable the Namibian people freely to exercise their right to self-determination at the earliest possible date.

31. In the summer of 1982, consultations between the parties reached a new level of intensity and expectations rose that an agreement was finally within reach. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the five members of the Western contact group stated in a communiqué issued in New York [*S/15287*] that there was agreement on the constitutional principles for the Namibian Constituent Assembly and on a method for electing the assembly, and that substantial progress had been made on the question of impartiality in the supervision of the electoral process as well as on the size, composition and deployment of UNTAG.

32. All outstanding problems thus seemed to have been resolved. But then it transpired that a major difficulty had arisen in the negotiations: the linkage of South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia to the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola.

33. My Government regrets that this issue has caused delay in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). The presence of foreign forces at the invitation of a sovereign neighbouring country of Namibia falls outside the scope of the proposals for a settlement that were accepted by all sides and should therefore not stand in the way of the early exercise by the Namibian people of their internationally recognized and inalienable right to self-determination and independence. We should therefore have preferred that the present more complex situation had not presented itself. In the present circumstances, however, we can subscribe to the view that the parties are justified in trying to reach an understanding on issues that are relevant to the situation which will prevail after Namibia's independence. For it has been recognized that there should be no need for the presence of foreign forces in Angola once the threat of South African military action against that State has been eliminated. But we should not insist on solving all the problems of the region at once. In this regard, we can subscribe to the view of the Secretary-General as expressed in his report to the Council: the independence of Namibia is "the essential and primary issue, which we must now face up to without further delay" [*S15776, para. 20*].

34. Namibia, being a Territory with an international status, can only proceed to independence through an internationally acceptable process of self-determination, as provided for in the independence plan. For that reason the Netherlands considered the unilateral elections which South Africa organized in Namibia in 1978 as null and void. We shall continue to reject any further measures which the South African administration of the Territory might take with the aim of arriving at an internal settlement of the Namibian problem. The Netherlands also condemns the repeated acts of aggression by South Africa against neighbouring States.

35. Five years of protracted negotiations since the adoption of resolution 435 (1978) have as yet failed to yield conclusive results. The patience of the international community has been stretched almost to its limits. If the Council in its wisdom now wishes again to grant a new lease of life to the negotiations and abstains from invoking its powers under the Charter of the United Nations, this should not be misunderstood by South Africa as a sign of weak-mindedness. Instead, it should be regarded as an urgent appeal to all concerned to redouble their efforts and to remove, in the coming months, the last obstacles on the way towards the implementation of the settlement plan. We, for our part, urge the contact group of five to remain conscious of the responsibility they have accepted towards the Namibian people and the world community. In the time ahead they should be able to

assess South Africa's readiness to co-operate seriously at last in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), after which the Council should convene once again to determine if the enabling resolution for the independence plan can be adopted or, alternatively, to consider how further to press South Africa for compliance with previous decisions of the Council.

36. Surely none of those involved in the negotiations can hope to profit from a renunciation of the commitment to enable the people of Namibia freely to exercise their right to self-determination at the earliest possible date. We hope, therefore, that the present debate, which has so clearly demonstrated the general feeling of uneasiness and impatience at the lack of decisive progress, will induce in all parties concerned a fresh sense of urgency and provide them with new resolve to overcome the final hurdles. Time is running out. If this debate succeeds in conveying this message, only then will it have answered its purpose.

37. Mr. GAUCI (Malta): Mr. President, your nation has done us a signal honour this month in sharing the presidency of the Council between two of its most eminent citizens. As your presidency and the current debate on Namibia draw to a close, I trust our exercise will not be another "betrayed mission" this time, but rather a prelude to the birth of a new and independent African nation, Namibia.

38. Together with a number of other African statesmen, your Minister for Foreign Affairs has explained, with matchless eloquence and deep conviction, the historical background to the justified impatience over the faltering progress in the quest for Namibian independence. The prolonged suffering and the frustrations of the Namibian people over the delay in the attainment of their cherished goal have been stated forcefully and forthrightly by the President of SWAPO, whose presence we welcome here.

39. The presence of so many ministers for foreign affairs amongst us is a testimony to their steadfast faith in the Organization, as well as of their united determination to pursue their goal by peaceful means. Together they have provided a comprehensive catalogue of the innumerable difficulties posed by South Africa; many have been patiently considered and taken favourably into account by SWAPO and the front-line States; there are others, deliberately introduced, which simply cannot be condoned as they run counter to the peaceful progress that should have been achieved years ago.

40. I do not wish to cover the same ground, except to say in all sincerity that we fully understand and sympathize with their frustrations and we particularly regret the suffering of the Namibian people in their quest for social emancipation and political liberty.

41. In any case, Malta's position has been stated in the past; we have made our maximum potential contribution to the promotion of Namibian independence. I need only recall, perhaps, that not a pennyworth of trade, not a gram of gunpowder, not one crumb of comfort, not one iota of recognition has been given to South Africa by the Maltese nation ever since South Africa instituted its racist policies at home and its illegal presence in Namibia. What we have given is high-level university and technical-college education to several Namibian students.

42. It is commonly acknowledged that the Namibian road to independence has been immorally long and unjust and the end, which seemed within reach a few years ago, has recently and unfortunately been made to recede. The last lap was supposed to have been relatively smooth; instead, new and formidable obstacles were placed in the way, some foreseen and foretold, but others quite unexpected and extraneous and deliberately interposed.

43. The momentum for progress has slowed down. Mercifully, however, it has not completely died out; even in the most negative of the statements made here last week a slight ray of hope still emerged. We must now analyse carefully what precise and effective steps we can take so that by concerted international action and by peaceful means we can again rekindle the fire of hope, dampen the discord of suspicion and sustain the people of Namibia in what is perhaps their darkest hour—we hope, however, the darkest hour before the dawn.

44. To help us in our task we have the valuable report of the Secretary-General which, as we have come to expect, not only sets an objective tone over developments since 1981 but also, most properly, touches the real heart of the matter. He urges that

> "the Namibian problem be regarded as a primary question in its own right,"—and I emphasize that phrase—"the solution of which will in itself ease other tensions in the region and be in the long-term interest of all concerned." [*ibid.*]

45. This fundamental principle has been overlooked so often in the past that it is necessary for it to be stressed loud and clear today. It is the one and only key to a lasting solution. It is a clarion call to which we are bound to respond. That is the principal perspective which we, for our part, fully endorse. It sets the right tone for our debate and of course for its outcome. I would therefore hope it will be possible for all of us—and particularly the countries most directly involved—to keep the primacy of this objective with inflexible persistence and with uncompromising dedication, especially in consideration of the clear legal responsibility that the United Nations has towards the people of Namibia. Collective and bilateral efforts are now even more resolutely called for; they need to be intensified and some countries in this respect remain with much more to contribute towards compliance than most of us. Their influence, however, should be exercised exclusively to promote the right of the Namibian people to independence.

46. I feel that this is not a time to recriminate and even less to falter. We must stick firmly to the guidelines spelt out in resolution 435 (1978) but concentrate at this stage

on the most effective modalities with which to achieve those guidelines in practical terms.

47. On this aspect also the Secretary-General's report informs us that progress has also been made—in fact, a large measures of agreement has been reached. The sooner free and United Nations-supervised elections are held, the more emphatic and incontestable will be the verdict of the people concerned as to their future. Agreement on the modalities should therefore be our immediate priority. We should not allow ourselves to be distracted from this direct approach.

48. It is also gratifying to note in the same report that all the parties to the negotiations remain committed to the principles contained in resolution 435 (1978). Just as that resolution was impressively supported, so must the backing for its implementation be generous, consistent and specific. South Africa's response must be clear and unequivocal.

49. It is therefore hoped that, on this occasion, the replies to be expected from the South African Government will soon be forthcoming and that no further pretexts will be provided to camouflage delay, so that it will soon be possible to take practical steps for the commencement of the implementation of that unanimously adopted Council resolution.

50. It is equally highly appropriate that we should all accord priority to helping the Secretary-General in the organization of the required consultations and team effort. A first, essential objective is for the Council to raise its authoritative voice to secure the appropriate climate for the proposed cease-fire in Namibia. Preparations for the sending of UNTAG to the spot should be finalized as a necessary corollary; agreement on details would stimulate the positive momentum that is needed in order to maintain the promise and the progress on which the international community has set its sights and which the people of Namibia have awaited for far too long.

51. My delegation therefore urges the Government of South Africa on this occasion not to crack its racist whip once more or to flex its military muscle, but rather to heed the humanist call of the international community by being forthcoming and extending all necessary co-operation. It is, after all, in South Africa's own long-term interests to have a neighbouring people and country well disposed towards it, despite its tragic arrogance and the economic exploitation it has inflicted on Namibia in the past.

52. In its search for gradual entente with its other neighbours, South Africa needs to mend the damage done by its past prevarication and to start writing a new chapter in the human and political history of southern Africa and inside South Africa itself. By its actions now, the Council can set the tone, the scenario and the arrangements for this process finally to commence. Its authority should encourage, ensure and supervise an overdue start. A unanimously adopted resolution would signal the determination of the Council to carry out its solemn commitment.

53. As all members are aware, the draft resolution before the Council [*S/15803*] is the outcome of collective effort and prolonged negotiation. Even at its lowest common denominator, it clearly reaffirms the legal responsibility of the United Nations for Namibian independence; it denotes an expression of great concern over the lack of progress and it identifies the source of the obstacles to progress; it introduces a new sense of urgency and a determination to concentrate efforts on the fundamental objective—self-determination for the Namibian people; it calls for the mobilization of the best resources available to the Organization in the peaceful pursuit of its objective; and it finally introduces a time element as well as conveying a clear indication that, in the event of failure to record progress, further action within the prerogative of the Council would be called for.

54. These elements in turn reflect the dominant themes that emerged from this high-level debate, together with the widespread hope that our worst fears would not come to pass, but rather that the best aspirations of the international community for the achievement of self-determination by the Namibian people would soon be realized.

55. There is a common feeling that a unanimously adopted Council resolution would create a positive political impact and would provide a psychological boost for steady progress in the near future. The invaluable resources of a collective and concentrated international effort, backed by the dedicated efforts of the Secretary-General and his team, constitute an irresistible tide for final victory. South Africa should join, rather than impede, this final sprint.

56. To the Namibian people goes Malta's assurance of continued support in their search for independence, freedom and progress in peace. We long for the day when we can greet them as brothers in this family of nations. It is the sacred trust of each one of us represented here.

57. Mr. NATORF (Poland): The question of Namibia has been turned into a perennial international problem of multifarious and dangerous dimension. South Africa's occupation of Namibia and its persistent acts of aggression against neighbouring States pose a serious threat to international peace and security and violate the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant resolutions and decisions of the United Nations. Taking this dangerous situation into account, the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held recently in Paris,[1] was strongly of the view that the United Nations and the international community must act urgently and energetically in support of the legitimate struggle of the Namibian people for self-determination, freedom and national independence.

58. The Conference also called for these very meetings of the Council to continue further action on the implementation of its relevant resolutions. The importance attached to these meetings of our body is emphasized by the participation of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of non-aligned countries, particularly the African States. Their

presence here is evidence of unswerving support for the cause of Namibia's independence.

59. We were happy to see again, in the seat of the President, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Zaire, Mr. Kamanda wa Kamanda, who in the most able manner conducted the proceedings of the Council when it was considering the present item on our agenda.

60. Today, in a disquieting and complex international situation, it becomes more important than ever that all United Nations resolutions concerning the question under consideration be fully implemented. It is high time that this body condemn and stop discernible manoeuvres on the part of the racist régime of South Africa.

61. We all heard South Africa's statement in this debate. One should not be misguided by the cultivated language and soft manner in which it was delivered. It was full of false and unfounded allegations, threats and pretensions. We know the facts very well. We know well these efforts to sail under false colours. Supported by its allies, South Africa has been raising one obstacle after another on the path to Namibia's independence. At the same time, the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa imposed by the Council [*resolution 418 (1977)*] has been violated by the same Powers.

62. It is quite clear now that the continuation of these policies would not have been possible without the cooperation that exists between major countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, particularly between the United States and Pretoria.

63. It is worth recalling that, while the General Assembly has consistently advocated comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against Pretoria as one of the means of resolving the situation, some Western countries have prevented that action. For that reason, we have always considered that the Council should urgently take effective measures to terminate all collaboration with the Pretoria régime in the political, diplomatic, economic and military fields.

64. The long-standing position of principle of Poland with regard to the racist South African régime and its criminal policies of *apartheid* has been clearly defined both in the United Nations and elsewhere.

65. My Government observes with deep concern the deteriorating and explosive situation in and around Namibia. We consider that South Africa's military build-up and its brutal acts of armed aggression against Angola and other neighbouring countries constitute a grave danger to peace and stability in this region of the world.

66. Namibia is the direct responsibility of the United Nations until genuine independence is achieved by its people. Council resolution 385 (1976), together with resolution 435 (1978) and other United Nations resolutions pertaining to Namibia, are the only basis for a peaceful settlement of the Namibian question. If there ever was a delusive hope that the activities conducted by the so-called contact group would lead to a solution concerning the liberation of Namibia, now, after so many years have elapsed, that illusion no longer exists.

67. We have many times in the past pointed out that the thesis that the events and the tension in southern Africa are a result of Cuban or other influences is false. Disseminated in certain circles in the United States, this thesis is not only false but also dangerous.

68. The policy of linkage and diversionary tactics stemming from this thesis should be flatly rejected. This debate has emphasized that very forcefully.

69. Poland fully supports the decisions of the OAU and non-aligned countries concerning the question of Namibia. My country reaffirms its unconditional support for the struggle of the Namibian people for independence, under the leadership of SWAPO, their sole and authentic representative. On this occasion, my delegation would like to extend special greetings and assurances of full solidarity to the delegation of SWAPO, headed by its President, Mr. Sam Nujoma.

70. My delegation read with interest the further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia [*S/15776*]. We highly appreciate its clarity. Yet, what is most important for us is the fact that its concluding observations correspond fully with the spirit and conclusions of our present debate.

71. This spirit is reflected in the draft resolution on which the Council is about to vote [*S/15803*]. It is important that this draft resolution condemns in a clear-cut way South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia and calls for compliance with and implementation of resolution 435 (1978). In our view, a very important provision of the draft resolution is the request addressed to the Secretary-General to report to the Council on progress within a period of three months.

72. Setting a deadline shows the determination of the Council to remain actively seized of the matter. It should also serve as a warning to those that one day will support the draft resolution and the next proceed with further confirmation of policies that are contrary to what they voted for. They should know that the matter will not be postponed *ad kalendas Graecas* and that the political and moral assessment of their two-faced standard of behaviour will be made in this chamber.

73. We hope that progress will be achieved in the forthcoming months. However, if obstacles persist, we believe that the Council should be ready to consider and adopt all necessary measures in order to ensure implementation of its resolutions.

74. In conclusion, may I state once again that the Polish delegation will continue to make the maximum contribution to the solution of the problem under

consideration. We hope that the Council will discharge its obligations in order to help the Namibian people to exercise fully and immediately its inalienable rights.

75. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Barbados. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

76. Mr. MOSELEY (Barbados): Before launching on the sombre task of making a contribution to the debate on the question of Namibia, my delegation begs your leave, Sir, to engage in the far happier undertaking of offering, on behalf of our country, sincere congratulations to you not only on your assumption of the presidency of this body but also on the impeccable dignity and efficiency with which you have conducted its affairs, especially the current debate on a matter so fraught with difficulties. My country, for reasons that are not difficult to understand, takes a vicarious pride in the fact that a native son of Africa has demonstrated such a high degree of diplomatic skill and judicial poise as you have throughout this debate on a topic which must of necessity impinge sharply on the sensibilities of your illustrious country and on your own sensibilities.

77. My delegation also thanks the other members of the Council for having acceded to our request to be heard.

78. My delegation ventures to say that, of all the matters which may properly be brought before the Council for consideration, none is more likely to stir the dark emotions of rage, frustration, bitterness and hatred than the question of Namibia and its twin sister, the question of *apartheid*. Indeed, the world will not soon forget that the factors underlying these two questions are the selfsame factors—ideas of racial superiority, injustice and greed—that fuelled one of the bloodiest holocausts and wars in the recorded history of this earth. On the other hand, the world will long remember that, as the sun emerging from behind a dard cloud promises a brighter day, so this great organization, the United Nations, with its Charter, and the Security Council hold out a beacon of hope for all mankind.

79. It is in this context that my country views with horror but firm resolve the harsh throwing-down of the gauntlet and the arrogant defiance expressed and implied by the representative of South Africa in the statement he made recently before the Council. In fairness, however, it must be said that that same statement contained some elements that on the surface appear reasonable and some that, by a tremendous stretch of the imagination, might even be read as vaguely conciliatory. By way of example, I cite the following:

> "Where we can, we shall continue to help our neighbours who commit themselves to peaceful coexistence and constructive co-operation. Inside our country we shall continue to maintain order and stability and we shall carry on with the process of controlled reform. We believe that there are more than enough moderate people and people of goodwill within our country, within South West Africa and within our region to assure us all of peace and prosperity." [*2440th meeting, para. 102.*]

80. At this point I am forced to say: "Aye, there's the rub." For, taking into consideration the basic philosophy of the policy of *apartheid*, who can trust the sense of justice of people who ruthlessly deprive the native inhabitants of a country of their land, institutionalize by their laws the dehumanization of those inhabitants and defy world opinion by so doing? At this point I am forced to say: "They make a wilderness and call it peace." And yet, the Government of South Africa must know that, however low an opinion it may have of the backbone of the truly native inhabitants, it cannot continue for ever to deny them the inalienable right of self-determination, which is a goal aspired to by all peoples throughout history, and it is to be expected that the fight to the death for freedom and justice and against tyranny will not be abandoned.

81. One more word, let me add, in this context. The world must understand that, if the test and touchstone in South Africa were one of ideology, the possibility might exist that a change of one's ideology might give birth to an accommodation wherein peace might have a chance to grow. Where the test and criterion are race and colour of skin, there is no way yet discovered whereby such an accommodation may be achieved by a change of race. That is at the heart of the dilemma which continues to face the protagonists of *apartheid*.

82. Earlier in my statement I expressed the view that the subject under debate is powerfully evocative of emotional reaction. The time has come now to deal as objectively as possible with the basics of the problem—and this if for no other reason than to establish beyond doubt that my country's policy is not to be shrugged off as a mere recital of sentimental petulance. Indeed there is no subject in the realm of international affairs about which my country is more united, more resolute or more concerned than that of the welfare of Africa in general and southern Africa in particular.

83. In blunt terms, my delegation can state my country's position on the question of Namibia by saying that the Government of Barbados continues to offer unqualified support to the struggle of the Namibian people to achieve complete self-determination, freedom and national independence. Barbados supports the recognition of SWAPO as the sole authentic representative of the Namibian people until such time as fair and free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations produce an elected Government.

84. Barbados remains unwavering in its contention that Walvis Bay is an integral part of Namibia and that the territorial integrity of Namibia should not be compromised in any way, particularly with respect to Walvis Bay.

85. Barbados fully supports Council resolution 431 (1978), 432 (1978) and 435 (1978) and, incidentally, has

decided in principle to provide police monitors as part of UNTAG if and when required to do so.

86. My country, faithful to its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations greatly deplores violence and rejects the use of force as a morally or legally acceptable means of achieving the just solution of problems. My country is not unaware of the difficulties, especially those associated with the economics of the problem, which have rendered a peaceful solution so far depressingly elusive. Barbados notes the efforts of the contact group. In this connection, however, Barbados is very strongly supportive of the reservations, doubts and anxieties expressed by SWAPO and will continue most earnestly to hope that the countries involved will never lose sight of the lessons of history, which teach that the sacrifices of moral principles upon the altar of expediency and appeasement paves a certain road to the most dire of consequences.

87. Neither extraneous considerations nor the so-called strategic or other interests of other States should be allowed to delay further the independence of Namibia. Linkage of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola with the termination of the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa is such an extraneous consideration. Is there any brand of justice which can deny sovereign Angola the right to choose its own friends, or is justice really the interest of the stronger?

88. Barbados recognizes with gratitude and sincere appreciation the efforts made by the Secretary-General in striving for a just solution of the Namibian problem, urges the continuation and strengthening of those efforts and compliments him on his report [*S/15776*].

89. Barbados endorses the Paris Declaration on Namibia and the Programme of Action on Namibia, adopted at the International Conference in April,[2] and in consequence supports the call for, first, the immediate implementation of the United Nations plan approved in resolution 435 (1978); secondly, appropriate action by the Council to ensure compliance with its resolutions—this involves the appropriate answer to the arrogant defiance and threat expressed and implied by South Africa's stated refusal to accept a deadline for the independence of Namibia; and, thirdly, an end to the destabilization of the front-line States.

90. Barbados reiterates that Namibia is the direct responsibility of the United Nations and that the self-determination and independence of that country are in the care of the Organization. The question of Namibia is essentially one of decolonization.

91. In closing, I would say that my country, while not seeking or wishing for the parties concerned a mindless confrontation, is unequivocally committed to the view that the Council, while striving to maintain peace and security in southern Africa, cannot risk compromising its very reason for existence by yielding to the claims of those States that would place their own selfish or ideological interests above the clear demands of natural justice.

92. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of the Niger. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

93. Mr. OUMAROU (Niger) (*interpretation from French*): Since it is impossible to have too much of a good thing, I should like to add my very sincere compliments to the many well-deserved compliments that have been lavished upon you, Mr. President. Having seen you at work throughout this busy month of May, I share today the general feeling that, in this debate devoted primarily to Africa, you, through your presidency of the Council, are doing great honour to our continent. We are therefore grateful to your great country, Zaire, with which the Niger maintains the warmest relations, for having accredited you to this prestigious body at such a crucial time, when we truly need a man with an open mind and the experience to succeed our great friend, now promoted to the office of Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kamanda wa Kamanda, with whose enthusiasm and clear-sighted militancy we are all familiar and with whom I am happy to have had in the Organization a friendly relationship both strong and enriching. I hope that the conclusion that the Council will soon be reaching will reflect your personal sense of balance and your praiseworthy efforts.

94. We also followed the presidency of Mrs. Jeane Kirkpatrick, the representative of the United States and I offer her the sincerest congratulations of my delegation on the outstanding way she carried out her delicate tasks.

95. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Niger—who could not be present—asked me expressly to take part in this debate to say that the Niger deems it a great honour to have been designated at New Delhi by the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries [*see S/15675 and Corr. 1 and 2, annex, sect. I, para. 49*] to come here to support in this chamber the just cause of Namibia and the inalienable right of the valiant Namibian people to sovereignty and independence. I am particularly anxious to do that because this is a cause that rallies the whole of the international community and which the Niger is always ready to support.

96. The multitude of eminent ministers for foreign affairs distinguished statesmen and diplomats from the four corners of the earth, who are now following the debate, or who have spoken to proclaim, loud and clear, their common impatience and common disenchantment at the deadlock, either deliberate or nurtured, which characterizes the process of decolonization of the Namibian nation, must be for our brother Sam Nujoma, present here, a moving endorsement of the justness of his struggle. I am particularly happy to make this further statement in his presence, which supplements our previous pronouncements on this matter, when the Niger repeatedly condemned here, in the General Assembly and in other relevant forums, every obstacle, every subterfuge and every additional inadmissible delay in the

implementation of resolution 435 (1978). Thus, the linkage recently trumped up by South Africa, between the settlement of the Namibian problem and the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, was denounced in the strongest terms by my Government.

97. You will understand, therefore, Sir, that at the outset I wish to reiterate the growing concern of my country and Government, not only at what must be called the lost opportunities on the road to independence of Namibia, but particularly the anguish that now besets Africa and the world, in view of the absence of any serious date for this inevitable event.

98. Certainly, no decolonization is easy; in the course of implementation, no decolonization has been, at one time or another, without hesitations or changes of position, characterized by what is, after all, anachronism and folly. But the history of decolonization in Namibia will be a different story.

99. This is a country which, cheated of its independence in 1920 and then in 1945, welcomed with new hope resolution 1514 (XV), which the General Assembly adopted in 1960, containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. But it was soon to experience, in the place of what rightfully belonged to it and as a result of its liberation struggle, more frustration, when in 1966 South Africa, recognized as having failed as the administering Power, rebelled against the Organization, rejecting General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, which terminated the Mandate which up to that time it had exercised over that Territory by the very will of the Organization.

100. Then came the illegal occupation, the oppressive, plundering and racist occupation, which the international community denounced right from the outset and has constantly, and again today, denounced with ever-greater force and determination. Finally, in 1978, thanks to the concerted impact of diplomatic pressure and the armed struggle organized and stepped up by SWAPO, the sole authentic representative of the Namibian people, there came another glimmer of hope. It came in this very chamber in the form of resolution 435 (1978), which acted like a balm to soothe the battered Namibian people, and they solemnly glimpsed the prospect of regaining their freedom, which was so dearly bought, within a year, one year too many.

101. Since then, five years have gone by. Not only is Namibia not yet independent, but the Organization has been flouted because, not content with taking advantage of and enjoying with impunity the fruits of its rebellion, rebel South Africa has the strength and the effrontery to attack the United Nations and even to come and take a seat at this table, in this international forum—the most prestigious and the most representative in the world—to defy all tthe nations of the world.

102. This means that those who are aggravated by this slow progress are not always wrong: in other words, all of us present here in this chamber, representing the international community, who urge the contact group to renounce its complacency, to step up its pressure on South Africa, and to compel that embarrassing partner to respect the commitments it has entered into. What we are asking this group to do, over and above the undeniable results—which the Secretary-General, with objectivity and clarity, described in his outstanding report [*S/15776*]—is clearly not to take the place of South Africa in order finally to bring about the liberation of Namibia; it is not to discuss once again with that country the terms of another settlement plan. The plan exists. We are requesting it to refuse, out of respect for its role and to protect the credibility of the Organization, to follow rebel South Africa in its recent or future attempts to ensure that the problem of Namibia is bogged down in considerations that are completely extraneous to resolution 435 (1978) and, furthermore, were neither raised nor envisaged during the negotiations on that resolution. For, after all, this resolution dates from 1978. The Cuban troops, which Pretoria is now setting up as a bugbear and a screen, have been stationed in Angola since 1975, at the request of and for the sovereign needs of that country, without their presence ever being mentioned as an obstacle to Namibian independence—in any event, until the pre-implementation meeting at Geneva in January 1981, where the racist authorities evaded their responsibilities so spectacularly. Let us therefore be wary of such procedures which, pushed to their limits, could lead our planet into the direst calamities.

103. My delegation believes, however, that we should not be too eager to reject the contact group outright because, since South Africa has already been outlawed by this international community, on more than one charge, and, as we know, holds the United Nations in low esteem, it might be harmful to give that international outlaw the feeling that, henceforth, would be living in a world without constraints, rules or laws, a world where it could consolidate its gains, ignore any condemnation and commit at will further crimes. An imperfect contact, but one that is more sensitive to pressure, is always better than no contact at all. The most embarrassing thing for a callous country like South Africa is still perhaps its friends. We hope that the contact group will assume the commitment, after today's meeting, to make clear to South Africa that henceforth it will no longer be protected from the sanctions of the international community unless, of course, it agrees to submit unconditionally and without delay.

104. I should now like to take this opportunity to reaffirm the full solidarity of the Niger with the front-line countries, which, daily and with courage and self-denial, face the disgraceful, repeated acts of aggression of South Africa, and which, through their sacrifices for the cause of militant Namibia, will rightly go down in the finest pages of the heroic history of the decolonization of that great country. It is incumbent on the Council to set the stamp of shame on the recent raid of which Mozambique was the victim, a raid that the international community denounced and that our Minister for Foreign Affairs solemnly condemned at the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the OAU held on 25 May last.

105. Finally, Mr. President, my delegation is loath to allow you, Sir, to close this decisive, important debate without mentioning the fact that, at its meeting last August, in our capital, Niamey, the Thirteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, of which the Niger is the current Chairman, discussed the Namibian question at length and reflected the concern of the member States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in a unanimous resolution [*see S/15466, annex I, resolution 12/13-P*], the basic provisions of which it is my duty to read out.

106. The Conference solemnly reaffirmed that it recognized the legitimacy and just nature of the struggle being waged by the Namibian people by all means at its disposal, including armed struggle, to free themselves from colonial domination, racist oppression and exploitation; it furthermore affirmed that resolution 435 (1978) of the Security Council remained the only basis for a transitional arrangement preparatory to the independence of Namibia; it supported the struggle of SWAPO to achieve national independence in that illegally occupied Territory; it therefore requested member States to increase substantially their support for SWAPO; it strongly condemned the South African régime for its illegal and continued occupation of Namibia and for its repeated acts of aggression against the front-line States; finally, it urged the Security Council to impose wide-ranging and mandatory sanctions against South Africa in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

107. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Chile. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

108. Mr. TRUCCO (Chile) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Mr. President, I could not begin my statement without saying how pleased my delegation felt at seeing the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Zaire among us once again, presiding over meetings of the Council. That our old and esteemed colleague, Mr. Kamanda wa Kamanda, should have temporarily left the tasks requiring his presence in his capital and should have assumed personally the presidency of the Council highlights the seriousness and importance of the problem we are considering and gave proof anew of his remarkable qualities as a responsible and talented leader, once again deserving of our highest respect and admiration.

109. I wish also to congratulate Mrs. Jeane Kirkpatrick, who conducted the proceedings of the Council during the month of April with the intelligence and dedication for which she is so well known.

110. A little more than two years ago the Council resumed its consideration of the question of Namibia, for the purpose of analysing, *inter alia*, the progress made along the path to completing the implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978).

111. Unfortunately, we cannot but recognize that the results have been discouraging. Today the Council is meeting again to take stock of the situation once more and to adopt the measures that may be necessary.

112. When, 17 years ago, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2145 (XXI) on 27 October 1966, finally putting an end to the Mandate over Namibia that the League of Nations had given to South Africa, the United Nations simultaneously assumed full responsibility for leading the Territory swiftly to independence.

113. The creation of the United Nations Council for Namibia the following year by resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967 reaffirmed that decision and conferred on that body, of which my country is a member, the task of administering and being the legal representative of Namibia and of co-operating with resolve and seriousness in bringing about the independence of the Territory.

114. Since then, innumerable resolutions of the Security Council and of the General Assembly have reiterated that resolve. In 1971, the International Court of Justice declared that South Africa had no rights over the Territory of South West Africa, thus recognizing what the General Assembly had already decided.[3]

115. We therefore feel it necessary to reiterate what we stated at the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held in Paris from 25 to 29 April 1983. Given General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI), Security Council resolution 264 (1969) and, later, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in 1971, the continued occupation of Namibia by South Africa is illegal and violates the territorial integrity of Namibia.

116. Thus, almost 17 years have gone by since the Mandate of the League of Nations was ended and the United Nations assumed responsibility for Namibia. Neither the General Assembly nor the United Nations Council for Namibia has been able to exercise its full powers.

117. This is therefore an urgent problem. We cannot continue to delay the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) in its entirety without running the serious risk of seeing the situation deteriorate throughout the region and international peace and security seriously endangered. We must consider without further delay and in all seriousness the way in which to lead Namibia to sovereignty as early as possible.

118. My delegation wishes to emphasize in the Security Council that it is essential to intensify support for the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes and reject the use of force as an arbitrary means of trying to put and end to a dispute. In this regard, we wish to express our firm support for the action taken by the Secretary-General with a view to finding a solution to the problem of Namibia.

119. In his report to the Council, the Secretary-General points out that "progress has been made in securing a large measure of agreement on the modalities to be employed in implementing resolution 435 (1978)" [*S/15776, para. 18*], but with equal candour he warns us that "the delay in implementing resolution 435 (1978) is

having a destructive impact not only on Namibia itself but also on the prospect of a peaceful and prosperous future for the region as a whole." [*Ibid., para. 16.*] He adds that "the delay also has an adverse effect on international relations in a wider sphere, adding to the prevailing sense of frustration and mistrust." [*Ibid.*]

120. We fully share this sombre view of the Secretary-General. We believe today more than ever that the parties involved in the matter, including the Western contact group, bear a paramount responsibility towards the international community. We cannot allow frustration and mistrust to prevail or that today, after so many years, one of the pillars of international coexistence, namely, the peaceful settlement of disputes, should be called into question.

121. My delegation hopes that these meetings of the Council will result in a strengthening of that basic principle. To this end, like others who have spoken before us, we wish to support negotiations by the Secretary-General with all the parties concerned. We firmly believe that, above all else, they must be conducted in good faith so that there may be no further delay in the full implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978), without any extraneous conditions which might weaken or nullify it.

122. Therefore it is essential, in order to make substantial progress in this, to bring about a climate propitious for negotiations.

123. The United Nations bears the responsibility for Namibia and it has assumed this responsibility until independence and the full exercise of self-determination in the Territory are achieved. We all share in that responsibility for the achievement of that objective. We are therefore pleased to note that the Secretary-General has taken a clear and determined stand, for which he has had the gratitude and unanimous praise of the delegations that have taken part in this debate. My delegation joins in that expression of solidarity and support.

124. We welcome with satisfaction the constructive terms of the statements of the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, thier reaffirmation of their support for resolution 435 (1978) and their determined efforts to overcome the difficulties which so far have delayed its implementation. We are also encouraged by the assistance that has been offered to ensure the effectiveness of UNTAG. We trust that the United Nations presence and the envisaged presence of forces to guarantee the effectiveness of the decisions adopted by the international community will result in the necessary speedy withdrawal of the foreign troops operating in the region.

125. For the foregoing reasons, my delegation agrees with all the terms of draft resolution S/15803, which will be put to a vote in the Council shortly.

126. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker on the list is the representative of Mauritius, on whom I now call.

127. Mr. MAUDAVE (Mauritius) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, I thank you for allowing me to speak again. I think this will be my final statement. This statement will allow me to sum up what has been stated by the 50 or so previous speakers under the headings of analogy, harmony and elegance.

128. First, let us take analogy. Ministers and representatives from the four corners of the earth have given their analyses on specific topics: the illegal occupation of the Territory, border violations, failure to respect human rights, prevarication and the use of false pretexts, the flouting of international opinion, and so on. Some of the statements were so similar that they were practically identical in substance and even in form. The solutions proposed all had the same goals: decolonization, the finalization of the technical details of UNTAG, the cease-fire, the early establishment of a Constituent Assembly, free and democratic elections, and an autonomous and sovereign Government.

129. There was agreement that pressure of some kind must be put on Pretoria to see reason. Some wanted to go further than condemnation and appeals for negotiation, whereas others were convinced that collective action here, supplemented by an indirect approach, as indicated on 23 May, would finally overcome South Africa's reservations. Some who spoke see further than the present situation and propose immediate planning of significant assistance for the development and reconstruction of a free, independent and sovereign Namibia within secure borders. As André Maurois said, there is a great intellectual pleasure in seeing in an analogy the beginning of a law. This law is the following: never oppose the most valuable developments of the century, which are freedom, self-determination, independence and decolonization.

130. However, I should like to utter a word of caution before finishing the analogy. This concerns the contact group. Rather than reaching a final verdict and saying that the consultations have not led to anything, we have agreed that some latitude should be left for indirect pressure. The future actions of the Five must make it clear that, in the balance of priorities, the fate of Herman Toivo languishing in a prison is more important than the wool of the caracul sheep.

131. Secondly, I come to harmony. There has been notable harmony in the tone of the various statements. Whatever part of the world they came from, all the speakers except one have expressed the same feelings of frustration, the same will to put an end to a situation that has lasted for many decades and the same concern regarding a possible escalation of violence, which might engulf the whole of southern Africa. Indeed, the same stress was put on indignation at the introduction of bargaining to prevent the accession of a people to the dignity of freedom. Everybody has spoken with the same fervour on the subject of human rights. The world community has asked the Secretary-General to be the overseer of the task of ensuring the decolonization of a country whose future has been made the direct responsibility of the United Nations.

132. Finally, I would refer to elegance. This comes from moderation of language, a sense of what is real and possible in terms of ideas—qualities which, in general, the principal parties concerned have demonstrated. The approach chosen was above all objective, and well-thought-out and dignified. When obstacles were encountered they did not seek to eliminate them verbally; they made constructive suggestions.

133. The serious attitude that characterized this series of meetings of the Council from the first day, the analogies I have cited and the harmony of tone and emphasis will have made it easier to attain a high plateau in the establishment of international relations, with the primary objective of bringing about moral relations among nations. This high plateau is that of coherence, which requires a precise awareness of the pitfalls and an organized strategy based on what is possible or acceptable.

134. Those who came before the Council to make statements succumbed neither to the logic of naïvety nor to that of confrontation. They were hampered neither by the dilemma of the doves nor by that of "les mains sales". Their aim was quite simply to try patiently, painstakingly to destroy prejudice, arrogance, racism and unrestrained commercialism, and to protest unceasingly against injustice and violence. The United Nations, which is, in a way, the expression of the world's conscience, must translate the lofty aspirations expressed in the Council into deeds at Windhoek.

135. Elegance also forbids us polemics. That is why it was decided, after consideration and reflection, not to indulge in invective or threats such as the Council heard on the morning of Tuesday, 24 May, from the one speaker who took a place at this table and made use of the language of belligerency. We decided to leave that speaker in his solitude. A concern for precision, however, obliges us to note one statement he made. He said:

> ". . . nor has the International Court of Justice ever delivered a binding judgement to the effect that South Africa's right to administer the Territory has been terminated".* [*2440th meeting, para. 71.*]

136. I have before me the text of the advisory opinion of 21 June 1971 of the International Court of Justice, which states in paragraphs 115, 117 and 118:*

> ". . . The decisions [of the Security Council] are consequently binding on all States Members of the United Nations, which are thus under obligation to accept and carry them out.
>
> ". . .
>
> ". . . A binding determination made by a competent organ of the United Nations to the effect that a situation is illegal cannot remain without consequence. Once the Court is faced with such a situation, it would be failing in the discharge of its judicial functions if it did not declare that there is an obligation, especially upon Members of the United Nations, to bring that situation to an end. . . .
>
> "South Africa, being responsible for having created and maintained a situation which the Court has found to have been validly declared illegal, has the obligation to put an end to it. It is therefore under obligation to withdraw its administration from the Territory of Namibia."[3]

137. This is not the place to give an exposition on the highest authority in jurisprudence. We are here to establish the ethical principles of international relations and, in order to enforce them, to strengthen the authority of the United Nations and the powers of its Secretary-General. It would not have been right, therefore, to allow the shyster lawyer to get away with his attempt on 24 May to blunt the impact of the opinion and the advice of our highest tribunal.

138. We seek finally to establish a climate of trust in which the situation can develop. Creative interpretation of statements even allows us to find some positive elements in that statement of 24 May. Mention was made therein of a desire for peaceful coexistence with neighbouring countries, of an invitation to conclude non-aggression treaties and to discuss problems of common interest, and even of "respect for the rights of all peoples to self-determination" [*ibid., para. 102*]. When we reread this statement carefully, we note, among all the confident language—three important elements: a certain weariness; the feeling that something must be done urgently; and, finally, fear. "No winner will emerge from such a conflict situation" [*ibid., para. 100*], he said, quoting his Minister for Foreign Affairs. Does this not mean that he admits that superiority in military equipment will not end the claims? Is it not also to confirm the arguments of Bishop Desmond Tutu and those of the leader of the opposition in the Pretoria Parliament, Mr. Van Zyl, last Monday, 23 May? Regarding the Secretary-General's report, it has been said that its more constructive tone has not gone unnoticed. It amounts almost to an invitation to board an aeroplane bound for Pretoria.

139. If I had to sum up in one word the atmosphere in which the Council has met, I should choose the word "gravity", in the Latin sense of *gravitas*, which also implies dignity, thoughtfulness, sobriety. Some speakers even took on the appearance of Roman senators superbly clad in their togas to deal calmly and without haste with the item on the Council's agenda, conscious that they had an international audience, but above all solemnly concerned with writing a new chapter in the history of southern Africa.

140. Africans have shown here that they have in common with the Romans of the days before the Punic wars a sense of ceremony, of ritual, a sense which enables them to bridge the gap between the aspiration to the ideal and the practical needs of everyday life.

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* Quoted in English by the speaker.

141. These various statements suggest that if we were to connect up our different weak sources of power sufficient energy would be generated to light a beacon which would herald at long last the emergence of a free Namibia.

142. The **PRESIDENT** (*interpretation from French*): Members of the Council have before them document S/15803, which contains the text of a draft resolution prepared in the course of consultations among members of the Council.

143. It is my understanding that the Council is ready to vote on that draft resolution. Accordingly, if there is no objection, we shall now proceed to vote.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

The draft resolution was adopted unanimously, [resolution 532 (1983)].

144. The **PRESIDENT** (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of the United Kingdom, who wishes to make a statement.

145. Sir John **THOMSON** (United Kingdom): Mr. President, before I say a few words in explanation of the vote I have just cast, I should like to express my delegation's appreciation to you and to your Minister for Foreign Affairs for the skill with which you have handled this debate. Namibia is a subject on which feelings understandably run high. Nevertheless, this debate has been conducted in a notably constructive and decorous manner and for that much of the credit must go to you.

146. I should also like to pay a tribute to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the front-line States for coming to New York to participate in our proceedings, for the leadership they have shown and for the effective and statesmanlike way in which they have laid this subject before the Council. Our thanks are due likewise to the other ministers for foreign affairs who have participated.

147. At the outset of this debate I expressed the hope that the Council would hold a constructive, not a confrontational, debate and that it would formulate a resolution that would reinforce the negotiating process. The Council has achieved what I hoped and has passed a resolution for which the United Kingdom voted with pleasure.

148. I should like to record two points of detail which affect my delegation. With regard to the third preambular paragraph of the resolution, I state that the United Kingdom's attitude to the resolutions listed therein, including resolutions 301 (1971) and 439 (1978) on which the United Kingdom abstained, remains unchanged. Secondly, the resolution takes note of the results of the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held in Paris from 25 to 29 April 1983. My Government was represented at the Conference, has taken note of its outcome, but was not a party to its decisions. Together with other members of the contact group, the United Kingdom informed the Secretary-General before the Conference opened that we would not participate in any decisions which the Conference might take, in the light of our special responsibilities as a member of the contact group.

149. The resolution expresses the urgent desire of all members of this Council—a desire shared widely throughout the United Nations, as the debate has shown—to bring about the rapid implementation of the United Nations settlement plan for Namibia under Council resolution 435 (1978). It is incumbent upon us all to give the Secretary-General all possible assistance in the further consultations we have asked him to conduct. It goes without saying that the United Kingdom stands ready to do so.

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.

Notes

[1] See *Report of the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, Paris, 25-29 April 1983* (A/CONF.120/13).

[2] *Ibid.*, part three.

[3] *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971*, p. 16.

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Litho in United Nations, New York 00400 90-60205—June 1991—2,050

UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-EIGHTH YEAR

2450th MEETING: 31 MAY 1983

NEW YORK

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2450th MEETING

Held in New York on Tuesday, 31 May 1983, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. UMBA di LUTETE (Zaire).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2450)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Namibia:
   Letter dated 12 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15760);
   Letter dated 13 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15761)

The meeting was called to order at 4.10 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Namibia:
Letter dated 12 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15760);
Letter dated 13 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15761)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2439th meeting, I invite the representative of Mauritius to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Maudave (Mauritius) took a place at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2439th meeting, I invite the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the other members of the delegation of the Council to take places at the Security Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Lusaka (President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took places at the Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2439th meeting, I invite Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Nujoma took a place at the Council table.

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with decisions taken at previous meetings on this item [*2439th to 2444th, and 2446th to 2449th meetings*], I invite the representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, the Gambia, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Liberia, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, the Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Qatar, Romania, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Upper Volta, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia and Zambia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Zarif (Afghanistan), Mr. Hadj Azzout (Algeria), Mr. de Figueiredo (Angola), Mr. Muñiz (Argentina), Mr. Woolcott (Australia), Mr. Hashim (Bangladesh), Mr. Moseley (Barbados), Mr. Adjibade (Benin), Mr. Mogwe (Botswana), Mr. Tsvetkov (Bulgaria), Mr. Pelletier (Canada), Mr. Trucco (Chile), Mr. Malmierca (Cuba), Mr. Moushoutas (Cyprus), Mr. Suja (Czechoslovakia), Mr. Al-Ashtal (Democratic Yemen), Mr. Khalil (Egypt), Mr. Ibrahim (Ethiopia), Mr. Davin (Gabon), Mr. Blain (Gambia), Mr. Ott (German Democratic Republic), Mr. van Well (Federal Republic of Germany), Mr. Gbeho (Ghana), Mr. Taylor (Grenada), Mr. Kaba (Guinea), Mr. Rácz (Hungary), Mr. Rao (India), Mr. Kusumaatmadja (Indonesia), Mr. Serajzadeh (Islamic Republic of Iran), Mr. Shearer (Jamaica), Mr. Kuroda (Japan), Mr. Wabuge (Kenya), Mr. Abulhassan (Kuwait), Mrs. Jones (Liberia), Mr. Burwin (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Mr. Tan Sri Zainal Abidin (Malaysia), Mr. Traore

(Mali), Mr. Muñoz Ledo (Mexico), Mr. Erdenechuluun (Mongolia), Mr. Mrani Zentar (Morocco), Mr. Chissano (Mozambique), Mr. Oumarou (Niger), Mr. Bolokor (Nigeria), Mr. Cabrera (Panama), Mr. Jamal (Qatar), Mr. Marinescu (Romania), Mr. Niasse (Senegal), Ms. Gonthier (Seychelles), Mr. Stevens (Sierra Leone), Mr. Adan (Somalia), Mr. von Schirnding (South Africa), Mr. Fonseka (Sri Lanka), Mr. El-Fattal (Syrian Arab Republic), Mr. Slim (Tunisia), Mr. Kirca (Turkey), Mr. Owiny (Uganda), Mr. Salim (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. Bassole (Upper Volta), Mr. Chaderton-Matos (Venezuela), Mr. Le Kim Chung (Viet Nam), Mr. Mojsov (Yugoslavia) and Mr. Goma (Zambia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

5. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have just received a letter from the representative of Colombia in which he requests to be invited to take part in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite him to take part in the discussion without the right to vote, under relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Albán-Holguín (Colombia) took a place at the side of the Council chamber.

6. Mr. SINCLAIR (Guyana): When, two years ago, the Council considered the question of Namibia, the liberation of that Territory had already been too long delayed.

7. We meet now in 1983 in a context that makes it even more imperative that action be taken sooner rather than later by the United Nations. Within Namibia repression has intensified. This also has external repercussions, in that the number of Namibians now in exile is greater than it ever was. Even in their exile and their refugee camps they are not safe from South Africa's terror. Tension and instability pervade southern Africa as the Pretoria régime steps up its policy of terrorizing its neighbours and those in the region who dare to lend support to the cause of freedom in Namibia. South Africa continues to be in military occupation of part of the territory of Angola. Meanwhile, along with Western transnational corporations, South Africa continues the indiscriminate plunder of the natural resources of the Territory of Namibia, so prejudicing the future development of an independent Namibia.

8. It was an appreciation of this worsening situation that moved the Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries, in their analysis last March of the situation in southern Africa, to request the convening of this series of meetings of the Council [*see S/15675 and Corr.1 and 2, annex, sect. I, para. 49*]. The high level of participation in this debate, including that of the President of SWAPO, Mr. Sam Nujoma, manifests the deep and widespread concern for the early termination of South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia.

9. As we consider again the question of Namibia our minds turn immediately to South Africa's intransigence and non-co-operation. My delegation has never had any doubt that, for South Africa, participation in the negotiating process was but a mere nod to the pressure of community opinion and a means of assuming a posture of co-operation in the hope of easing that pressure. It is clear to us that South Africa's manoeuvres and delaying tactics have been designed only to buy time, so as to find a way of ensuring its continued domination of Namibia while giving the appearance that change will have taken place.

10. But South Africa's intransigence is only one side of the coin. The other side is the permissiveness and the tolerance which has been shown towards South Africa by those States which, by virtue of their extensive trade and other links with the *apartheid* régime, are in a position to pressure South Africa into compliance with the decisions of the Council. South Africa's intransigence is therefore not all home-grown. Each restraint placed upon international action against that régime has contributed to fortifying the belief in Pretoria in its ability to survive and to continue pursuing its policies. Meanwhile, the authority, status and effectiveness of the Council suffer. Our concern is therefore also focused on the role of those who, by their inaction no less than by their action, have facilitated South Africa's intransigence, and on the weakening of the international Organization that naturally follows when those with positions of special responsibility fail to discharge that responsibility.

11. To say that Guyana shares the feelings of dissatisfaction expressed at what has been accomplished so far in the negotiations is to say the very least; and as we look back on the course of those negotiations involving South Africa and five of its major Western trading partners we are naturally tempted to ask ourselves how well principle has fared against national interest throughout that process, how much real serious pressure was placed upon South Africa to comply with the demands of the international community. My delegation has always believed and urged that, in the event of non-compliance by South Africa, the members of the Western contact group had an irreversible obligation to lend their positive support to the adoption by the appropriate organs of the United Nations of effective measures designed to achieve the objectives which those States sought to realize through their joint efforts.

12. We have always held the view that, in this Herculean task in which we are all engaged in respect of South Africa, concern and action must go hand in hand. For the people of Namibia, concern to ensure South Africa's co-operation wears a more credible face when it is at the same time accompanied, and seen to be accompanied, by a consideration of practical measures to be taken in the event of non-co-operation. We are wondering whether the threat was ever made to South Africa that opposition to sanctions would be withheld if South Africa did not show more flexibility. These questions become all the more relevant in view of certain recent developments. I refer, for example, to the embrace in which South Africa is now being held by some, an embrace that mocks the sensitivi-

ties of Africa and the indignation of the international community.

13. The details of the negotiations for the implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978) are too well known for me to repeat them here. My delegation has taken careful note of the varying assessments of the progress of those negotiations. It is a process, we recall, which has tested to the utmost the patience, the flexibility and the statesmanship of SWAPO, in particular, and of the front-line States; but they have prevailed.

14. While we should avoid giving way to cynicism and despair, we need to be very sober in our assessment of what has been accomplished so far. While we need to approach the future positively, we need to be careful that our spirits are not made to soar too high. How many times have we told, for example, that the breakthrough was just around the corner? We have taken note with appreciation of the efforts of the contact group so far. However, if we have learned anything at all about South Africa in the course of the negotiations, it is the need to be cautious.

15. Quite apart from South Africa's particular approach to the negotiations, which itself has effectively stymied that process, the Pretoria régime is now being freely given another pretext for not co-operating in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), by the introduction of an element that was nowhere envisaged in that resolution and bears no relationship whatsoever to the settlement plan. That element is the withdrawal of Cuban troops.

16. Cuban forces entered Angola following a sovereign decision of the Government of that country. The Government and people of Angola already have tremendous problems defending their sovereignty against South Africa. They deserve our support and solidarity in those efforts. States must refrain from compounding those difficulties.

17. Those who are most directly affected by the insistence on a Cuban withdrawal from Angola as part of a settlement in Namibia are the brutalized and oppressed people of Namibia, for that insistence gives yet another pretext for the Pretoria régime to prolong its presence in the Territory. My delegation would like to urge that in our approach to the solution of the question of Namibia we keep uppermost in mind the interests of the suffering people of that Territory and avoid actions or policies that are inconsistent with the promotion of those interests. In this regard, I must pay a tribute to the Government of France for publicly separating itself from the policy of linkage.

18. For the Organization, which has so resolutely set its face against racism and for which the freedom of peoples is one of its corner-stones, the situation in Namibia constitutes what is perhaps the greatest challenge since its establishment, all the more so since the Territory of Namibia is one for which the United Nations itself has assumed direct responsibility. South Africa's continuing occupation of Namibia and its oppression of the people of that Territory are a stain on the human conscience, an insult to Africa and a threat to peace and stability in southern Africa and indeed to international peace and security. The United Nations and the international community must remobilize political forces in pursuit of the struggle for the liberation of Namibia and for implementation of resolution 435 (1978), which remains the only valid basis for a negotiated settlement of the Namibia question. We feel that the momentum of international action must be regained.

19. In his report on the work of the Organization submitted last September,[1] the Secretary-General observed, among other things, that the Security Council, the organ of the United Nations with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, all too often found itself unable to take decisive action to resolve international conflicts, and its resolutions were increasingly defied or ignored by those who felt themselves powerful enough to do so. He pointed out that the Council too frequently seemed powerless to generate the support and influence needed to ensure that its decisions were respected, even when they were taken unanimously. The Secretary-General did not say it, but members of the Council will agree that the case of Namibia, in particular with regard to resolution 435 (1978), is a demonstration of that weakness to which he refers.

20. Is there another issue on the international agenda on which three major organs of the United Nations have pronounced themselves in such historic concert? In 1971, the International Court of Justice declared South Africa's presence in the Territory of Namibia to be illegal.[2] The General Assembly, in its resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, terminated South Africa's Mandate and decided that the United Nations would assume direct responsibility for the Territory. The Council unanimously adopted a resolution approving a plan for South Africa's withdrawal and for the Territory to proceed to independence. Yet, for all this, Namibia continues to be illegally occupied; and the supreme irony is that the representative of the occupying régime is pretending to warn the Council about what kind of decision we should or should not adopt.

21. My delegation is fully in accord with the provisions of resolution 532 (1983), adopted this morning, which mandates the Secretary-General to undertake consultations with the parties to the proposed cease-fire and to report to the Council not later than 31 August on the results of those consultations. We sincerely hope that in the coming weeks those who have influence with South Africa will, in support of the efforts of the Secretary-General, exert the necessary pressure on the Pretoria régime and so make the contribution to freedom in Namibia that their strength and influence have long made possible and that so many have for so long been urging upon them. Should South Africa still continue in its intransigence, there can be no reluctance to impose mandatory sanctions in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

22. My delegation shares fully the Secretary-General's perceptions on the question of Namibia, as expressed in

the concluding paragraphs of his report [*S/15776*]. We feel his anguish at the tragic delays in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), most recently through the introduction of new extraneous issues. We reassure him of our continuing support and co-operation in his efforts to bring liberation to Namibia and peace to southern Africa.

23. I also wish to express praise to the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, Mr. Lusaka, for the strong and committed leadership he has been providing to the Council, as the legal Administering Authority for the Territory. We also wish to pay a tribute to Mr. Mishra for his own dynamic contribution to the struggle as United Nations Commissioner for Namibia.

24. After more than three decades of *apartheid*, Africa is impatient. The people of Namibia are impatient, and understandably so, after years of oppression and degradation. The United Nations must reassert its authority in respect of Namibia, and my delegation nourishes the hope that this debate will mark the beginning of the last phase of the efforts of the international community for Namibia's liberation.

25. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the President of SWAPO, Mr. Sam Nujoma, who was invited by the Council at its 2439th meeting to participate in this debate. I now call on him.

26. Mr. NUJOMA: Mr. President, I am very grateful to you and the other members of the Council for according the delegation of SWAPO the opportunity once again to address this body at this time.

27. My delegation is immensely gratified by the high-level participation in the debate and also by the correct political orientation of the important statements made by nearly all the speakers throughout the debate.

28. We are naturally greatly satisfied at the final outcome of the meeting, which has proved to be timely and significant. In other words, our mission has been accomplished as planned. The agreed objectives which we had set out to pursue here, in close co-operation and co-ordination with the United Nations, are now embodied in the Council resolution just adopted unanimously. This positive action by the Council has further underscored the inevitability of the victory of our just cause over the forces of colonial domination, foreign exploitation, reaction, darkness and death. Today we are happy to note that our cause is the cause of the United Nations, which means the cause of all who cherish peace and uphold justice. On this basis we are confident that, with the solid backing of progressive forces the world over, final victory is certain, for this is the only logical and historically valid outcome of the colonial conflict in Namibia.

29. There is absolutely no question in our minds, as our own liberators, who must continue to bear the heavy burden of the struggle, that we shall win, whether through the bullet or the ballot. This fact has been repeatedly acknowledged by friend and foe alike, including the Boer racists themselves. Thus we are realistic enough to know that it is not one or another resolution that will bring freedom to Namibia. We know that numerous resolutions have been adopted over the years, the implementation of which has been obstinately frustrated by the racist régime of Pretoria. But we also know that whenever the international community, in a clear and categorical way, expresses its support for and solidarity with our people in their heroic struggle, that further strengthens our resolve to carry on and advance the struggle by conquering new heights and expanding the zones of combat inside Namibia.

30. The resounding success which we have been able to score here could not have been possible without creative imagination and the systematic use of strategy behind the scenes and in the course of the consultations, resulting in the text of the resolution adopted by the Council.

31. In this connection, our thanks and appreciation go to all the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and other high officials representing the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement and other friendly countries who participated in the debate, thus lending their enormous prestige to the deliberations. Similarly, we express our indebtedness to all the other representatives who added the convincing voices of their countries in support of our just cause, while sparing no effort and not mincing words in strongly condemning and rejecting the linkage or parallelism that is being unscrupulously injected into the process of the decolonization of Namibia by the United States Administration and the *apartheid* régime.

32. In the same vein, I wish sincerely to thank the initiators of this meeting, that is, the Chairman of the African Group for this month, the representative of the current Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement and the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia. Likewise, I am grateful to the African members of the Security Council for sponsoring my participation in the debate. Needless to say, the presidency of the Security Council by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Zaire and by you, Sir, has been most effective, as can be seen from the resounding success achieved.

33. These are our well-considered sentiments directed to our friends and defenders of the ideals of the United Nations and of the Charter.

34. On the other hand we have our detractors, namely, the collaborators with and apologists for racist South Africa. Their objectives both before and during the meeting were different, and appeared to be to sabotage the meeting, if not to prevent it altogether. A litany of distortions and false rumours was spread in various capitals about alleged progress and it was erroneously intimated that a Council meeting on Namibia at this time would be counter-productive. Well, the overwhelming majority of the States Members of the United Nations thought otherwise and persisted, thus rebuffing this kind of unwarranted manipulation of the situation in Namibia for the sake of the selfish interests of the major capitalist Powers.

35. Having failed in their initial ploy, racist South Africa's friends have sought to use the debate for stonewalling and disinformation, on the cynical basis of "If you cannot beat them, join them". Their statements confirm this, for they were all at variance with what everybody else said.

36. We strongly deplore the fact that, despite the unanimous adoption of the latest resolution of the Council, which, *inter alia*, unambiguously reinforces the mandate of the Secretary-General as the principal authority in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), the so-called contact group should still display the arrogance of power by deciding to hold another of its secret meetings on Namibia on 9 and 10 June in Paris, in order to further its member's deceptive manoeuvres and intrigues.

37. This development, coming as it does immediately after the end of this meeting, is diversionary and, in our view, destructive of the provisions of the latest resolution of the Council.

38. For our part, we most resolutely condemn and reject any attempt on the part of those countries further to complicate the Namibian issue by introducing dangerous and objectionable notions such as so-called general security considerations or other regional problems in southern Africa. Whether used euphemistically or explicitly, linkage in any form at all is totally repugnant and unacceptable to us and to all the African people.

39. We can therefore not afford to remain silent when we see that outrageous schemes are being hatched by the imperialist forces to delay Namibia's independence and to impose on an independent Namibia impediments that would make its sovereignty and territorial integrity a mockery and give *apartheid* South Africa *carte blanche* to commit aggression against Namibia under any conceivable pretext. For these reasons, SWAPO is strongly opposed to the notion of a "cycle of violence", which puts the naked aggression of the racist Boer régime on the same footing as the national resistance of an oppressed people.

40. What SWAPO would like to see is the members of the so-called contact group—especially the three permanent members of the Council—supporting the efforts of the Secretary-General as individual Members of the United Nations rather than constituting themselves a mini-United Nations.

41. In this regard, we urge them to adhere to the letter and spirit of resolution 435 (1978) and, in particular, the provisions of the latest supplementary resolution of the Council, which, in our view, is intended to hasten Namibia's independence.

42. At this juncture, allow me to respond, albeit briefly, to the statement made in this body by the racist representative of the illegitimate régime of *apartheid* South Africa.

43. Even though this was the maiden speech by that particular agent of the *apartheid* régime, his statement was as typical as those of all his predecessors. Their language is usually intemperate, abusive, insulting and belligerent, with generalized threats against the whole world, and their logic is always crooked. It seems that successive spokesmen for the *apartheid* régime are chosen not on the basis of their diplomatic skills or political acumen but strictly on the basis of their Afrikaner bellicosity and their unmitigated rhetoric about reactionary violence and racial arrogance.

44. During this debate, as in all previous ones on this subject in the United Nations, one speaker after another has singled out racist South Africa as the obstacle to Namibia's independence. They have recalled its history of defiance, non-compliance, intransigence and delaying tactics, which is older than the history of the United Nations itself. During the past 37 years, it has resisted and prevented the implementation of the relevant resolutions and decisions of the United Nations, notably those of the Council.

45. The *apartheid* régime is an international outcast. It remains suspended from General Assembly sessions. Had it not been for protection through the Western power of veto in the Council, the racist State would long ago have been expelled from the United Nations. It is a ruthless Fascist State, second only to Nazi Germany, whose model of a racially-inspired repressive State the Afrikaner leaders are trying very hard to emulate. The *apartheid* system has long been condemned as a crime against humanity, and its inhuman practices of institutionalized racism have inflicted and continue to inflict untold suffering on the oppressed peoples both of Namibia and of South Africa itself. All the African people consider that warmongering racist State to be their public enemy No. 1 because of its aggressive, violent and expansionist behaviour in Africa.

46. Time and again, the African front-line States have brought before the Council complaints against the racist régime of Pretoria for its acts of destabilization, unprovoked aggression, subversion and insidious blackmail against them.

47. Furthermore, *apartheid* South Africa has built up a huge military machine in the region, while harbouring hostile intentions against all the black people who inhabit the African continent. Of all the dangers mentioned thus far, the most serious is its introduction into Africa of nuclear technology, if not nuclear weapons themselves, considering the attendant threat to the peace and well-being of all the peoples there and the world over. Since 1915, the Namibian people have been languishing under the military weight of the racist army of occupation, which has recently reached the alarming strength of 100,000 men deployed throughout occupied Namibia.

48. Virtually all the Secretaries-General of the United Nations have, in the pursuit of their duties and responsibilities, repeatedly encountered prevarication and defiance by the racist gangsters in Pretoria. Nobody has ever said anything good about the neo-Nazis of *apartheid* South

Africa in these meeting rooms, save for the occasional lonely voice of one of its major Western trading partners.

49. The whole world stands resolutely opposed to everything that racist South Africa stands for. The African masses of Namibia and South Africa are demanding their birthright: freedom, justice and national independence. Happily, they have the whole world standing behind them in solidarity, and we are convinced that the South Africa racists, like all the others throughout history, are doomed. They have become their own worst enemies. We shall continue to use all the means at our disposal to sharpen the contradictions within their ranks and create favourable conditions for the seizure of power by our people in our beloved fatherland.

50. I do not have much to say beyond this point, except to dismiss with the contempt it deserves the statement delivered here on 24 May 1983 by the spokesman of the non-representative racist State of South Africa. He had the audacity to try to lecture the Council on the legal history of Namibia and other salient issues relating to the decolonization process in Namibia.

51. True to type, he tried to turn reality on its head by using diatribe, omission and invention as he sought to propagate a distorted version of history to suit his racist and colonial interests. Certainly, nobody was either interested in or persuaded by his futile antics.

52. To begin with, the statement put us back to square one in that we were reminded that the Botha régime did not accept the legal authority of the United Nations over Namibia. It follows from this that the régime is still claiming to be administering the Territory "in conformity with the spirit of the lapsed Mandate" [*2440th meeting, para. 71*].

53. In this connection, there is no way in the world this can be true, when 100,000 troops and police are occupying our country. As regards the lapsed Mandate, its terms explicitly directed the Mandatory Power to promote to the utmost the political interest, material and moral well-being and social progress of the Namibians, while creating the necessary conditions for them to accede to full independence through the exercise of their inalienable right to self-determination. Of course, this is no longer a contentious point. South Africa's presence in Namibia is illegal following the termination of the Mandate in 1966.

54. Contrary to the false claims being made by the Boer régime, it is the Pretoria régime which has obstructed and continues to obstruct Namibia's independence because of its inordinate fear of a SWAPO victory, which in any case is inevitable. It is just a matter of time. It will even be sooner than later.

55. Once again the Council has unanimously agreed that it is the illegal régime of Pretoria that is directly responsible for the non-implementation of resolution 435 (1978). This régime has never shown good faith, nor has it really made an unequivocal and firm commitment to implement that resolution. Any semblance of co-operation on its part with the United Nations was intended only as a public relations show to fit a given situation at a particular time.

56. As far as our struggle is concerned, no amount of threats or aggression will deter us from intensifying the struggle for the total liberation of Namibia. This is our resolve, this is our determination and this is the dedication we must continue to uphold, under the banner of SWAPO, for a free and genuinely independent Namibia.

57. Mr. LICHENSTEIN (United States of America): We have been joined in these important proceedings by many distinguished diplomats from many parts of the world, particularly from the continent of Africa, and, not least, by your distinguished Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. President, and our former esteemed colleague. All of us owe you and him thanks for guiding these deliberations with a sure yet flexible hand and with unfailing courtesy and judiciousness. Beyond even yourselves and your country, you have reflected great credit on the Council.

58. The United States is pleased to have been able to vote for the resolution we adopted this morning. We share the common objective of all members of the Council: the swiftest possible attainment of Namibian independence; and we believe that this resolution will make a positive contribution to that end. The United States must point out that the third preambular paragraph refers to several resolutions, among which there was one—Council resolution 435 (1978)—which the United States did not support. Our affirmative vote on the present resolution does not imply any change in the United States position on resolution 435 (1978). With regard to the fifth preambular paragraph, in echoing the comments of the representative of the United Kingdom, I would also note that my Government, although represented at the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held in Paris, was not a party to its decisions. Together with other members of the contact group, the United States informed the Secretary-General that it would not participate in the decisions of the Conference in view of its role as a member of the contact group in the negotiations aimed at achieving Namibia's independence.

59. Over the past two years and longer, my Government has been deeply involved in the search for a settlement of the Namibia problem. We understand the frustration felt because Namibian independence has not in fact yet been achieved. However, in addition to the very substantial progress that has been made in developing the framework of Council resolution 435 (1978), we believe a great deal has also been accomplished towards establishing an environment in which all parties are able to take the political decisions necessary to implement the United Nations plan. If there is to be a lasting settlement, we need to create the conditions in which all countries in the region—most particularly South Africa and Angola—can feel secure and turn their energies to their own development. This would of necessity involve not only complete respect

for territorial integrity by all countries within the region; it must also involve the withdrawal of all foreign forces in the region. Creating the secure conditions that in turn may provide a climate of confidence will be an essential part of this settlement which we all devoutly wish and towards which we are all earnestly working.

60. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Gabon. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

61. Mr. DAVIN (Gabon) (*interpretation from French*): Permit me first of all to thank you, Mr. President, and the other members of the Council for having been good enough to allow the delegation of Gabon to take part in the debate on the situation in Namibia.

62. I wish now to fulfil the most pleasant duty of extending to you, Sir, my warmest congratulations on the remarkable way in which you have performed the extremely delicate functions of President of the Council for the month of May. We have appreciated your diplomatic talents, as well as the manner, rigorous and fair, in which you have conducted our proceedings.

63. I wish also to take this opportunity to pay a well-deserved tribute to Mrs. Jeane Kirkpatrick, the representative of the United States, for the way in which she conducted the Council's proceeding last month.

64. The delegation of Gabon welcomes the unanimous adoption by the members of the Council at this morning's meeting of resolution 532 (1983). It is a significant step on the path towards a rapid and satisfactory settlement of the Namibian problem.

65. Although we agree with the thrust of this resolution, the adoption of which, in principle, marks the end of the consideration of this agenda item, my delegation believes that the debate is not over, the subject is far from exhausted, and we wish therefore to reaffirm our position here.

66. We have been meeting once again to debate the situation in Namibia. This series of Council meetings was held shortly after the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held in Paris from 25 to 29 April. The Conference, in which many States participated—almost all of them represented in this room—set as its objectives the examination of the situation in and relating to Namibia; solidarity with the Namibian people in its struggle for self-determination and national independence in a united Namibia under the leadership of SWAPO; solidarity with and assistance to the front-line States; and measures to be taken to ensure the rapid implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia in accordance with Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978).

67. Africa was, on the whole, satisfied with the results of the Conference because certain principles that it cherishes were reaffirmed, namely, the right to self-determination of the Namibian people; respect for the territorial integrity of Namibia; assistance to the front-line States; denunciation of those who by their support strengthen South Africa; the reminder that Namibia is a direct responsibility of the United Nations; and rejection of the linkage between the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. The Government of Gabon wholeheartedly supports those principles.

68. It was on 27 October 1966 that the General Assembly adopted resolution 2145 (XXI) terminating the Mandate that authorized South Africa to administer Namibia and placed that Territory under the direct responsibility of the United Nations. Sixteen years have elapsed since that time, but South Africa, in defiance of that decision and in disregard of international law, continues illegally to occupy the Territory of Namibia and systematically opposes, on the most fallacious pretexts, all proposals for a peaceful settlement that have been made to it. In this way it is doing everything in its power to drive its negotiating partners to extremes and make them, in desperation, acquiesce in confrontation, which provides South Africa with its pretext for complaining about the attacks of SWAPO and the front-line States. One can only wonder whether such an attitude is pure Machiavellianism or the most perverse masochism.

69. Namibia is a geographical entity which forms a whole with Walvis Bay and the offshore islands. But South Africa lives under an *apartheid* régime which delights only in the systematic dividing of peoples according to the good old method of "divide and rule". Thus, Pretoria has introduced into Namibia a whole repressive arsenal of terror composed of arbitrary and racist laws directly modelled on the *apartheid* system itself and a military and police machine marked by ruthless brutality, arbitrary arrests, humiliation, bullying and harassment, and tortures of every description. South Africa is bent on exacerbating ethnic differences the better to be able to manipulate the inhabitants and win them over to its cause. Obviously those tactics are aimed at one objective, that is, doing away once and for all with SWAPO, which is recognized by the international community as the sole authentic representative of the Namibian people. Once SWAPO was out of its way, South Africa would then be in a position to tighten its grip finally on Namibia through its puppets.

70. Thus we have a policy of annexation and the expansionist ambitions of a country which poses as the defender of democracy and Western values. One can only wonder what the world's democrats think about this: whether they are flattered by so much solicitude or else offended by such unabashed cynicism.

71. Although they live in a country very rich in natural resources, the Namibians are reduced to servitude and poverty. In fact, they are lucky if they receive a tiny proportion of the vast profits earned from the riches of their own soil, profits which serve only further to enrich South Africa, its allies and partners, in flagrant violation of Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia.[3]

72. One would be tempted to think that, in its typical spirit of constant defiance and arrogance, South Africa actually contrives to feed the media and deliberately tries to be on the front of the stage whenever it is put in the dock. That is its own special way of manifesting the disregard and scorn in which it holds the entire international community. That is its own particular way of making anyone who still has any doubts on the subject understand that South Africa has not the slightest intention of obeying international law or associating itself with any genuine process of negotiation aiming at peaceful and equitable solutions.

73. Thus, at the thirty-sixth session when the General Assembly was busy considering the question of the policy of *apartheid*, South Africa carried out a destabilization operation against Seychelles by means of mercenaries for whom gold is more valuable than African lives.

74. During the thirty-seventh session, when the General Assembly was about to debate the question of Namibia, South Africa launched an unjustifiable and murderous attack against the peaceful Lesotho.

75. Today, with the bombing of Matola, it was the turn of Mozambique to be once again the victim of an act of armed aggression by the infuriated racists of Pretoria, who have no respect whatsoever for the sovereignty of States or for the lives of the peaceful peoples that they victimize.

76. One is entitled to wonder about the real feelings of the powerful defenders of South Africa, whose benevolent understanding, if not more or less avowed solidarity, assures Pretoria of impunity and *de facto* immunity. It is not surprising, therefore, that South Africa should evince such scornful arrogance towards the international community as a whole and such sovereign disdain for the resolutions of the United Nations.

77. This is the case with resolution 435 (1978), which approves a settlement plan for Namibia, the spirit and letter of which South Africa is trying to distort by attempting to establish a linkage between the implementation of that plan and the presence of Cuban troops in Angola.

78. The delegation of Gabon categorically repudiates the theory whereby the independence of Namibia would be subordinated to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The presence of these troops results from an agreement which is perfectly valid in international law between Cuba and Angola. Therefore, the linking of the independence of Namibia to the withdrawal of Cuban troops constitutes, in the view of my delegation, pure and simple interference in the internal affairs of Angola.

79. Attempts are being made to persuade us that the purpose of this link is to safeguard security, but whose security? The security of South Africa? For, in spite of the presence of Cuban troops on its soil, Angola does not occupy a single square inch of South African territory; it is, on the contrary, South Africa that is occupying an important part of Angolan territory. So we reach a paradoxical situation in which the aggressor, after invading and confiscating the land of others, is crying for help and calling for protection, while the victim is cast in the role of the accused and is supposed to make even more concessions.

80. The Council, which is the most authoritative organ of the Organization, cannot in all decency endorse any further this spurious argument of linkage without damaging its own credibility. In the whole of Africa there are about a half a billion men and women watching us, and we should constantly bear that fact in mind. We are not talking about a rather abstract subject on which we have been invited to make speeches. We are talking about human lives, the lives of men, women and children, who are supposed to be protected by the international law of which the Organization is the very expression.

81. The United Nations should no longer tolerate South Africa's continuing illegal occupation of Namibia or the fact that it is launching from that Territory acts of armed aggression against neighbouring independent States. The Council should compel South Africa to put an end to its dangerous adventurist policy, if necessary by coercive measures such as the mandatory and comprehensive sanctions provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

82. Faced with the aggressive and brutal policy of South Africa and the continuance of the illegal occupation of Namibia by the Pretoria régime, this is a responsibility that the members of the Council should have no hesitation in shouldering, particularly those that are members of the contact group charged with implementing the settlement plan for Namibia. It is incumbent upon them to prevail upon South Africa to comply with the provisions of the settlement plan approved in resolution 435 (1978), which, accepted by all, provides, *inter alia*, for elections under the supervision of the United Nations, to elect a Constituent Assembly; the withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia; and the freeing of political prisoners and the abolition of racist laws. This plan remains the sole valid basis for a peaceful settlement, and that is why we call for its immediate and unconditional application.

83. Violence, which as everyone knows breeds violence, has lasted too long and it is high time that it was ended. South Africa must withdraw immediately from Namibia. Whether it likes it or not, it must leave sooner or later. This is the bidding of history, and Pretoria, in spite of the strength of its support and the power of its arms, cannot oppose this inevitable evolution.

84. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Viet Nam. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement

85. Mr. LE KIM CHUNG (Viet Nam) (*interpretation from French*): My delegation has already had an opportunity, Sir, of expressing its warmest congratulations to you on your assumption of the important office of President

of the Council for the month of May. It is a great pleasure for me to reiterate these congratulations today and to say once more how earnestly we desire the successful fulfilment of your important and noble mission.

86. It is also a great pleasure and a great honour for me to welcome among us such an impressive number of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and other eminent persons, particularly the President of SWAPO, Mr. Sam Nujoma, and the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, Mr. Paul Lusaka.

87. I have listened very closely and with great respect to the statements made here since 23 May, particularly those of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the front-line and non-aligned countries. I fully endorse the analysis of the prevailing situation in and around Namibia and the evaluation of the background and nature of the question of Namibia as presented here so clearly and in such an exhaustive and judicious manner.

88. My delegation would like to stress forcefully the exceptional seriousness of the continuing illegal occupation of Namibia by the South African racist régime, which thus far has managed impudently to defy the international legal system, to flout the authority of the United Nations and to treat with contempt the wishes of the international community concerning the achievement of independence by Namibia.

89. My delegation would like in particular to associate itself with the indignation of the President of SWAPO who, before the Council the other day, assailed the *apartheid* junta, which, through its persistent policy of savage repression against the people of Namibia and its policy of aggression and terrorism against neighbouring States, has in cold blood committed a dual crime against humanity and against peace, more than ever justifying immediate and concerted punishment. We also share his indignation at the self-centred and hypocritical policy of the United States and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, which have publicly espoused the cause of the South African racist State and thereby have become its shameless and notorious accomplices, and must be held directly responsible for the obduracy of the Pretoria régime and for the impasse that the Namibian question has now reached.

90. In accordance with the decisions taken at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held last March at New Delhi [*see S/15675 and Corr. 1 and 2, annex, sect. I, paras. 40-51*], and the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held in Paris in April,[4] my delegation also feels that the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia, set forth in resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978), must be implemented without delay, and for this to be done effectively, the question of Namibia must be brought back fully into the context of the United Nations and placed in the hands of the Council, so that the latter, as a priority, may exercise its authority without foreign interference and again assume full responsibility for the prompt implementation of resolution 435 (1978). We also consider that this time the Council must draw up a precise time-table for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and continue actively to deal with this question until the process has been successfully completed.

91. As was rightly pointed out by the President of SWAPO, the question of Namibia calls for "positive action now, not mere exhortations or empty promises" [*2439th meeting, para. 111*].

92. The people and Government of Viet Nam have consistently given the cause of Namibia their deep understanding and unreserved support, since the objectives and circumstances of this cause are similar, if not identical, to those of the struggle which the people of Viet Nam waged against colonialism and imperialism in order to attain their fundamental national rights, namely, independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity.

93. When a mission of consultation from the United Nations Council for Namibia visited Viet Nam in August 1981, the Government of Viet Nam solemnly reaffirmed in a joint communiqué

> "its principled position of total support for the legitimate struggle of the Namibian people for self-determination, freedom and genuine independence, under the leadership of SWAPO, which is the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people. The Government of Viet Nam strongly supports the struggle of the Namibian people by all available means including armed struggle, the legitimacy of which has been solemnly proclaimed by resolutions of the General Assembly".[5]

94. Government and State leaders and the widest circles of the population and opinion in Viet Nam follow with great concern the situation in and around Namibia and sincerely desire the prompt attainment of independence for Namibia, an end to the unspeakable suffering of the brother people of Namibia and an end to the sacrifices unjustly imposed upon the front-line countries, neighbours of Namibia.

95. We have always taken an active part in the work of international bodies dealing with the question of Namibia, as we did just recently at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries and the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence.

96. We have strongly condemned all acts of aggression and destabilization perpetrated by Pretoria against the front-line countries since the illegal occupation in August 1981 of part of Angolan territory, including various criminal raids of Mozambique in January 1981, against Lesotho in December 1982 and again against Mozambique on 23 May, the very day on which the first of the current meetings of the Council devoted to the question of Namibia was held. The spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam on 24 May roundly condemned the South African *apartheid* régime for savagely bombing

the densely populated districts of Maputo, and expressed his conviction that all the criminal adventures of the Pretoria régime would be severely punished.

97. The internal situation in Namibia, as recently presented to us by the President of SWAPO, shows that the "illegal occupiers there have no intention whatsoever of permitting Namibia's accession to independence for a very long time to come". [*Ibid., para. 122.*]

98. While listening to Mr. Sam Nujoma, my delegation recalled the blackest moments of the long and painful war of resistance waged by the Vietnamese people against the United States imperialists for the salvation of their homeland—in fact, similar adversaries, similar criminal designs, almost identical manoeuvres and plans of action. As in the case of South Viet Nam at that time, the enemy of the Namibian people is now seeking at all costs to hold on to Namibia as a neo-colony and to make it a vast garrison, a huge fortress, an immense military base, to serve both as an infernal machine for perpetuating the illegal occupation of the country by the most atrocious repressive terror and as a platform for launching armed attacks against independent African countries, such as Angola, Lesotho, Mozambique, Seychelles, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

99. So the obstacle still looms large on the road to the independence and freedom of the Namibian people. Facts have amply shown that verbal condemnations are not enough to overcome the intransigence of the Pretoria *apartheid* criminals or their protectors and accomplices. It is high time that the international community took energetic action.

100. In deciding to keep actively before it the question of Namibia until the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia has been fully executed, the Council will have to strengthen the powers of the Secretary-General in order to enable him to carry out with greater intensity a whole range of complex and delicate diplomatic moves, while seriously preparing itself for the imposition of comprehensive mandatory sanctions pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter should the Pretoria régime persist in not hearing reason. The Conference in Paris wisely considered that sanctions are the only means available to the United Nations to make South Africa abide by its decisions.

101. However, my delegation considers that it is necessary that the community of States determine to broaden its assistance of all kinds, including military assistance, to the sole legitimate and authentic representative of the people of Namibia, SWAPO, and to the front-line States in order to strengthen the power of the armed resistance of the people of Namibia on the battlefield and the power of the front-line States to retaliate against the repeated acts of aggression by Pretoria. Our people's experience has been that the forces of international reaction, whether colonialism, imperialism, expansionism or hegemonism, like to use force to terrorize peoples and teach them lessons. We must therefore be ready to meet violence with violence, because that is the cost of final victory for the oppressed peoples. My delegation therefore wishes fully to support the President of SWAPO when he said on 23 May that unless the Security Council acts decisively to secure the withdrawal of South Africa from the international Territory of Namibia the people of Namibia will have no alternative but to continue the armed struggle with greater intensity. [*Ibid., para. 153.*]

102. It is precisely in that spirit that my delegation ends its statement by declaring its firm support for the urgent appeal made by the Secretary-General in his report when he said:

> "I call urgently on all concerned to strengthen and concert their efforts within the framework of the United Nations and to demonstrate the necessary political will to bring about the early independence of Namibia in accordance with the United Nations plan." [*S/15776, para. 20.*]

103. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of the German Democratic Republic. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

104. Mr. OTT (German Democratic Republic): Sir, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic would like to join others in expressing its congratulations on your able handling of the presidency of the Council in the month of May. Your great diplomatic skills and experience have undoubtedly contributed to the accomplishment of the responsible tasks facing the Council.

105. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic has followed with great interest this important and impressive debate, the importance of which is, furthermore, emphasized by the presence and participation of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and representatives of a large number of States, as well as chairmen of important United Nations bodies.

106. The President of SWAPO, Mr. Nujoma, has convincingly and impressively described the dangers for stability in the region of southern Africa and for peace and security in the world at large arising out of the unsolved problem of Namibia. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic shares the opinion of the overwhelming majority of speakers that the situation in southern Africa has further deteriorated as a result of the escalation of the policy of aggression and terror pursued by the racist régime in South Africa. The *apartheid* régime has been almost unanimously condemned during the debate. At the same time, numerous representatives pointed to the responsibility of the so-called contact group for the persistent delay in the implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978) and revealed the underlying motives for its manoeuvres. The representatives of only a few States made an attempt to conceal the true causes, to distract attention from the nature of the question and to justify their policy directed against the legitimate interests of the people of Namibia.

107. On the occasion of a friendly visit paid a few days ago by the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, Mr. Robert Mugabe, to the German Democratic Republic, the Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Erich Honecker, stated:

> "Africa is a rising continent. It becomes clearly visible there that the advance of the forces of peace and national liberation, despite temporary difficulties, cannot be stopped. Therefore, it cannot cause surprise that the most aggressive imperialist circles make the attempt also on the African continent to turn back the wheel of history. But they will not succeed in doing so. . . . The reasons for the tense situation in southern Africa lie in South Africa's policy of violence. As a part of imperialist global confrontation politics, and with the backing of the United States, this policy aims to subject anew the States and peoples of that region to the old domination."

108. It has also been confirmed during this debate that the dangerous situation in southern Africa is caused by the plotting of imperialist States with the *apartheid* régime in South Africa. While, here at the United Nations, representatives of those States have expressed in high-sounding phrases their desire for a peaceful settlement of the Namibian issue, it is from those same States that weapons and equipment are being supplied for the merciless war that is being waged by the racists against the people of Namibia fighting for their freedom. While representatives of some States members of NATO make statements about the evil of *apartheid*, the transnational corporations of those very States have stepped up their exploitation of the people and the natural resources of Namibia and are drawing millions of dollars of profit from the sweat and tears that result from *apartheid*.

109. To give only one example to prove this, the United States gets from Namibia 98 per cent of its imports of cobalt, 80 per cent of its platinum, 100 per cent of its industrial diamonds, 58 per cent of its uranium, and other important strategic raw materials.

110. Thus the South African racists are simply being encouraged by the open political, military, economic and nuclear assistance given by the United States, Israel, Taiwan and a number of other Western States to continue the illegal occupation of Namibia and to disregard the decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. Many speakers have quite rightly pointed to the fact that the United States Administration's course of so-called constructive engagement with Pretoria is aimed at the preservation of the military, strategic and economic interests of imperialism and the destabilization of progressive States in the region. Moreover, it is no secret that plans exist for the deployment of medium-range missiles in South Africa, as is intended in Western Europe. The carrying-out of such plans would even further worsen the already tense situation in the region and would have disastrous consequences for world peace and international security.

111. Today the Territory of Namibia has already been transformed into a huge military camp. The report of the United Nations Council for Namibia, entitled "The military situation in and relating to Namibia",[6] reveals the share that the NATO States have in the creation of this large military potential. This document, furthermore, gives evidence of the fact that more than 100,000 soldiers of the South African racist régime and thousands of mercenaries from the United States and other Western countries are operating in Namibia with the aim of oppressing the people of Namibia and of launching aggressive actions against southern African States. As can be seen from the document entitled "Activities of foreign economic interests operating in Namibia",[7] 53 out of the 88 transnational corporations directly involved in the plundering of Namibia have their head offices in capitals of States of the so-called contact group. One can understand only too well why, in view of these facts, many speakers during the debate have voiced doubts about the integrity of the declared intentions of those States.

112. The world public has followed with great concern the escalation of the aggression perpetrated by South Africa from the illegally occupied Territory of Namibia against Angola and other States of the region. Gangs financed and equipped by Pretoria terrorize the population in the front-line States and perpetrate acts of sabotage against industrial installations and communication systems. Assassinations of members of the liberation movements are on the increase.

113. The German Democratic Republic strongly demands the immediate termination of the undeclared war against Angola and the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the racist forces from the territory of that sovereign State.

114. The Government and people of the German Democratic Republic strongly condemn the most recent acts of aggression against the capital of Mozambique. In a special statement [*S/15802, annex*], that barbaric raid is denounced as a new expression of the aggressive policy of the South African racist régime against the free peoples of southern Africa.

115. The German Democratic Republic supports all those States which demand that South Africa be forced at last to give up its policy, which endangers peace and security. The imposing of effective sanctions by the Security Council against the *apartheid* régime, the strengthening of the arms embargo and strict control of its implementation and the prevention of all manoeuvres by the racists to find a so-called internal settlement have become much more urgent than ever before.

116. The Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in New Delhi in March and the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held in Paris in April, as well as the present debate, have made it very clear that the activities of the self-appointed so-called contact group of Western States have in no way changed the dreadful fate of the oppressed

Namibian people. The racist régime instead has been given a five-year period to escalate its repressive machinery and expand its military and nuclear potential. This has contributed to the aggravation of the situation in Namibia and in the whole region.

117. In this connection, the demand for the strengthening of the role of the United Nations is absolutely justified. Above all, the Council should assume full and direct responsibility for the earliest possible settlement of the question of Namibia.

118. The German Democratic Republic trusts that the Council will take the relevant measures in order to ensure the immediate implementation of United Nations resolutions on Namibia in their entirety, including resolution 435 (1978).

119. My delegation considers the resolution adopted today to be a first step in that direction. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic, furthermore, supports the constructive proposals to that end made by the President of SWAPO, Sam Nujoma, and many other representatives of States. My delegation also deems it urgent to determine a precise time-frame for the implementation of further measures aimed at the granting of independence to the Namibian people.

120. We reject very strongly the attempts of the United States Administration to interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign States through a policy of linkage and to raise new obstacles to a settlement of the Namibian problem.

121. The German Democratic Republic advocates the independence of Namibia, with the preservation of its territorial integrity, including Walvis Bay and the adjacent islands. It is high time for power to be put into the hands of the Namibian people, represented by SWAPO, the recognized sole and authentic representative of that people. Assistance in solidarity with the struggle of the Namibian people under the leadership of SWAPO is part of the responsibility of all States Members of the United Nations for the independence of Namibia. It serves to eliminate a dangerous hotbed of tension and promotes the maintenance and strengthening of world peace.

122. In conclusion, Sir, permit me to reaffirm that the German Democratic Republic will continue to stand alongside the peoples and States of Africa as a true friend and reliable ally. Accordingly, the German Democratic Republic will continue to give political, diplomatic and material assistance to SWAPO, the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people.

123. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Bulgaria, whom I invite to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

124. Mr. TSVETKOV (Bulgaria) (*interpretation from French*):Mr. President, first of all I should like to thank you and, through you, the other members of the Council for allowing me the opportunity to take part in the Council's deliberations on the question of Namibia, a question to which Bulgaria, faithful to its consistent policy of support for the right of colonial peoples to self-determination and independence, attaches great importance.

125. I should like also to congratulate you most cordially on your assumption of the important post of President of the Council for the month of May and to express our satisfaction at the excellent results obtained by the Council under your competent leadership.

126. For years the people of Namibia, under the leadership of their sole legitimate representative, SWAPO, have been waging their struggle to exercise their right to self-determination and national independence. The legitimacy of that struggle and the aspirations of the people have recognized and reiterated in many General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Without the generous economic, political and military assistance given South Africa by some Western countries, first and foremost the United States, Namibia could have joined the community of independent States a long time ago as a full member.

127. The Bulgarian delegation endorses the objective and thorough analysis of the present context of the problem of Namibia that was made in the statement by the President of SWAPO, Sam Nujoma, and we welcome his personal participation in the work of the Council. The illegal occupation of the Territory is still going on and its militarization by the racist régime is reaching record proportions. The oppression of its people, the detentions, the torture and the arbitrary assassination of patriots continue and grow in number. In its aggressive war against the people of Namibia, Pretoria makes increasing use of the services of mercenaries whom it recruits in several Western countries and incorporates into the racist army. Recently the illegal régime has been taking action to "Namibianize" the war in the Territory, by imposing compulsory military service on the population.

128. South Africa is intensifying its acts of aggression against independent African States. The front-line countries are the main target of such actions. By striving to destabilize their Governments, Pretoria is seeking to create in southern Africa a situation where the people of Namibia would be isolated in their struggle, cut off from the support of their African brothers in the region. The barbarous attack on the capital of Mozambique, Maputo, resulting in casualties among the civilian population of the city, is a recent example of this. The racists continue to occupy part of the territory of Angola and constantly carry out criminal raids against the people of that sovereign State, which has a legitimate Government. The aggression against Angola is also characterized by the fact that it clearly shows the convergence of the aims and interests of Pretoria and of United States imperialism. While South Africa was bringing direct economic and military pressure to bear on Angola, the United States openly stated that the racists had alleged legitimate security interests. The United States Administration has con-

sistently spared no efforts to link the question of Namibian independence with the withdrawal of the Cuban troops who are in Angola at the invitation of that country's Government. All these artificially created obstacles on the path to a just settlement of this problem are not accidental or surprising. For decades the transnational companies of certain Western States have been taking part with Pretoria on an equal footing in the pitiless plundering of the rich natural resources of Namibia. The illegal occupation of the Territory and the inhuman system of *apartheid*, which is rife there, are regarded by the transnational companies as favourable circumstances that enable them to derive as much profit as possible, to the detriment of the people of the Territory.

129. Furthermore, the international community is well aware that the policy of confrontation in international relations and of escalation in the arms race that has been pursued in recent years by imperialist and reactionary circles is also, alas, becoming clear in the case of the Namibian problem and is hampering efforts to solve it in the interest of the people of Namibia. It is precisely this policy of imperialism that is encouraging Pretoria in its obstinate opposition to the will of the international community, as unanimously expressed in the relevant United Nations resolutions.

130. The desired basis for achieving genuine independence for Namibia is clearly set forth in appropriate United Nations resolutions. My delegation is deeply convinced that the question of Namibia can be resolved only by the immediate cessation of the illegal occupation and by strict respect for all resolutions, particularly Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978). However, as has been stressed by several previous speakers, we have realized that the activities of the so-called contact group, far from providing a solution to the Namibian question, have in practice given Pretoria the chance to delay and erect more and more obstacles on the path to solution.

131. The Bulgarian delegation is deeply convinced that the Council must step up its efforts to achieve, as soon as possible, the exercise of the inalienable rights of the Namibian people to self-determination and national independence. The international community has already realized that South Africa has repeatedly demonstrated its contempt for the decisions of the United Nations. Its policy has been rightly described by the United Nations as a threat to international peace and security. That is why, in the opinion of my delegation, the Council should, in any decision it takes, set a time-limit for the implementation by Pretoria of resolution 435 (1978) and take all the measures provided for under the Charter of the United Nations, including, if necessary, the application of comprehensive, mandatory sanctions in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter. This is the way to force the criminal régime to respect the will of the international community and give the people of Namibia the chance to determine their own future freely. My country fully supports the decisions of the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held recently at New Delhi, and the decisions of the OAU on this question.

132. Bulgaria is an active member of the United Nations Council for Namibia, which was set up as the sole legitimate Administering Authority for the Territory until its independence. We shall continue to contribute actively to the Council's efforts to achieve the independence of Namibia, in conformity with United Nations resolutions.

133. We welcome the efforts of the Secretary-General to solve the problem of Namibia in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the world Organization.

134. In his address to the participants in the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held at the end of April in Paris, the President of the Council of State of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov, stated:

> "Before this lofty forum, the People's Republic of Bulgaria proclaims, once again, its deep solidarity with the courageous struggle of Namibia and its vanguard, SWAPO, while expressing its conviction that the United Nations will not hesitate to redouble its efforts to bring about an equitable solution to the Namibian problem as soon as possible."[8]

135. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

136. Mr. SERAJZADEH (Islamic Republic of Iran): The question of Namibia has been discussed in the Council many times. Some negotiations, through direct and indirect channels, on the right of self-determination and independence of the Namibian people have been in process and the agreements on a just solution and peaceful settlement have been recognized by most Members of the United Nations. Unfortunately, no concrete action concerning the withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia has been taken so far.

137. The lack of harmonious co-operation and a united determination, caused by differences in perspective and goals among the various groups and States, has created a prolonged stalemate regarding the achievement of independence for Namibia. The ineffectiveness of decision-making in the Council has caused the racist régime of South Africa to ignore Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978), which have been accepted by its members unanimously.

138. The vast economic and military co-operation of the United States with the *apartheid* Government has strengthened the position of South Africa against the oppressed people of Namibia. the United Kingdom's sale of radar equipment to the treacherous régime of South Africa to monitor the rightful activities of the Namibian people against the usurper forces of the white régime postpones their independence. The provision of nuclear reactor facilities by the French colonialists also shows that the use of rhetoric is preferred to any attempt to bring about a peaceful settlement in Namibia.

139. Along with the contradictory conduct of the members of the contact group, the military ties and intelligence links between the Zionist régime of Israel, an imperialist partner, and the racist Government of South Africa preclude a just solution of the problem of Namibia.

140. The Islamic Republic of Iran, with its independent foreign policy based on "neither East nor West", has closely observed the struggle of the Namibian people for independence as well as international negotiations to establish an independent State in the last African colony, Namibia. In the past 15 years, United States Administrations have successfully attempted to protect South Africa because of its minerals and its strategic location on the sea lane.

141. President Nixon and Mr. Kissinger had a systematic, gradual approach towards Africa in general and southern Africa in particular. By subordinating the interests of black Africa and increasing their important ties with white régimes in southern Africa—the former Southern Rhodesia and South Africa—they benefited from the natural resources of those countries for the economic survival of the United States. The revolutions in Angola and Mozambique in 1975, which followed the end of Portuguese colonial power in those countries, brought new realities to southern Africa. The shifting balance of power in southern Africa caused President Carter to adopt his so-called humanitarian policy in dealing with the black majority, who were, and still are, active in liberation movements, particularly in southern Africa—namely, in Namibia and South Africa.

142. The Carter policy, in co-operation with the multinational corporations, worked only to appease the oppressed movements fighting against the *apartheid* régime of South Africa in order further to guarantee the industrial and economic survival of the United States.

143. Now the military and linkage policy of the Reagan Administration, with its irrelevant pre-conditions, has created a new obstacle to a justified settlement of the Namibian independence. That Administration has continued to further its own interests in South Africa by the strengthening of military, economic and intelligence ties, thereby supporting the racist régime's aggressiveness and its continued domination of the Namibian people through overt and shameless intervention in Namibia.

144. The colonialist and imperialist forces, along with the racist usurpers, have for years dominated and plundered the human and natural resources of the African people. The inhuman policies of the "civilized" colonizers, mainly arising from their racist attitude and their superiority complexes, must be taken seriously into account. It is time that all elements, forces and Governments dedicated to the freedom and independence of oppressed peoples condemned the illegal occupation and domination of Namibia by the *apartheid* régime and all its imperialist and Zionist cohorts, and whole-heartedly supported the just and heroic struggle of the Namibian people.

145. In the view of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the aforementioned negotiations and political approaches will only delay the prompt establishment of an independent State and self-determination for the Namibian people. An impartial settlement is only attainable through co-operation among the members of the OAU, the Non-Aligned Movement and SWAPO and the front-line States, within the framework of the immediate implementation of resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978). Furthermore, the removal of South Africa from membership in the United Nations would guarantee progress in the attainment of independence by Namibia.

146. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Canada. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

147. Mr. PELLETIER (Canada) (*interpretation from French*): I am grateful to you, Sir, and to the Council for having given Canada the opportunity of participating in this debate, the subject of which is of crucial importance not only for the people of Namibia but also for the future of the whole of southern Africa. It is a particular pleasure for me to be able to participate under your presidency, in view of the long-standing co-operation between our two countries. I am confident that you will succeed in enabling the Council to produce constructive results and to bring us closer to our objective: freedom and independence for Namibia.

[*The speaker continued in English.*]

148. Before turning to that issue, I want to join earlier speakers in expressing dismay at the recent South African attack on targets in Mozambique. Canada condemns that attack in violation of Mozambique's sovereignty, just as it condemns the recent act of violence in South Africa. Both involved loss of life and injury to innocent victims. This pattern must be broken. We know change must and will come in South Africa; we hope it comes soon and in peace. For acts of terrorism and raids across national boundaries can only lead to the heightening of tension in the region and the risk of broader conflict.

149. For us in the Council, these events must also underline the urgent need to end the conflict in Namibia and to implement the United Nations settlement plan.

150. As one of the initiators and drafters of the United Nations settlement plan for Namibia in 1978, Canada deeply regrets that the Council is still seized of the issue five years later and that the people of Namibia are still unable to exercise their right to self-determination. We appreciate and share the concerns of the international community which have prompted the call for this series of Council meetings.

151. Earlier this week, the representative of the United Kingdom, Sir John Thomson, gave a comprehensive account of the negotiating history of this issue [*2439th meeting*]. He outlined the special initiatives that led to the

formulation of the United Nations settlement plan and Council resolution 435 (1978). He spelled out the committed effort undertaken by the contact group following the setback at Geneva to resolve the remaining problems and to clear the way for the implementation of the United Nations plan. I shall not therefore deal at length with the history of the issue. Suffice it to say that the intensive efforts which have been devoted to these negotiations during the past five years have resulted in a substantial body of agreement.

152. That body of agreement has unfortunately fallen short till now of what is needed to secure implementation of a plan which no one challenges in itself. As Sir John suggested, this is not, however, the time to falter in our commitment or our efforts. It is rather a time to persist, to build on what we have already achieved and to succeed.

153. I should like in this context to thank the Secretary-General for his recent report, [*S/15776*], which summarizes the activities of those involved in the negotiations for a settlement over the past two years. All members are well aware that when the Secretary-General took office he identified Namibia as one of his highest priorities. His frequent consultations and expressions of concern for the issue have added to the international pressure for a solution.

154. Recognition should also be given to the dedication shown by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Namibia, Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, and the Secretariat as a whole. The work they have done in preparing for the civilian and military components of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) has contributed immensely to the readiness of the United Nations to undertake the task which will face it on the day of implementation.

155. The special contribution of the front-line States and Nigeria also deserves recognition. They have been unceasing in their efforts and have afforded close co-operation in the negotiations aimed at the early implementation of resolution 435 (1978). The constructive attitude of our African partners has been important throughout our latest talks.

156. Their co-operation enabled substantial progress to be made during the intensive consultations last summer. During those consultations, difficult issues were addressed and resolved to the satisfaction of those involved in the negotiating process in Washington and New York. Understandings were reached on how to ensure the fairness and impartiality of the settlement process and on the deployment of UNTAG. All parties agreed to a set of principles concerning the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution for an independent Namibia. These have been published in a Council document [*S/15287*].

157. As a result of these consultations, the only issues which remain outstanding are, first, the electoral system to be employed in choosing the members of the Constituent Assembly—and the context of the decision has been defined—and, secondly, some technical questions related to the composition of the military component of UNTAG.

158. In the light of the progress made, representatives of the front-line States, Nigeria, SWAPO and the contact group met the Secretary-General on 24 September 1982 to report on the understandings that had been reached and to indicate what remained to be done. It was common to all that insuperable obstacles remained in the context of resolution 435 (1978).

159. Over the years of these negotiations, many issues have been addressed by one side or the other. Many obstacles have been overcome through discussions involving the United Nations, the front-line States, SWAPO, South Africa and the contact group. The legitimate interests of all the parties involved in the settlement plan have been weighed and taken into account.

160. These efforts have been made against the background of South Africa's illegal occupation of the Territory. What remains to be achieved is its acquiescence and participation in the implementation of the United Nations plan.

161. As the Secretary-General has pointed out, South Africa has raised another issue in the region—outside the mandate of the contact group—a condition for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). These two matters have a relationship only in so far as one of the parties chooses to draw them together. Canada for its part does not accept the concept that the resolution of one should be conditional upon the resolution of the other. It is none the less evident that these regional security concerns exist and pose an obstacle. We understand they are being dealt with separately in bilateral talks. We hope that they may be resolved quickly with full respect for the sovereignty of the States concerned and that the people of Namibia may be given the opportunity to exercise their right to self-determination.

162. Our regret at past delays in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) does little to comfort those who must still face dislocation, conflict and the denial of political and human rights in Namibia. It is against this background that I should like to make three points.

163. The first is that an immediate peaceful settlement is unquestionably in the best interests of all of the people of Namibia and of the countries bordering Namibia, including South Africa. That must be our guiding consideration. There is no other factor that can have equal weight with my Government or with the Council.

164. Secondly, it is not a question of whether Namibia will achieve independence. It is a question of how soon it will do so and under what conditions. Canada will continue to exert its best efforts to ensure that the transition to independence comes soon and in conditions of peace.

165. That brings me to my third point. The people of Namibia have suffered in recent years not only from con-

tinuing conflict but also from conditions of uncertainty and protracted drought. They will face many challenges following independence, including the momentous challenge of developing their country and bringing benefits to all of its people. My Government's hope is that they may be enabled to address those challenges in the context of co-operation within the region and with the support of all the countries which have shown a lively interest in the future of Namibia.

166. So far as Canada is concerned, I wish to leave no doubt that we should be happy to develop measures of economic co-operation with an independent Namibia, as we have with Zimbabwe and other countries following their independence. We look forward to that opportunity and also to the prospect of stability in the region. For we believe that the establishment of an independent and fully representative Government in Namibia and the end of conflict will also increase opportunities for economic co-operation throughout the region.

[*The speaker resumed in French.*]

167. Finally, I would say to all those who have been following the debate that we envisage for this region a future that will make it possible to strengthen peace and security in southern Africa, despite the fears and the mistrusts that today are impeding progress. Those of us who have sought a peaceful and negotiated solution in Namibia will not lose interest once that objective has been attained. I should like to recall in this context that the Commonwealth Heads of Government in 1975 stated that they were ready to have Namibia join them after independence. I am convinced that they would be only too happy soon to receive a reply to their invitation from the Government of a free and independent Namibia. Bearing in mind the very special responsibility borne by the United Nations and the Council with regard to Namibia, my Government hopes that this debate and the already assured adoption of a constructive resolution will speed up the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). The people of Namibia deserves peace and independence. They must be allowed to decide their own fate as soon as possible.

168. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Mexico. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

169. Mr. MUÑOZ LEDO (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): It is fortunate that this debate is taking place under the presidency of a distinguished and eminent African whose diplomatic gifts have earned him the esteem and respect of the United Nations. We should like to thank him most fraternally—as well as the other members of the Council—for giving us the opportunity to speak today.

170. Mexico's militancy in the matter of the struggle for decolonization has been a corner-stone of its foreign policy, hence our active participation in efforts to secure the independence of Namibia and the elimination of *apartheid*, as well as our efforts to isolate the Pretoria régime in order to ensure respect for human rights in that country and the freedom of the peoples of southern Africa.

171. We have repeatedly denounced the flagrant violation of the international legal order represented by the occupation of Namibia and the consequent defiance of the authority of the United Nations and affront to Member States, particularly those which have accepted the responsibility of being members of the United Nations Council for Namibia, which, in spite of its efforts, has not succeeded in fulfilling its functions as the Administering Authority for the Territory.

172. My country has scrupulously observed the oil embargo; we have striven to make the arms embargo effective and have come out in favour of the application of appropriate measures to end the support and supplies enjoyed by the Pretoria régime.

173. As far back as last September, we came to the Council to ask for the adoption of the conclusions and recommendations of the report submitted in 1980 by the Security Council Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of South Africa [*S/14179*], over which my delegation had the honour of presiding. Unfortunately, our request was not granted and with the continuance of the violation of the embargoes there has been a strengthening of South Africa's impunity, which lies at the very base of its occupation of Namibia.

174. The impatience of the international community at the slow pace of the Namibian independence process is more than justified. The optimism aroused by the adoption of resolution 435 (1978) has now turned into general frustration. There is every ground for believing that the path taken so far should be substantially changed and that respect for the will of the Council should be enforced through the means provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.

175. The delegation of Mexico has taken this stand for some years now. In May 1980, at the extraordinary plenary meetings of the United Nations Council for Namibia, held at Algiers, we pointed out that the time-limits we had granted to the Pretoria régime had expired and that South Africa must without delay comply with the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. We asserted that there was no longer any reason for waiting and we should not wait.

176. It was clear then that the Pretoria régime had set in train and alternative strategy aimed at replacing the United Nations plan by another of a neo-colonialist type, based on the exclusion of the authentic fighters for independence and the strengthening of its regional hegemony.

177. In June 1980, we referred in this forum to the web of international complicity developed by South Africa and the great success it had achieved in managing to have its own interests included in global strategies and fears. We observed that, thanks to that support, the Pretoria régime

had demonstrated its hostility to the United Nations plan and had increased its efforts to consolidate its illegal occupation. [*See 2229th meeting, paras. 10 and 12.*]

178. In January 1981, in the face of the failure of the Geneva pre-implementation meeting, we suggested here that the South African Government perhaps had some grounds for supposing that there did not exist a genuine commitment on the part of all Member States to the independence plan. Three months later [*2274th meeting*], we stated that the limits of tolerance had already been exceeded and called on the Council to take immediate decisions to safeguard its honour and future.

179. At that time we were facing the danger of acceptance of a thesis—the London memorandum—which referred to measures giving "greater confidence to all of the parties on the future of an independent Namibia" [*S/14457, annex*]. Acceptance of that argument would mean contradicting squarely the principle of self-determination and supporting a correlation of forces favourable to the occupying country.

180. There were two options facing the Council: to grant further concessions to South Africa or to exert effective pressure on South Africa. It was indispensable to make it clear to the Pretoria régime that the flexibility of the front-line States and SWAPO was not to be taken as a sign of weakness and that the action recommended to the Western Powers was not susceptible of any ambiguity.

181. When our appeal was not heeded and decisions called for by the events were not taken, the Council gave an equivocal sign of greater tolerance towards South Africa and opened up a new chapter in the occupation, based now on allegedly ideological reasons.

182. In March 1981, in the plenary General Assembly, my delegation referred to the growing practice of seeking to impose unilateral solutions on problems that were within the competence of the Organization. It was necessary, we said, to adopt a new course of action and to bring to bear all the means at our disposal to exert constant pressure on Pretoria and those States which were encouraging and supporting the South African régime in its obstinate defiance of the international community.[9]

183. We asserted that the presence of South Africa in Namibia was something which had been acquiesced in by those who could have prevailed upon South Africa to cease its occupation. We thought the time had come to make a decision: either to comply with the principles of the Organization, or to sacrifice a few States on the altar of expediency.[10]

184. We also pointed out that the battle for decolonization should not be affected by a narrow bipolar conception of the world, and that the recrudescence of international tensions were having a very severe effect on the activities of the United Nations, in this and other regions, which suddenly found themselves raised to the rank of strategic border zones.[11]

185. In May of that same year, in the course of the International Conference on Sanctions against South Africa, held in Paris, we stressed the need to avoid the raising of considerations of a global nature which distorted the actual nature of the problem. We said that the issue was that of putting an end to colonialism in Africa, which should in no way be allowed to be confused with super-Power rivalry. The best way of maintaining international security, we added, was by saving the peoples and territories of the third world from conflicts which were alien to them.

186. In September 1981, at the eighth emergency special session of the General Assembly, we rejected the theses that attempt to reduce revolutionary movements of developing countries to mere conspiracies or mechanical reflections of the East-West confrontation. We repeated our warning against hegemonic solutions: we came out in favour of the peaceful way of resisting conflicts in southern Africa, the Middle East and Central America, while safeguarding in all cases the principles of the Charter and the competence of the United Nations.[12]

187. We have ventured to offer this summary of the facts and positions because we believe that in this case history is particularly illuminating. The path of concessions to South Africa clearly was not leading to the independence of Namibia, and this problem, whose origins are as clear as its nature is undisputed, has thus become blurred; indeed, it has been diverted into a struggle for world dominance.

188. The decisions adopted by the General Assembly and by the Security Council do not admit of interpretations and commit all States. On few occasions has right and morality been so clearly defined in a matter of self-determination. Whatever element or condition may be added to the resolutions adopted, it is just a pretext for prolonging colonial domination.

189. We still have time to change our course. My delegation welcomes the decision adopted by the Non-Aligned Movement, which initiated this debate. We also welcome the overwhelming participation of Member States and the high quality of their statements, which without any doubt reflect the will of the international community.

190. The report of the Secretary-General [*S/15776*] is proof of his interest in the subject and his good judgement. It contains observations which warrant our serious consideration, in particular his expression of regret that the process has been set back by the emergence of other issues which were neither raised nor envisaged at the time resolution 435 (1978) was adopted, or in the subsequent negotiations, and that factors outside the scope of that resolution should hamper its implementation.

191. My Government is pleased that the Secretary-General considers the question of Namibia as a special responsibility in the light of its importance to international peace and security. In so doing, he is renewing the commitment to bring to bear his authority in the peace-

ful solution of controversies and in support of efforts at negotiation to be undertaken by Member States in keeping with the Charter.

192. The resolution unanimously adopted this morning contains elements that are indispensable for initiating a new course of action. We trust that a correct reading of it will serve to reject any idea of linkage or parallelism with regional or global situations, arguments that have been used as an excuse for continuing to violate adopted decisions.

193. My delegation wishes to take this opportunity to congratulate the United Nations Council for Namibia upon its efforts, so far inconclusive, and to repeat our firm solidarity with the Governments and peoples of Africa, which, in spite of acts of aggression, interference and reprisals, have persisted in their heroic struggle against domination.

194. The Security Council should remain vigilant, ever prepared to take the necessary measures if its resolutions are not promptly complied with. It is essential to prevent the prevailing neo-colonialist designs and ambitions from becoming the norm in relations between powerful States and their neighbours. It is necessary to avoid, in this and other regions of conflict in the world, a situation where hegemonic interests are pursued in defiance of the norms of international law and the will of the United Nations.

195. The **PRESIDENT** (*interpretation from French*): The last speaker is the representative of the United Nations Council for Namibia, to whom the Security Council issued an invitation at its 2439th meeting. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

196. Mr. LUSAKA: Mr. President, I thank you once more for calling on me. Our debate on the question of Namibia is now coming to a close. May I also thank your Minister for Foreign Affairs and you personally for the efficient way in which both of you have guided our deliberations. We have all benefited from your wisdom and experience.

197. Our thanks go also to the delegations that joined us in these deliberations, especially the Ministers for Foreign Affairs who have travelled to New York to participate in the debate. The level and quality of participation, not to mention the number of speakers, have demonstrated the global importance of the question of Namibia.

198. When I addressed this Council at its 2439th meeting, on 23 May, I stated that our major objective for coming to the Council was to call on it to reassert its authority in the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia as approved in resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978). We urged that all consultations on the implementation of this plan should be conducted within the United Nations framework.

199. Nearly all of the speakers who have addressed the Council during our deliberations have stated their commitment to the early attainment of independence by Namibia. We hope we can anticipate the same from those who have yet to speak. Nearly all of us have spoken in a measured and restrained tone. However, let no one misread our restraint as a sign of weakening in our support for the struggle of the Namibian people for independence. We stated that we had not come here for confrontation. We stated that all of us should join together in finding ways to implement the United Nations plan on Namibia.

200. In resolution 532 (1983), adopted by the Council this morning, the Council decided to mandate the Secretary-General to undertake consultations with the parties concerned with a view to securing the speedy implementation of resolution 435 (1978). The Council requested the Secretary-General to report to it on the results of these consultations not later than 31 August 1983. The resolution further called upon South Africa to co-operate forthwith and fully with the Secretary-General in order to expedite the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) for the early independence of Namibia.

201. A review of the statements made in the Council in favour of Namibia's independence shows that they contain a common element. There is unanimity with regard to the essentials concerning the implementation of the United Nations plan on Namibia, which every one of us has accepted as the only basis for an internationally-recognized settlement. This unanimity of views is also reflected in the assessment as to how the implementation of the United Nations plan has hindered by issues that are extraneous to the plan itself.

202. I wish to refer to two statements made in the course of this debate. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that his Government agreed with the Secretary-General in reporting that "—as far as the United Nations is concerned the only outstanding issues are the choice of the electoral system and the settlement of some final problems relating to UNTAG and its composition". [*2439th meeting, para. 55.*] He also categorically stated that "These are indeed the only outstanding problems under resolution 435 (1978)." [*Ibid.*]

203. The second statement I should like to refer to is that of the representative of the United States. She stated:

> "Because of the substantial progress that has been made over the past two years, only two major issues remain to be resolved in preparation for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). These are: the choice of the electoral system to be employed in the elections, which all parties are agreed must be settled in accordance with the provisions of resolution 435 (1978) and in a manner that does not cause delay; and final technical matters concerning the composition of the military component of UNTAG.
>
> ". . .
>
> "We share the concern that the factors relating to the regional situation in southern Africa, which are,

> however, outside the scope of the mandate of the contact group have not yet permitted implementation of the United Nations plan." [*2443rd meeting, paras. 186 and 189.*]

204. In these remarks we perceive a clear acceptance by the United States of the fact that extraneous issues that are irrelevant to the question of Namibia are hindering the progress towards the attainment of independence by Namibia.

205. Both the United Kingdom and the United States representatives referred to the suffering of the people of Namibia and to the sense of frustration. So, if they do indeed sympathize with the people of Namibia in their quest for liberation, they should translate this sympathy into action, and do so now.

206. No one in history has succeeded for long in suppressing the yearnings for freedom that emanate from oppressed people. There are those who in the not-too-distant past vowed that freedom for the people they oppressed would not come in their lifetime. Yet they have lived to see themselves being proved wrong. What has happened elsewhere will certainly happen in Namibia.

207. But it is our duty to see that the independence of Namibia does not cause more bloodshed, more refugees, more suffering, more loss of life. We have a plan, the United Nations plan, that guarantees a peaceful transition of Namibia to independence. We all accept it and agree on its essentials. What then are we waiting for? If we are collectively to shoulder our responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations we must act together now in the interest of the liberation of Namibia.

208. Nearly three score speakers have come before the Council to manifest how peace and freedom for Namibia are an integral part of international peace and security. They, like us in the United Nations Council for Namibia, have called for an immediate end to the illegal occupation of Namibia. They, like us, have called on Pretoria to make a firm commitment as to its readiness to comply with Security Council resolution 435 (1978). They, like us, have called for the fullest measure of co-operation with the Secretary-General in order to expedite the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). As we anxiously await the report of the Secretary-General to this body by 31 August, we shall remain vigilant. In our painful vigil we shall draw comfort from the fact that the question of Namibia is now back where it belongs internationally: within the United Nations framework.

The meeting rose at 6.50 p.m.

NOTES

[1] See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 1.*

[2] *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971*, p. 16.

[3] See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 24*, Vol. I, annex II.

[4] See *Report of the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, Paris, 25-29 April 1983* (A/CONF.120/13), part three.

[5] See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 24*, part three, chap. II, sect. 5(b), para. 11.

[6] A/CONF.120/3–A/AC.131/91 and Corr. 1 and 2.

[7] A/CONF.120/4–A/AC.131/92.

[8] See *Report of the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, Paris, 25-29 April 1983* (A/CONF.120/13), annex IV, sect. A.1.

[9] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 109th meeting, paras. 173 and 175.

[10] *Ibid.*, paras. 182 and 183.

[11] *Ibid.*, paras. 192–194.

[12] *Ibid., Eighth Emergency Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 9th meeting, paras. 30–39.

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Litho in United Nations, New York 00400 90-60205—April 1991—2,050